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This thesis makes a distinction between screen and surface. It proposes that an inquiry into
screens includes, but is not limited to, the study of surfaces. Screens and screening practices are
about doing both divisions and vision. The habit of reducing screens to the display neglects their
capacity to emplace separations (think of folding screens). In this thesis an investigation of screens
becomes a matter of asking how surfaces and the gaps in between them articulate alignments of
people and things with displays that, in practice, always leave something out of sight. Rather than
losing touch with screens by reducing them to surfaces, in other words, I am interested in alternative
screen configurations. For this task I sketch an approach that touches on screens through the figures
of lines, surfaces, textures, folds, knots and cuts. Lines help me to make the case for thinking about
screens as alignments. I then ask what kinds of observers emerge from reducing screens to single or
digital surfaces. I trace that concern with Google Glass, a pair of “smartglasses” with a transparent
display. To distinguish between screen and surface I suggest, through a study of biodetection and
assistance dogs, how to qualify or texture screens within webs of relations. I further outline, with
snapshots  of  my  workplace  and  two  screens  named  Vig  and  Ben,  two  modes  of  touching  or
un/en/folding  their  locations.  Finally,  with  knots  and  cuts,  I  underline  the  unfolding  of  self
checkouts  in  supermarkets,  and  the  enfolding  of  automated  tellers  outside  banks.  All  of  these
reconfigurations experiment with screens by moving sideways in order to approach their displays
laterally, and make visible their (ab)use by those in power. This method is a way of grasping the
embodiment and the materiality of screens, while responding to the practices, agencies, and affects
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Chapter 1. Moving Sideways
Late  in  December  of  2014,  the  National  Geographic  Channel's  series  “Crowd Control”
screened an episode on the dangers of walking and texting with smart phones on the street.1 It
addressed,  in  the mode of  an experimental  reportage of  population behaviour,  the reduction of
peripheral  vision of people walking and texting (National  Geographic 2014).  With some funky
background  music,  the  show begins  by  proposing  that  people  who  walk  and text  are  clueless
regarding their surroundings. As a test to support this assertion the host introduces us to Joe, a
person wearing a gorilla costume who walks around the streets in Washington DC, wearing dark
glasses,  eating  bananas,  and reading a  newspaper.  Joe  appears  to  put  bystanders  into  a  public
situation articulated as an exercise, to distinguish between those who notice him and those who
don't.  So people walking by allegedly fail  to see Joe,  as they seem too preoccupied with their
screens. 
This dissertation is also about how people may miss what is around and away from the
display  of  screens.  It  is  less  concerned,  however,  with  walking and texting.  Attending to  their
surroundings while  walking and texting entails  a  risk that  people seem to manage,  I  think,  by
iteratively looking at the display and around their smart phones, juggling with the screen and the
street, switching their attention between these surfaces.2 Only when that practice fails people do
seem problematically to lose their grasp of what lies beyond their displays.3 This thesis is about
1 http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/crowd-control/videos/walking-while-texting/  (last accessed 08/01/16)
2 I do not mean surface as an abstract plane beyond the screen, but simply that attending to the surfaces situated
around the display of the screen, like the pavement of the street and the colours of the traffic lights, matters for
walking and texting. 
3 Breakdowns of action with screens are generative for becoming aware of what is around and away from their
displays; a sound, for example, can redirect people's attention around them. But one may also bump into other
people and things, which is what seems risky about text-walking: people can break their bodies. The expression
“juggling” means to attend around, through, and away from screens,  an attempt to grasp both their flows and
breakdowns.
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that: staying with the trouble of grasping screens by considering what is beyond their displays.
Rather than failure to notice one’s surroundings, the analytical problem is losing touch with screens
by reducing them to singular or digital displays. Here we will consider an alternative approach to
screens, one that pays attention to displays but also aims to grasp in complementary ways what
comprises the screen beyond the display. 
What  is  a  screen?  A Google search ramifies  this  question  in  all  sorts  of  directions.  An
interesting  report  posted  early  in  2016,  on  the  Samsung company  website  for  mobile  devices,
informs us that this  year the market for TV displays may change.4 Quoting the journal “Korea
Times”,5 the  article  states  that  LG  and  Samsung,  the  giant  South  Korean  manufacturers  that
dominate the TV display industry, will reduce their production to prevent operating losses against
their Chinese competitors. In another search result, a piece by the popular website mashable.com,6
we are told more about the histories of screens, including TVs. The website illustrates the creation,
application,  and variation of  screening components and practices.  These range from the use of
cathode ray tubes (CRT), light emitting diodes (LED), or liquid-crystals (LCD) to plasma (seen as
the foundational materials for television and computer displays); to the popularisation of touch-
screens, high definition, and three dimensional image devices; and finally the prediction of future
screen technologies that feature virtual realities as well as curved, flexible displays. 
This is all intriguing, but I am struck that these online stories seem to define screens just as
displays.  The  trouble  in  confusing  screens  with  displays  is  the  blind  spot  that  such viewpoint
articulates.  By conflating  displays  with  screens  one  can  miss  what  screens  leave  out  of  sight.
Instead, looking beyond the display allows us to grasp what screens separate or divide, and what
4 http://www.sammobile.com/2016/01/04/samsung-display-and-lg-display-to-cut-down-on-production-this-year/        
(last accessed 01/08/16)
5 http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/2016/01/133_194425.html  (last accessed 08/01/16)
6 http://mashable.com/2015/01/06/screen-display-tech-ces/#_gW1k0Gwkkql  (last accessed 01/02/16)
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they sometimes hide from view. This is a mundane matter as it touches all sorts of screens and
screening activities. Why undertake a study of screens? In the middle of a decade when screens
appear relentlessly to demand the attention of people, and things are increasingly equipped with
them, the point is to sketch a method to grasp screens less as objects that absorb time, energy, or
desire,  and more as powerful  companions that  rearticulate  practices,  agencies,  and affects.  The
method advocates moving sideways from the concentration of attention, the extraction of values,
and the exploitation of people and things touched by screens. This is not a normative but an open-
ended, contingent, situated inquiry into screens, composed by grasping their empirical, material and
semiotic relations with people and things. 
Screenness
I have worked with screens myself during the writing of this thesis, in different places. I
have taken photos in public squares with my phone or sat on the floor of a packed train to scribble
my ideas. Today I write this in the living room of my shared house, in front of my laptop screen, on
a Tuesday morning. The lights of the room are off. I set the brightness of the display low to test how
the screenness of this screen partly relies on the materials of the laptop, showing this line with a
specific  brightness  and resolution,  a  luminous intensity  and granularity  of  pixels that  my older
screens  in  the  office  cannot  reproduce.  I  may also consider  how the  screenness  of  this  screen
depends on the materials of the living room. For instance the pale daylight shining through the
window may be  filtered  out  by  closing  the  curtains,  changing how I  perceive  the  screen.  The
screenness of the screen in this sense rests on heterogeneous materials. Note that some of them are
framed as on screen, while some of them are screened out. Screenness I want to suggest is a twofold
act. Screens screen/out. The screen's display brings something into view and leaves something out
of sight.
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Screenness relates to all sorts of framing activities. Let's think about this with a clip7 of
Michael Jackson's entrance at the Super Bowl in 1993 (a popular sports event, the championship
game of  the  U.S  National  Football  League,  where  pop  stars  like  Jackson  feature  as  mid-time
entertainment). The framing of his act  is embedded in a short television clip,  which is in itself
another kind of framing. The camera first pans over the audience and zooms in on a giant screen
mounted on the wall of the stadium. The screen, remaining black for a second, suddenly flashes
silver lights to introduce Jackson on screen.  He makes his  signature dance-kick-move and then
disappears from view, only to reappear in flesh and bone on top of the frame of the display. Here
Jackson's clip is helpful to address screens, frames,  and displays. What I mean when I  say the
screen's display (or simply display) is everything within the frame of a screen. In the case of the
television clip the show or display first took place within the frame of the screen of the stadium.
Frames  are  quite  literally  for  me the  material  enclosing  of  what  screens  display.  Frames  draw
attention to the screen's display – a move that enacts the selection of something specific that is
brought into view and something else that is left out of sight – insofar the focus remains on the
screen. That is the twofold act of screens, and what we learn with Jackson's clip is that what a
screen brings into view and leaves out of sight may be dynamic. What screens display or make
present on screen may become manifestly absent – or made present off screen in cases such as
Jackson's clip. 
This way of grasping the frame of screens borrows the distinction between presence and
manifest absence from John Law's method assemblage (2004: 14, 42, 84). Methods for Law are
enactments that  construct knowledges by assembling or performing the realities under  scrutiny.
Methods are as partial and situated as the knowledges and realities they co-produce (2004: 68, 83,
see also Haraway 1988, Strathern 1991). How does this help to grasp screens? Note that Law is
7 http://i.imgur.com/J6gXUqB.gifv   (last accessed 09/2/16)
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suggesting  that  we  take  knowledge  as  enactment instead  of  representation,8 so  in  the  case  of
studying screens  or  employing  screens  for  knowledge practices,  what  is  brought  into  view on
screens or through their displays should not be framed as a representation, but as the result of a
bundle  of  “ramifying  relations  that  generate  presence,  manifest  absence,  and  Otherness”  (Law
2004:42). In this sense Law provides a distinction with which to grasp the frame of the big screen in
Jackson's clip, for example. In the clip the frame first helps him to come into view on screen (to
become present  through the display)  and then to  become manifestly absent from it  in order  to
reappear on top of the frame. What about Otherness? Here we may let loose the frame of the screen
to grasp what the display leaves out of sight. Presence and manifest absence may happen through
and  around  the  display  of  screens  –  but  Otherness  is  a  kind  of  absence  that  is  not  manifest,
something that is completely left out of sight, although it remains necessary, in the case of screens,
for what is brought into view. The walls of the stadium in the clip, for instance, or the infrastructure
required for the screen to take part of the history, politics, and economics of Jackson's constitution
as a celebrity. The distinction between screen, frame, and display can be drawn in this way:9
Figure 0. Display, frame, and screen
8 “And it is the word ‘practice’ that is the key. If new realities ‘out-there’ and new knowledge of those realities ‘in-
here’ are to be created, then practices that can cope with a hinterland of pre-existing social and material realities
also have to be built up and sustained” (Law 2004:13).
9 In this drawing “distinction is perfect continence” (Spencer Brown 1972:1). The display is contained by the frame
contained by the screen. 
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Embodiments
I have suggested so far that the screenness of screens depends on materials, bodies, and
relations of people and things; these generate presence, manifest absence, and Otherness around,
through, and away from the frames and displays of screens. This way of thinking about screens
echoes  various  aspects  of  other  approaches  to  screens  in  the  field  in  which  I  position  myself,
Science  and  Technology  Studies  (STS).  Screens  have  been approached  in  STS through highly
diverse issues; for instance, financial markets (Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger 2000, 2002), protein folds
(Myers 2008), and robotic rovers (Vertesi 2015). Karin Knorr-Cetina and Urs Bruegger in their
work on the global microstructures of financial markets (2002) have paid careful attention to the
screens of traders,  stressing how their  displays bring markets into being. On screen the market
becomes  something  traders  may  locally  attach  themselves  to;  like  people  in  supermarkets,  the
financial  market  becomes through the display an object  of  attachment  (2000).  This  means that
traders  “strap  themselves  to  their  seats  to  bring  up  their  screens”  (Knorr-Cetina  &  Bruegger
2000:146),  which become the “medium of  existence” of  the market  (Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger
2000:146), insofar as traders remain glued to the display, “their body and the screen world melting
together  in what  appears to be a total  immersion in  the actions in which they are taking part”
(Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger 2000:146).10
10 Screens, in turn, encapsulate the market on screen. Enveloped within the frame of their displays, the market exist
for traders at work, following Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger, “only on screen, where it comes as close as one can get
to the ethnomethodological sense of a locally produced phenomenon” (2000:146). At the same time the authors
affirm that “the screens themselves are of course global rather than local” (2000:146). They propose taking the
screen as representing a faceless global community of participants, engaged in “real-time” exchanges. And “the
question to ask is whether the idea of embeddedness can be extended to global domains whose participants are not,
as in traditional communities, in one another's physical response presence and represent anonymous aggregates”
(Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger 2000:161). As emphasized above, here we may move away from representation –
while still agreeing with both authors on how “temporal mechanisms, and the common orientation of participants to
an object on screen, may constitute a basis for a postsocial form of 'intersubjectivity'” (Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger
2000:161). We may specify that screens appear global because what is made present on screen travels within a
network of displays that brings the financial market into view. And what the screens leave out of sight either as
manifest absence or Otherness can be grasped as a local or global extension of this market embedded on the screen
of the traders. 
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Like Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger,  Natasha Myers considers what is  made present on the
screen;  in  her  case,  with  crystallographers  sculpting  “embodied  models  alongside  the  digital
renderings they craft onscreen” (2008:163). Noting how chemists articulate their bodies to figure
out  processes  of  protein folding,  she argues  that  digital  models  of  protein  structure “acquire  a
materiality and tangibility through their manipulation onscreen” (2008:178). So Myers shows us
that  the “in between” of a screen is  always an embodiment.  Screens render things present and
absent  in  fleshy ways.  Specifying  the  body-work of  Diane,  a  participant  in  Myers'  study,  she
describes how Diane's gesticulations carve out “the space of the computer screen […] With her
hands clasped and pulsing around invisible objects, she conveys the density and textures of the
molecules, and their inter-molecular associations, while in the open, gestural space in front of her
she builds  a  model  ‘onscreen’” (2008:178).  Janet  Vertesi  provides another  tangible  example of
screen embodiment in her work on Seeing Like a Rover (2012, 2015). From the point of view of
those navigating these robotic probes – deployed by the US National Space Agency (NASA) –
Vertesi unpacks the body-work of image planning (2015:164), that is using photos to see like a
rover  in  order  to  guide  the  robot's  movements  on Mars.  Telling  us  about  Liz,  a  participant  in
Vertesi's study, she details her grasp of the rover. “Right here [touches chest] is the front of the
rover, my magnets are right here [raises head, touches base of her neck], and my shoulders [touches
shoulders] are the front of the solar panels, and that’s [leans forward, splays both arms out behind
her at forty-five degrees] the rest of it” (2015:164). Liz fleshes out the rover from images on screen.
Matters of screen embodiment have been also a concern for authors interested in digital
identity  and ontology,  like Sherry Turkle  and Katherine Hayles.  In  Life  On The Screen Turkle
(1995) invites us into the worlds of those who construct their identities online. Turkle's focus on the
screen traces  the connections  between people's  selves  and simulation,  and the consequences  of
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“taking things  at  interface  value”  (1995:19-26,  102-124).  In  particular  her  approach to  screens
captures people facing displays when framed as “interfaces” that would make it possible to “step
through the  looking glass”  (1995:9)  into  virtual  cyberspace  worlds,  which  is  a  story rooted  in
science  and  fiction.  From cyberspace  Turkle  unpacks  how  people  shape  multiple  fluid  selves
constituted in interaction (Turkle 1995:15).  Drawing on a similar trope, that of human-machine
cyborgs, Hayles in  How We Became Posthuman (1999) looked at “posthuman” embodiments of
technology,  the more-than-human meshing of  organisms and machines.  For  Hayles,  posthuman
metaphors  privilege “informational  pattern over  material  instantiation,  so that  embodiment  in  a
biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life” (1999:2)
which correlates to perspectives found in cybernetics, information theory,  and cognitive science
among other disciplines. The posthuman divides and reattaches “the material body that exists on
one side of the screen and the computer simulacra that seem to create a space inside the screen”
(Hayles  1999:20).  Such  screens  would  allow  people  to  dwell  in  cyberspace,  to  leave  behind
“unoccupied  shells”  (Hayles  1999:38),  by  stepping  over  a  boundary  that  splits  actuality  from
virtuality (Hayles 1999:258). 
Alignments
Screens are about division as much as they are about vision, something that is difficult to
grasp when one is into the habit of only looking at screens as digital displays. Instead, take for
example  how folding  screens  divide  one  place  from another,  or  how firescreens  are  meant  to
protect.  Screens  in  their  material  and allegorical  variety have been extensively explored within
Media and Cultural Studies. This field has detailed screens, for instance, as surfaces for projection
in  the  emergence  of  cinema  (Musser  1994),  and  as  “virtual  windows”  used  widely  in  art,
architecture,  television,  and  computing  (Friedberg  2006).  It  has  also  explored  the  diversity  of
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screens  and screening artefacts  [devices  such as  cameras  obscuras,  panoramas,  magic  lanterns,
shadow theatres, diaphanoramas, stereoscopes or peeping boxes (Huhtamo 2004)] by suggesting
archaeological  and genealogical  methodologies  (Manovich  1995,  Gere 2006)  and the  historical
unravelling of “screen making” practices (Musser 1994:15). Through careful attention to screen
embodiments,  these studies have also raised questions  and proposed suggestions  to account for
screen agency – Erkki Huhtamo for instance has encouraged researchers to pay attention to the
“shifts of perception between nothing less than ontological realms that take place when [people]
move their gaze from the screen to other humans, to the surrounding landscape, to another screen,
and back again in rapid succession” (2012:144). We learn with them that screens are difficult to
look at. Never a neutral medium of presenting information, screens for Lev Manovich (1995) are
aggressive. They can filter, screen out, take over, and render non-existent what is framed outside
their displays. 
When one approaches what a screen aligns, in an encounter of people and things with a
display that always places something else out of sight, the enactment of such screen alignment
envelops what Lucas Introna and Fernando Ilharco have studied, in phenomenological ways, as
people's experience of screens: the “intentional orientation that conditions our engagement with
certain surfaces  in as much as we comport ourselves towards them as screens” (2006:58). This
attention to the phenomenology of screens and screenness (Introna and Iharco 2004, 2006, 2011)
has benefited from grasping how screens attract attention,  specially in cinema (Sobchack 1992,
1994, 1997; Marks 2000). “What is seen on the screen by the seeing that is the film has a texture
and solidity. This is a vision that knows what it is to touch things in the world, that understands
materiality […] It not only understands the world haptically but also proxemically” writes Vivian
Sobchack  (1992:133).  Stressing,  on  the  other  hand,  the  (hi)stories  and  (public)  enactments  of
images  on  screen,  Media  and  Cultural  Studies  scholars  have  investigated  screens  in  scientific
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filming  (Cartwright  1995),  information  media  (Arnold  2002),  organizational  practices  (Styhre
2013), or urban spaces (Krajina 2009, Simone 2012). 
Novel ways of studying what I name screen alignments, of  attending to screens (Ziewitz
2011) and encountering screenness,  have surfaced from the research of STS scholars  into how
“screens play an increasingly central role in a wide range of human practices” (Winthereik, Lutz,
Suchman  &  Verran  2011:1).  Once  again  writing  against  grasping  screens  as  passive,  inactive
spectators, they suggest taking screens as “participants in the construction of vision and action”
(Winthereik,  Lutz,  Suchman & Verran  2011:1).  Because  screens  in  this  sense  help  to  organize
everyday interactions by aligning people and things with displays, the lesson entails learning to
account for the dis/continuous ways in which screens can be outlined as “cutting off  particular
views and viewers as well  as connecting them. Screens stretch human interactions in  time and
space, and produce new spaces and forms of interaction”  (Winthereik, Lutz, Suchman & Verran
2011:1).  In  this  sense,  the  authors  propose  that  to  grasp  how screens  make people  and things
in/visible or present and absent in relation to one another, we need a relational ontology that can be
traced by taking screens as indexes (ordering devices), or by unpacking their capacities to configure
bodies and practices. Seeing screens as ordering devices that distribute agencies helped scholars to
study screening practices in cases of tax regulation (Boll 2011), school planning (Ratner 2011), and
research collaboration (Bjørn 2011). And attending to reconfigurations of their (digital) displays
afforded the possibility to dis/entangle the screen from/to maps of urban disasters (Petersen 2011)
and transport systems (Valderrama 2011). These approaches aptly encourage the generation of new
accountabilities  and responsibilities,  the latter  by looking well  “beyond the  physical  screen for
reconfigurations in the wider context” (Winthereik, Lutz, Suchman & Verran 2011:2). Screens in
these stories are encountered along with the answerability of “doing ethnography on screens and
screenness” (Winthereik, Lutz, Suchman & Verran 2011:2).
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I have been inspired to think responsibly of matters of screen alignments, and to stay in
touch with  their  materiality,  by Donna Haraway and Karen Barad's  work.  These  feminist  STS
scholars and SF activists11 troubled and changed, with the indivisibility of the material  and the
semiotic,12 my former approach to the cultural and the technological, the social and the natural,
based on the observation of society as an autopoietic system of communication (Luhmann 1995,
2012).  In  this  theory  as  in  others  in  sociology,  materiality  appears  somehow backgrounded  in
communicational processes. It enters the scene in the coupling of the psychic and social systems,
for example, as a fleshy symbiotic element; and also within social systems, for instance as mass
media materiality  acquires  the shape of  infrastructure (Luhmann 2000a:3).13 Haraway's  practice
couldn't be more different; in her queer accounts of objects and subjects of (scientific) knowledge,
people and things are always situated simultaneously as material and semiotic, and no relational
process is exclusively symbolic. Her material-semiotic actors can be seen as generative nodes of
natural  and  social  relations,  whose  open-ended  boundaries  “materialize  in  social  interaction”
(Haraway  1991:208).  Likewise,  Barad  has  proposed that  “existence  is  not  an  individual  affair.
Individuals do not preexist their interactions; rather, individuals emerge through and as part of their
entangled  intra-relating”  (2007:ix).  Her  approach underlines  the  inseparability  of  epistemology,
ontology,  and ethics  (Barad  2007:26);  and the  inevitability  of  interfering  with and through the
making of the world. 
11 Haraway's SF research practice conjoins Science Fact, Speculative Fabulation, String Figures, Science Fiction, So
Far…  
12 “Matter and meaning are not separate elements. They are inextricably fused together, and no event, no matter how
energetic, can tear them asunder” (Barad 2007:3).




Drawing  from this  literature  that  appends  materiality  to  screenness  and  embodiment  to
screens,  and  tracing  the  material  agencies  of  screens  as  alignments  of  people  and  things  with
displays that iteratively bring something into view and leave something out of sight, I begin to
compose the material-semiotic framework for a method to study screens, by grasping how such
alignments  create  presence  and  absence  around,  through,  and  away  from  their  displays.  As
concisely put by Law, material-semiotics “privileges partial perspective, split vision and situated
knowledge,  arguing both that  there  is  no escape  from location  and that  identities,  locations  of
knowledge, politics,  and  action  are  heterogeneous  and  irreducible  rather  than being  coherent”
(2004:160). 
Insofar  as  matters  for  Haraway  take  multiple  rather  than  singular,  or  many  modes  of
“becoming with” which are not translatable (or reducible)  to  one another,  she reminds us with
Marilyn  Strathern  that  it  matters  for  partially  connected  issues  how  thoughts  think  thoughts,
knowledges  know knowledges,  relations  relate  relations,  worlds  world  worlds,  and  stories  tell
stories  (2015:160).14 If  screens  in  their  own  ways  are  heterogeneous  and  irreducible  to  their
displays,  then  it  matters  which  thoughts,  knowledges,  relations,  and  worlds  may  flourish  with
stories  of screens.  Because storytelling matters,  the chapters  of the dissertation tell  stories  that
attempt  to  make  a  difference  between  screens  and  displays,  and  also  to  experiment  with  that
difference. 
This  storytelling  exploration  first  took  the  shape  of  a  portfolio  of  screens  to  collect
interesting  cases.  Along  the  way  some  of  these  screens  were  discarded.  Many  were  cases  of
“cutting-edge” screening technologies. They were cutting off – or so it seemed to me – the views
14 See also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z1uTVnhIHS8&t=1259 (last accessed 11/03/16) 
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and  viewers  of  screens  that  seemed  interesting  not  only  because  of  their  displays.  Then  this
exploration  of  screens  took  the  shape  of  writing  experiments,  of  shaping  voices  to  talk  about
screens.  This  resonated  also  with  a  kind  of  inquiry  that  puts  rhetoric  and reality  or  style  and
substance  together,  by  writing  without  splitting  mind  and  matter  or  facts  and  fictions  (Lynch
2012:465).  Finally  this  exploration  took the  shape  of  a  method or  way of  touching and being
touched by screens. 
Each chapter experiments with screens by writing about them in a specific situation read
with a different figure,  so we'll  come back in the last  chapter to review the method assembled
throughout  the  thesis.  Moving sideways  is  the  gesture  these  experiments  nurture.  Approaching
screens by moving sideways is a matter of paying attention to the ways in which screens align
people and things with displays. To this extent the gesture may be attuned for moving sideways
from particular people and things when encountering screens, but such attunement in turn is an
experimental matter that can go wrong. Moving sideways is not easy because screens are tricky.
Nevertheless, as we go on we'll attempt to avoid the extraction, concentration, and exploitation of
the  attention and values of people and things. This is not only because screens relentlessly demand
more  attention  from people,  and things  are  increasingly  equipped with  them,  but  also  because
screens are helping to make worryingly mundane the collection of valuable information (which
points to issues of privacy), their demands on space and time (which leads to matters of mobility),
and the abuse of screens by those in power. Or at least that is my worry. All chapters provide a
figure to approach screens by moving sideways: (2) lines, (3) surfaces, (4) textures, (5) folds, (6)
knots and (7) cuts. 
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Chapters
There is  more  than  one  way of  putting  these figures  together.  Below I  will  outline  the
chapters,  but if  this  comes across,  perhaps,  as too abstract,  readers can try to jump to the last
chapter, where we will review in detail how moving sideways helps to approach screens. Once
there,  it  is  possible  to  continue  anywhere  else  in  the  dissertation.  I  was  inspired  to  make  the
structure  porous by a  novel  from Julio  Cortazar  named “Hopscotch”.  The plot  of  this  book is
assembled in an open-ended way, and Cortazar tells readers at the beginning that they can hop, or
jump through the chapters, to build different readings. I invite readers to pick alternative routes as
well. This won't change the argument. What it adds is a sense of how the figures can work together
in multiple ways to study screens. So, one may read the stories  straightforwardly in order to learn
step-by-step how to approach screens sideways. And those inclined to take another route may use
this table of instructions, or come up with their own directions:
***
1 – 8 – 5 – 2 – 7 – 3 – 6 – 4 
***
Chapter  2  makes  the  case  for  reading screens  with  lines.  To grasp  screens  in  terms  of
alignments  we  start  with  lines.  What  are  lines?  We will  approach  them by drawing  lines  and
unpacking them from a  few pictures  taken during  my summer  walks  to  campus.  Tim Ingold's
taxonomy of  lines  (2007)  becomes  helpful  to  distinguish  different  lines  that  participate  in  the
alignment  of  the surfaces and/or  gaps  of screens.  With lines I  will  grasp displays  as  a part  of
screens.
In  this  way  I  will  take  lines  as  material-semiotic  actors  and  stress  that  boundary  lines
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particularly help to organize action and relations.  Attending to boundary lines as specialized in
sorting  out  people  and  things,  I  will  speculatively  begin  to  move  sideways  from  screens,  by
underlining how practices of exploitation overall  tend to circulate around centres of calculation
(Latour  1987)  and coordination  (Suchman  2011).  Such  practices  expand  lines  shaped  in  these
centres. 
Chapter  3  focuses  on  surfaces  and  discusses  the  kinds  of  observers  that  emerge  from
reducing  screens  to  single  digital  surfaces.  I  will  grasp  surfaces  with  Google  Glass,  a  pair  of
“smartglasses”  with  a  transparent  screen  that  I  detail  with  a  marketing  video.  This  promotion
displays a profitable user who spends “One Day” with Glass. It  portrays this  imagined user in
situations where he is  always looking through Glass.  Actions  in  these situations unsurprisingly
never  break  down.  Everything  appears  as  timely,  configured  for  a  user  who  moves  smoothly
through a city. 
Contrasting this story, I will picture a day with Glass with the absent breakdowns made
visible, by reading a video response that makes these present through a satiric version. This depicts
how actions “augmented” by the screen remain fragile achievements. Adding some parody, the user
again  looking always through Glass  burns  himself  with  hot  water,  and gets  run over  by a  car
because of Glass. To shake off the tendency to conflate screens with surfaces and to configure
displays made to profit from people, we will learn from a dog called Emma how to juggle with
screens.
Chapter 4 translates with the help of more dogs the lesson of juggling with screens into
practice.  Dogs will  help us to  grasp screens  as alignments  of  people and things with displays.
Focusing on screening practices  of  Medical  Detection  Dogs  we will  learn  in  the  contact  zone
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(Haraway  2008)  how to  follow people  and things,  moving around,  through,  and away from a
display  of  samples.  We  will  detail  the  work  of  a  playful  screening  practice  tuned  for  cancer
detection,  where humans and dogs align with screens the textures or qualities of their  webs of
relations (Law and Lien 2013). 
Studying screens  with Medical  Detection  Dogs will  also bring us  closer  to  the field  of
Animal-Computer  Interaction (ACI).  I  draw from my encounters with ACI practitioners  during
fieldwork,  and  the  research  of  my friend  Charlotte  Robinson,  to  show with  a  prototype  of  an
emergency phone for  assistance  dogs how screens  that  take  shape in  ACI can  help  animals  to
qualify their  webs of relation,  by orchestrating their  alignments  or arranging their  architextures
(Law and Lien 2013).
Chapter 5 further suggests with snapshots of my workplace and two computer screens I
named Vig  and Ben,  that  becoming in  touch with screens  is  a  matter  of  unfolding what  their
displays  bring  into  view,  and  grasping  what  such  alignment  places  out  of  sight  by  enfolding
arrangements  which  are  cut  off  for  particular  viewers.  As  Geoffrey  Bowker  (2012)  notes,  the
allegory of the fold is useful in STS to remain mindful about boundary-work in technosciences.
With folds I  trace the boundaries  of my workplace,  unfolded through Vig and Ben around my
shared office. 
Then  complementing  such  way  of  approaching  my alignments  with  Vig  and  Ben,  as  a
method  to  assemble  or  unfold  presence,  manifest  absence,  and  Otherness,  we  will  add  with
Haraway's  apparatuses  of  bodily  production  (1991)  another  mode  of  grasping  alignments,  that
makes  present  the  “hinterland  of  relations”  (Law 2004)  enfolded  out  of  sight,  away  from the
screen's  display.  Both  methods  to  study  screens  attend  to  the  passages  of  stories  that  unfold
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significant  alignments,  and  arrangements  that  enfold  spatio-temporal  patterns  of  inclusion  and
exclusion.
In  chapter  6  I  will  touch  on  screens  and  calculative actions  with  self  checkouts  in  a
supermarket.  The  chapter  highlights,  with  the  material-semiotic  knots  of  a  mnemonic  artefact
named  Khipu  (an  Inca  accessory  used  for  accounting),  the  timings  of  purchases  that  people
choreograph with things on the shopping floor and the collective devices (Callon and Muniesa
2005) that  self  checkouts  align  in  supermarkets.  I  briefly  compare  supermarket  purchases  with
online grocery shopping. 
We will work with Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of chronotope (1982), an amalgamation of
time and space  or  “TimeSpace”  (May and Thrift  2001),  to  distinguish  ways of  timing acts  of
calculations,  through breakdowns of different  moments of movement and the re-attachments of
people and things  to  the collective devices  of a  supermarket.  From one bundle to  another,  the
courses  of  action  with  self  checkouts  knot  or  put  together  the  shopping  floor,  the  queue,  the
purchase point,  and the shopper's  exit  passage;  a  patchwork that  can be realigned for  different
supermarkets.
In  chapter  7  we will  grapple  with  screens  and financial  actions  with  automated  tellers.
Underlining how automated tellers also act  as  vaults  or safes,  I  will  grasp the spacings  of the
enveloped  passages  that  people  and  things  cut  through the  protections  of  the  cash  point.  This
approach refigures such passage of access with the walls of the pukara, a fortress-like toponym also
borrowed from the Incas. In this way I will attempt to cut the automated teller from the personal
touch and the neoliberal optics (Hayward 2013) that banks use to disclose people as clients. 
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For this task I will underline with the use of topological thinking in social studies, to grasp
how people and things make a place for, and align specific locations with, automated tellers. I will
sketch topologically how the alignment of people and things with the machine's display carves out
the kind of places that secure automated tellers in everyday life. This refiguration decenters the lines
of visibility, utterance, and force (Deleuze 2007) of automated tellers, and modifies their dynamics
of change by suggesting a way of passing money without banks.
Chapter  8  hops  through  the  dissertation  and  discusses  how  this  study  of  screens  has
composed stories and experimented with modes of grasping screens, sketching a lateral  way to
approach their alignment of people and things with displays, in order to reconfigure screens by
moving sideways. 
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Chapter 2. Lines on the road
Anna  Tsing  has  written  wonderfully  about  mushrooms  (2012:141).  She  says  that
wandering and love of  mushrooms engender  each other.  By this  she means that  picking up
mushrooms  comes  with  the  pleasure  and  contemplation  of  the  speed  of  walking  the  earth.
Bumping  into  and  so  collecting  mushrooms  entails  the  delights  of  bounties  which  are  not
products of human labour (2012:141).  Stepping along a path in this  sense guides her  future
walks,  so  she  tells  us  that  “delight  makes  an  impression:  an  impression  of  place.  The very
excitement of my senses commits to memory the suite of colours and scents, the angle of the
light, the scratching briars, the solid placement of this tree, and the rise of the hill before me.
Many times, wandering, I have suddenly remembered every stump and hollow of the spot on
which I  stood — through the mushrooms I  once encountered there” (2012:142).  I  think her
relating to  mushrooms is  very telling of  people’s  fingery engagement  with things,  including
screens. Take digital icons for instance,15 as things that screens bring into view with “all the
pleasures  of  the  unasked  for  and  the  unexpected”  (2012:142).  Inspired  by  Tsing's  sense  of
“encountering”  mushrooms,  in  this  chapter  I  suggest  with  photographs  from  my  walks  to
Lancaster  University  a  way to  attend  with  lines  to  how screens  align  people  and things  in
practice.  Thinking with lines as material-semiotic actors (Haraway 1988:588) that interact to
create surfaces, I offer an impression of traces and threads as the building blocks of screening
practices.  I propose to address what screens materialize,  indeed what counts as a screen,  by
thinking about  them as  practical  alignments  of  the  surfaces  of  people  and things  during  an
encounter.
15 See chapter 5
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Lines
What  do  lines  and  surfaces  tell  us  about  screens?  Tim Ingold  initially  suggests,  for
example,  that  “every thing is  a parliament  of lines” (2007:5),  a  claim that  seems helpful  to
define  people  and  things  as  gatherings  of  enveloped  bodily  volumes:  as  alignments  that
materialize,  enact,  or enfold people and things.  Following Ingold “to study both people and
things  is  to  study the  lines  they  are  made of”  (2007:6).  But  what  are  lines  made of? Let's
approach  them  empirically.  Draw  a  set  of  points  on  a  surface,  join  them  with  parallel  or
crisscrossed  strokes,  and  you get  a  kind  of  line  that  Ingold  calls  a  trace.  According  to  his
taxonomy,  a  trace  is  an  enduring  mark  left  in  or  on  a  surface  by  a  continuous  movement
(2007:43).  The gesture appears with striking frequency in everyday life.  For instance,  traces
might  be  left  by  the  movement  of  feet  on  a  patch  of  land,  by  doodling  with  chalk  on  a
blackboard,  by  folding  an  origami.  Ingold  further  differentiates  traces  into  two  categories:
additive and reductive. While the former adds an extra layer to leave a trace on a surface, the
latter  removes  a  material  from the  surface  to  leave  a  trace.  Then  painting  with  graphite  or
watercolours and writing with ink or lemon juice creates lines that neatly fit  in the class of
additive traces. Crawling through a desert or a swamp and navigating through a jungle or an
ocean are traced lines that nicely qualify as reductive.16 Besides traces, Ingold thinks of threads
as another kind of line. These are filaments that when put together “in the air” make nodes. As
Ingold writes:
At a relatively microscopic level threads have surfaces; however, they are not drawn on
surfaces. Here are some common examples: a ball of wool, a skein of yarn, a necklace, a
cat’s cradle, a hammock, a fishing-net, a ship’s rigging, a washing line, a plumb-line, an
electrical circuit, telephone lines, violin strings, the barbed-wire fence, the tightrope, the
16 Folding origamis makes lines not by adding or reducing a solid material, it leaves creases via bending the surface
(Ingold 2007:44). 
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suspension bridge (2007:41). 
Note  while  threading can  be taken as  a  specific  anthropological  practice,  threads  are
made  not  just  by  humans.  So  an  attentive  walk  through  the  countryside,  Ingold  suggests,
discloses the thread-like lines hidden underground in the shape of roots, rhizomes and fungal
mycelia, or above on the veins of leaves and the sprouts and shoots of plants. Let's apply these
classes and cases of Ingold's taxonomy by looking at a series of photographs of my summer
walks to my department in Lancaster University. Here I note a winding path that is aligned or
articulated by a set of surfaces. They trace on the road, on the signpost, and on these fences the
boundaries dividing the path as a public place and the surrounding private houses (figure 1). See
also  the  significance  of  the  line  in  the  centre.  It  helpfully  signals  the  point  where  the  path
disappears, as well as who – pedestrians or bikes – should take which side to walk or ride the
road. This line put in the centre meshes the organization and the mechanization of the path, and
at  the  same  time  it  differentiates  the  expected  positions  of  human  organisms  and  bicycle
mechanisms travelling  along the  road.  During  my walks,  I  saw people  and things  regularly
staying within and travelling along the places designates by these figures. The line in the centre
is material and semiotic, a material-semiotic actor on the road, informing along the way the
tracing of parallel or peripheral lines (figure 2) that also bound the paths meant for bikes or
pedestrians.
Squirrels,  rabbits,  dogs  and children  without  leashes  have  no  respect  for  such  linear
subtleties. When you suddenly hear around here the brakes of a bike, it  is probably because
someone  walked  over  the  line  traced  in  the  centre.  This  brings  to  mind  Lucy  Suchman’s
ethnomethodological  reminder  that  “order  is  in  the  details”  (2011:24),  and  helps  me  to
foreground again the landscapes borrowed from Tsing’s foraging:
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             Figure 1. Path to campus  Figure 2. Parallel traces
      (photograph by author)               (photograph by author)
The familiar  places of foraging do not require  territorial  exclusivity;  other  beings  —
human and otherwise — learn them too. Their expansive and overlapping geographies
resist  common  models,  which  divide  the  world  into  ‘your  space’  and  ‘mine.’
Furthermore, foragers nurture landscapes — with their multiple residents and visitors —
rather than single species (Tsing 2012:142). 
Inspired by this  delightful  invitation to walk the earth,  and bumping into details  that
escape pre-ordered arrangements,  I zoom my biomechanical eye to focus on the lines at  the
margin of this path. I turn my shoulders parallel to the road, and face a fence along the way
where unruly edges appear (Tsing 2012). I grasp in the allegory and the mess of these margins
the meshings of people and things that may flourish around, through, and away from all sorts of
screens. Peripheries like centres are full of gestures, details, and stories. Note the plant’s shoots
and sprouts growing around the matrix-like shape of the fence (figure 3) as well as through its
29
metallic  threads  (figure  4).  In  this  manner,  by  turning  sideways  along  the  road,  traces  can
become threads, and by facing the road again,  threads can become traces. “It  is through the
transformation  of  threads  into  traces,  I  argue,  that  surfaces  are  brought  into  being.  And
conversely, it is through the transformation of traces into threads that surfaces are dissolved”
(Ingold 2007:52). 
        Figure 3. Shoots and sprouts           Figure 4. Metallic threads
     (photograph by author)             (photograph by author)
Surfaces
What  I  did  to  traces  and threads  by  turning sideways is  something I  may repeat  by
constantly ripping surfaces apart  to make threads,  and then by densely putting these threads
together again to create surfaces and traces. Likewise, if people and things are made of lines,
they may be iteratively ripped apart  and then put  together  again,  within an infinite  loop of
creation  and  destruction  of  enveloped  entities,  enfolding  and  unfolding  them  through  the
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transformation  of  threads  into  traces  and  the  dissolution  of  traces  into  threads.  This  linear
becoming  then  highlights  the  promiscuously  fleshy  input  of  folding  bodily  volumes.  As
registered  in  the  photographs,  the  figuration  of  entities  entails  threading  and  tracing  the
heterogeneous surfaces of enveloped volumes becoming parts  of people and things.17 Ingold
addresses  this  when  he  writes  about  making  cuts,  cracks  and  creases  (2007:44-47).  Such
ruptures  have the capacity  to  make and to  dissolve  surfaces  says  Ingold,  following Wassily
Kandinsky (1982)  and the  example  of  the  spade,  cutting  “the  surface  of  the  soil,  as  in  an
archaeological  section,  creating  a  new,  vertical  surface  in  the  process”  (Ingold  2007:45).
Severing  surfaces  to  make  cuts,  cracks,  or  creases  plays  a  part  in  the  loop  of  creation  or
destruction  of  enfolded  bodily  volumes.  Cutting,  cracking,  or  creasing  people  and  things
mediates their  tracing and threading practices.  Then cutting in this way “a sheet of material
rather  than  the  ground  itself  does  not  create  a  surface  but  divides  the  material:  thus  the
dressmaker cuts lines in her material with scissors, as does the puzzle-maker with his jig-saw”
(Ingold 2007:45). 
Doing  lines  envelopes  the  maker,  who  becomes  enfolded  into  the  surfaces  created
through  tracing  practices,  and  dissolved  through  threading  practices.  For  instance,  Ingold
presents  the  case of  a  labyrinth  to  trap  the  dead imagined by the  Chukchi  of  north-eastern
Siberia, as it appears in the monograph by Waldemar Bogoras. This maze in the underworld
stretches  through  the  earth  rather  than  on  it.  Unlike  the  famous  Cretan  labyrinth  traced  by
Daedalus  (that  Theseus  resolved by means  of  a  thread),  in  this  ghostly  maze travellers  are
enclosed  within  the  earth,  in  a  medium  that  facilitates  movement  along  its  cracks  and  its
crevices.  This  would  insulate  them,  according  to  Ingold,  from  sensory  contact  with  the
surroundings.  Like  going  online  without  attending  to  what  lies  around  and  away  from the
computer  screen  –  this  portrays  “the  very  moment  of  going  underground,  of  entering  the
17 In other words, I am suggesting with lines how entities are figured as people and things in the making of surfaces.
31
labyrinth, [when] the surface itself disappears from sight” (2007:56). Similar to the transition
from life  to  death,  becoming  digital  has  been  seen  as  dissolving  the  fleshiness  of  surfaces
(Hayles 1999). 
Now that  I  have defined people and things as  made of  lines  and sketched how they
become enveloped by the surfaces  they create  and dissolve,  let's  see how another  line from
Ingold's  taxonomy –  the  ghost  line  –  participates  in  the  process  (2007:47).  Ghost  lines  are
invisible  threads  made  infinitely  thin  by  endlessly  ripping  apart  a  surface.  The  ghost  line
becomes  visible  by  transforming  it  into  a  thicker  thread  or  a  trace.  For  instance  the  lines
satisfying  the  axioms  of  Euclidean  geometry  can  be  traced  on  paper,  or  the  lines  of  a
constellation  of  stars  in  the  sky  can  be  mapped.  A ghost  line  plotted  by  such  bijective18
transformations  becomes  concrete  in  a  practical  way,  and  once  abstracted  into  a  specific
situation,  it  may be  seen  as  tracking the  trajectories  of  people  and things,  tracing  time-like
curves.
The  full  scope  of  the  process  of  creating  or  dissolving  surfaces  can  be  stated  as  a
transformation  that  begins  within  two  potentially  endless  extremes.  On  the  one  hand,  an
infinitely thin ghost line that becomes thicker.  On the other,  an infinitely dense surface that
becomes  thinner.  If  this  process  starts  with  a  ghost  line,  to  create  a  surface  the  line passes
through  the  states  of  a  point,  a  thread,  a  trace.  To  dissolve  the  surface,  the  process  goes
backwards and the trace passes through the states of a thread,  a point,  a ghost line.  So, the
making  of  specific  surfaces  entails  the  co-production  of  a  bundle  of  lines,  as  traces  make
surfaces, threads texture them, creases bend them, cracks fracture them, cuts rip them apart,
ghost  lines  create  spaces  in  between  them :  :  lines  become worldly  with  other  lines.  More
generally,  world lines are a way to note and a code to take notes about a course of events.
18 Bijection in mathematics is way of enumerating a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of two sets.
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Annotating  their  states,  world  lines  may  be  effective  as  means  to  track  sequential  paths  or
trajectories.19 Lines are also useful in calculus to approximate the slope of curved paths with
straight  traces.  What  lines  do to  other  lines  echoes  the  flexibility  of  bending and rectifying
trajectories.
Let there be more lines
A boundary remains stable when the line tracing its border or limit  does not become
something  else.  A limit  depends  on  the  becoming  of  its  line,  on  the  mode  of  being  of  its
borderline,  on how the  border  becomes  worldly  with other  lines.  Note  before  that  we have
already encountered a boundary line in the centre of the road. Constructing such a borderline is
easy. Begin with an action that you aim to organize in a specific way by sorting out the actors in
an arrangement. The line in the centre may be any line (thread, crease, ghost line, etc.) that is
centred around such an arrangement, a line put “in between” the actors that orders people and
things.  This  figure  is  useful  to  sketch  lines  that  grow from centres,  appearing anywhere by
diffracting  their  ordering  capacities  through  other  lines,  seizing  their  locations  to  shape  an
arrangement, to configure a practice, to order and discipline the actors, to make them be the
people and things the line in the centre aims to sort  out.  I grasp more subtle details  of this
boundary  line  in  chapter  7  by  grasping  it  as  knotting  lines  of  visualization,  utterance,  and
subjectivation  between lines  of  force.  Now let's  define first  how the  line  in  the centre  may
become powerful by entangling the lines of people and things with centres of calculation and
coordination. 
The  line  in  the  centre  becomes  worldly  by  suturing  trajectories  of  people  or  things;
19 For instance, the trajectory of “personal human events (with time and place as dimensions) that marks the history of
a person — perhaps starting at the time and place of one's birth until one's death. The log book of a ship is a
description of the ship's world line, as long as it contains a time tag attached to every position. The world line
allows one to calculate the speed of the ship, given a measure of distance (a so-called metric) appropriate for the
curved surface of the Earth” (Wikipedia's world line entry retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_line).
At steady speed the world line traces a geodesic.
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situating,  stabilizing,  and sanctioning the course of their  events,  pinpointing their  actions  by
producing,  positioning,  and  policing  the  states  of  their  movement.  A great  example  of  the
construction of a line in the centre is offered by Latour's take on Lapérouse's travels (1986),
sailing for Louis  XVI to improve his map of  sea routes.  According to  Latour  a network of
relations between the people and things enrolled in Lapérouse's journey is what allows him to
stabilize translation between the inscriptions on his map and the sites abroad.  A network of
relations  makes  it  possible  to  situate  18th century  Versailles  in  the  centre  of  a  circuit  of
transportation  of  vessels  and  a  cycle  of  accumulation  of  goods.  In  this  sense,  the  journey
produces  a  circuit  with  a  centre  that  aims  to  calculate  a  maritime  route  to  maximize  the
accumulation of goods,  and to sanction the circulation of people or things  by policing their
movements  around the  positions  mapped by such centre  of  calculation.  To sail  this  circuit's
waters  people  and things  have  to  become what  Versailles  wants  them to  be:  means  for  the
exploitation of a circuit.  Note with Suchman's similar notion of a centre of coordination, we
might  sum up that  Versailles  was concerned,  above all,  “with  problems of  space and time”
(2011:25).
Stabilized with the translations of  Lapérouse's  map,  the trajectories  across the circuit
around  this  centre  (Versailles)  can  be  characterized  as  movements  “from point  to  point,  in
sequence,  as  quickly  as  possible”  (Ingold  2007:73).  Such  movements  relate  to  an  array  of
interconnected  point-ports,  aligned before  setting  out,  and enacted  by  the  trajectories  of  the
vessels  –  a  movement  that  meanders  as  little  as  possible  from the  sea  route  of  Lapérouse.
Contrast  this  kind  of  sailing  with  the  movements  of  bodies  that  might  diverge  from those
authorized by Versailles. Entities in open waters – not to mention underwater – may drift by
sailing and swimming along a digressing path rather  than across  Lapérouse's  route.  Moving
along would be a different kind of activity than moving across a trajectory. For Ingold “both
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kinds  of  movement,  along  and  across,  may  be  described  by  lines,  but  they  are  lines  of
fundamentally different kinds. The line that goes along has, in Klee's terms, gone out for a walk.
The line that goes across, by contrast, is a connector, linking a series of points arrayed in two-
dimensional  space” (2007:75).  Ingold relates then moving across with transport  and moving
along with wayfaring; for him, transport is a form of movement that can be broken down in
advance,  into multiple  spots  on the  way,  then rejoined by a  trajectory that  reconnects  these
places. A wayfarer does not travel like this. She inhabits the duration of motion without rush,
taking delight from the speed of walking the earth and sailing the sea. She trails as she goes
along.
  
Moving along or  across  is  a  distinction  that  may inform too  how people  and things
travelled on my way to university.  As said above,  the line in the centre  sutured people and
bicycles  on  the  road,  assigning  a  lane  for  each  to  move  across  the  path.  Their  trajectories
followed the line in the centre without trespassing the boundary it materializes; thus moving
across the road bounds people and things  within passages marked by the line in the centre.
Surely the path works for transport purposes from town to campus and back, but people and
things may move differently,  obliquely (figure 5),  laterally (figure 6).  One may dismiss and
reimagine this path by moving along the road, trailing around and eventually diverting away
from the line in the centre. 
Let's sum up then the displacement of people and things being wayfarers rather than
subjects or objects of transport, by saying that shifting from travelling across to trailing along
any worldly trajectory entails moving sideways from the line in the centre. This shift means
avoiding the  lines  that  may form part  of  centres  of  calculation  and coordination,  to  release
oneself from positions within a circuit, materialized by what I have called the line in the centre.
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Instead of facing such lines diffracted by a centre, a point or orientation that fixes in advance
“your” place and “mine”, stretching the line in the centre vertically as when people and things
travel down or up the road, one may place oneself and others sideways, alongside the line in the
centre, to face it as a bending horizon projected at infinity.
             Figure 5. Oblique path                               Figure 6. Lateral path
             (photograph by author)       (photograph by author)
 
Moving  sideways  is  an  attempt  to  deactivate  passages  delineated  by  centres  and
peripheries. The attempt consists of finding ways to reflect on the meandering trails that may
divert  from lines  that  force people  or  things  to  become some fixed entities,  for  the  distinct
purposes  of  stabilizing  ways  of  exploiting  them.  Moving  along  sideways  enables  attentive
wayfarers to forage the infinities of lines diverting from the patterns of forces of centres of
calculation and coordination. Rather than sorting out and screening people and things across the
divides of these forces, by moving sideways one articulates shifts that disclose the materials and
semiotics of alternatives to practices of calculation and coordination that attempt to define in
advance what people and things are. Trajectories for alternative passages through such circuits
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may be endlessly placed instead alongside the line in the centre, when imagined as a horizontal
spectrum that bounds the positions of people and things in open-ended ways, aligning them on a
projective plane that envelops their parallel trajectories, folding them as they trail along so as to
articulate their  movements.20 
(Re)aligning Screens
 
So  what  do  lines  and  surfaces  tell  us  about  screens,  if  one  aims  to  rearticulate  the
screening  of  people  and  things,  across  the  passages  aligned  by  centres  of  calculation  and
coordination? Gunther Kress considers (citing Skeat's Etymological Dictionary) that the word
“screen” has two definitions and three broad meanings (2006:200). On the one hand, a screen is
that which shelters from observation,  a division or a partition. On the other, a screen is that
which filters for an implied observer. The sense of screens as shelters means that they protect or
conceal. Defining them as filters means they can select. The notion of selection for an observer
particularly  relates  to  the  role  of  screens  in  visual  practice,  while  screens  as  shelters  from
observation have a slightly different meaning. These screens afford a curious observer to ask, in
particular,  who  or  what  is  being  separated  from  whom?  Fire  screens  exemplify  well  this
denotation of screens as partitions or divisions that shelter from observation (figure 7). Note in
this figure that the screen, mounted on a wooden stand with a knitted image of a fruit bowl,
conceals the fire from the observer. Computer screens, in contrast, are good examples of filters
that  display or  select  for  the  observer.  They also resonate  with Claude Shannon’s  theory  of
information (1949) or noise filtration and the canalization of signals through electromagnetic
waves.  In  this  sense,  screens  may  be  about  both  vision  and  division.  They  can  reveal  and
20 Placing passages to proceed by moving sideways is a tactic inspired by Michel de Certeau's practices of everyday
life (1984: 91-110); de-centring forces of calculation and coordination nurtures the “multiform, resistance, tricky




                    Figure 7. Fire screen                                  Figure 8. Grating screen
            (image taken from reddit.com)                (photograph by the author)
The sense  of  a  screen as  that  which filters  for  an  observer  seems to aptly  name the
contemporary  use  of  the  screen  as  a  surface  for  projection,  as  a  display  used  in  cinema,
television,  photography,  or  a  display  for  an  observer  of  the  outputs  of  computing  devices.
Perhaps the  German expression  Bildshirm is  a  useful  alternative  word for  computer  screen,
roughly meaning picture-shield,  pointing to the screen's capacity both to reveal and conceal,
something  more  evident  in  the  Dutch  term  sherm (cover),  and  the  Frankish  word  skrank
(barrier). To move toward a reading of the screen as a picture-shield requires first that we grasp a
sense of screening devices untied from computing machines – such as the fire or grating screens
pictured in figures 7 and 8. 
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Note how figures 7 and 8 provide single-frame pictures of screens made with different
kinds of lines. Figure 7 portrays a Victorian fire screen mounted on a stand.21 The screen looks
like a painting, made of densely webbed threads, framed with wood, stitched with traces that
produce a surface.  It  protects  from a fire and creates an image for an observer.  It  enfolds a
person, not only because of her focus on the surface of the screen,  but  also because of her
position in relation to the screen, separating her from the sparkling fire. If one turns around the
screen for the image to face the fire, this double effect is lost. Surely fire screens mostly provide
protection: they make sense as they align with, and so divide people from, the fire. Move the
stand attached to this fire screen and you mess with the way it aligns people and things. But that
appears  to  be  hardly  the  case  for  the  grating  screen  pictured  in  figure  8.  Reposition  the
wheelbarrow and the alignment  is  preserved, the screen still  acts  as a filter  mounted on the
wheelbarrow. Grating screens are made of lines less densely threaded than Victorian fire screens.
They mostly have parallel filaments neatly sorted out in matrix-like metallic shapes. This leaves
holes in between the threads through which something may be selected and so brought into view,
and something else may be left out of sight. So we may assume that this grating screen acts a
sieve to filter sand and earth, to sort them out by screening the bigger stones which are brought
into view on the surface, leaving the finer grains out of sight beneath it. 
This preliminary reflection about screens suggests how their surfaces align people and
things in open-ended ways. Screens tend to be associated with visual practices, but they also
separate  or divide people and things.  Etymologically  we may classify screens as that  which
shelters from an observation, and that which filters for an implied observer. Screens are about
vision  and division,  revealing  something and concealing  something else.  The surface  of  the
screen tends to materialize both effects in practice, as one or the other or both may surface in
action. Screening can be seen as a superficial effect, but screens may align people and things
21 There is another smaller and more modern fire screen aligned directly in front of the fire.
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with gaps, rather than surfaces, in order to separate them – and this is key to distinguishing
between surfaces and screens. Note that while in aligning the surfaces of people and things one
might split them, by placing a surface between them, one might also separate them by making a
gap. Such is the case when screening people into different groups, by articulating a gesture that
divides them from one another. Screens become defined in practice as alignments of people and
things with displays that always leave something out of sight. This entails studying screens in
action, but it does not reduce screens to the study of surfaces. It expands what is unique about
them, to the study of people and things aligned with gaps and/or surfaces that articulate vision
and divisions. 
I have specified lines here as the building blocks of the surfaces of screens, and defined
screens as alignments of people and things with displays. Screens are mundane arrangements
that may simultaneously reveal something and conceal something else. In this double sense the
screen becomes a practical achievement, an arrangement that articulates an open-ended method
for aligning people and things. For me this suggests that we stretch the study of screens beyond
the study of surfaces; that is, around, through, and away from the display. It also implies that
screens in practice, or screening practices, can help us to articulate responses to the forces of
calculation  and coordination  that  order  people  and things.  That  is  the  task  of  this  study of
screens: to write for people who might articulate meandering trails, in order to grasp screens that
might become the companions of wanderers and wayfarers. By folding screens for people and
things  as  they  trail  along,  I  attempt to  move sideways to  disclose passages  for  practices  of
calculation  and  coordination  that  divert  from  centralized  power.  Before  arguing  that  this
disclosure  relies  upon  the  study  of  screens  through  becoming  with  them,  by  juggling  with
screens or attending to the timing/spacing of their alignments, in the next chapter I detail how
screens might be understood to depend on centres of calculation and coordination to work in
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everyday life. I explore this case with a device for “augmented reality” called Google Glass,
arguing  that  all  the  alignments  of  screens   that  are  bound  to  centres  of  calculation  and
coordination do not reduce, but rather shift, the blind spot of the observer.
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Chapter 3. The blind spot of Glass
Google Glass is a wearable computing device for “augmented reality,” with an optical head
mounted display (laminated with a layer of liquid crystal on top of silicon). Shaped as a pair of
glasses, the device may be instructed verbally to read e-mails, check the time, send messages, take
notes – like a “smart” phone, but with a transparent screen worn on the face. Glass was designed by
Google X: a research and development facility that experiments with prototypes potentially to be
marketed by the tech-company Google. Before releasing a test version of Glass in 2013, Google
shot a marketing video titled “One Day”,  featuring the story of a day told from the point of view of
a person wearing Glass.22 From the video we get  an impression of  the social  life  of Glass,  as
imagined by Google. For example, in “One Day” the person wearing Glass never removes them
from his face: he is always looking at people and things through this pair of glasses. In this chapter,
I discuss this vision and its reduction of what screens are to a single surface. Glass is still under
development today but the “explorers”, those selected by Google to test Glass, and those who are
hoping to buy the commercial version, may not get a day with Glass as depicted in the promotional
video. The impetus has flagged in response to several practical issues; from Glass perhaps looking
too daft when worn in public, to privacy matters both for those using Glass and those around them.
My particular concern regarding Glass, however, is with the project’s way of looking at screens in a
way that reduces them to their display surfaces. What might be missed by paying attention merely
to the display is what lies around and away from the screen. As I explain below, I learned this lesson
from a dog named Emma.
Screens often take part in mundane practices by framing a single, frontal surface: a display
that is made visible and becomes different from the other surfaces aligned in screening practices.
Graphical figures can be displayed through a frontal surface – they can be enacted ‘on screen’.
22 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9c6W4CCU9M4  (last accessed 24/08/15)
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When designed as a see-through surface, like da Vinci's perspectival window (Friedberg, 2006:29),
screens may also render transparent all of the various layers where graphical figures appear. What
kinds  of  observers  are  implied  then  by screens,  when seen as  display  surfaces?  I  unravel  this
question by reading the screen of Glass as a microdisplay that screens an observer's field of view.
Google Glass may be seen as part of a collection of similar “smartglasses”, including Microsoft’s
HoloLens or Facebook's Oculus Rift, which mount a transparent optical surface in front of a user.
The alignment screens a graphical display on top of the surfaces of someone's field of vision. In
practice this reduces screens to a single frontal surface that people cannot look away from. Let's
grapple  then  with  how  screens  can  be  singled  out  as  graphical  displays,  beginning  with  the
promotional video “One Day” where the screen, imagined by Google, (dis)appears from the point of
view of its implied observer. A particular genre of storytelling, this video promotes Glass through
the  desire  to  inhabit  the  social  life  enabled  by  the  device.  Since  Glass  appears  in  such  a
cinematographic  way,  I  read  it  through this  way  of  unravelling  time  that,  according  to  Henry
Bergson (1911), is editable and cuttable in moments of movements that can be predetermined or
estimated in advance. Then I compare “One Day” with another version, a satire in which all actions
with Glass appear to break down.
Glass' empty gaze 
The plot of “One Day” starts on a couch. We hear music and see the white legs and flip flops
of an implied observer. We never get to face the user of Glass during this video, because we see his
actions from his point of view. This is an imagined portrait of Glass seen from the first person
perspective,  presented  as  if we  were  seeing  through  the  screen.  Rendering  a  day  from  this
viewpoint, we are invited to see how it feels to use Glass. We note, for example, how the user's
menu pops into sight over the field of view. Mounted on the user’s face, Glass stays aligned with his
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perspective on his surroundings. Walking as the user to the kitchen, we see Glass remind the user,
while making coffee, to see his partner tonight. The message pops up as he faces away from the
action of pouring coffee. Later the weather applet appears, automatically, while looking through a
window, while the surrounding buildings outside, behind the graphical display, seem blurred out
(figure 9). The story continues as movements around the house, as the user takes a seat to eat and to
plan a rendezvous with a friend at the bookstore. At the table both actions fall neatly into place
within the user's field of view. They become subtly overlapped through a focal point on the horizon,
a mode of vision that the user embodies with a kind of empty gaze, which momentarily excludes
from action what is immediately around him (figure 10). 
        Figure 9. Blurred background                             Figure 10. Overlapped actions
       (image taken from “One Day”)                   (image taken from ”One Day”) 
I  highlighted  the  moments  where  the  background  of  the  actions  shown are  blurred  out
because they signal the gestures of looking through Glass. When using Glass the screen, mounted
on a pair of glasses, is placed in an upper corner of the wearer’s lines of vision. But the gaze of that
person, seen through the screen of Glass from the position of someone facing him, may feel like
being looked at with an “empty” gaze – the gaze of someone staring behind you. I think that this
effect signals how someone wearing Glass may lose touch of people and things around them. We
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can also note how during the video everything seems automatically configured for the user. Glass
pops up just in time when the user is near the underground station, alerting him that the service is
suspended. A Google Map diagram kicks in, precisely overlapping images of the location of the
user and the pathway to the bookstore, positioning him on top of the map and the city. This is an
autonomous,  transparent  display of  graphics  showing a mode of  vision that  allows the user  to
inhabit a cyclopean eye. Across the footpath, this monocular sight is informed by arrows showing
the path and an indication of the distance to the shop. In this way the day goes by as the user meets
his friend, and finally serenades his partner. Glass' depiction on screen appears to display always
meaningful data coupled with flawless interactions. 
It seems not too much of a stretch to imagine that, during this story, people might respond to
Glass by putting it away. Of course capturing that gesture is not an attractive promotional tactic for
Google. Instead, the user and the screen appear always aligned. In imaginaries like Google's, as
Malte  Ziewitz  observes,  “the  relationship  envisioned  between  screen  and  user  is  necessarily
constant  and independent  of  the  specific  circumstances  under  which  they  [both]  are  observed”
(2011:208).  Something  is  missing  in  this  portrayal  of  Glass'  alleged  capacity  to  follow  the
movements  of  the  wearer.  What  might  be  excluded from this  demonstration  is  the  never  fully
predictable situatedness of an action with Glass, and all of the possible broken alignments that can
render visible the transparent surface of Glass' graphical display. In other words, the situatedness of




For Erkki Huhtamo screens have “a tendency to become invisible; they mediate perceptions
and interactions, effacing their own identities in the process“ (2012:145). If screens bring something
into view and leave something else out of sight, then some screens screen themselves as well. Note
that if screens are defined as alignments of surfaces, the effect produced by partly effacing screens
does not create screenless images (Friedberg 2006:240), but rather transparent surfaces. In the case
of Glass,  the self-effacing tendency of the screen can be disclosed.  Screens in general may be
cracked. Alignments can be interrupted. A breakdown suggests, following Haraway (1988:586), a
time where one may avoid seeing screens with a cyclopean eye, or as a thing capable of a self-
satiated god-like mode of vision.23 In the case of Glass, the imagined cyclopean eye is empowered
by centres of calculation and coordination, rendering and “augmenting” (i.e matching) people and
things on screen along with a layer of data synced by Google. 
The Google (goggle) map shown in the Glass promotional video is an example of how this
device's  capacities  would  depend  on  Google's  databases  acting  as  centres  of  calculation,  and
Google's  location-based  apps  acting  as  centres  of  coordination.  We  have  defined  a  centre  of
calculation, following Latour (1987), as an array of movement around a trajectory, that maximizes
the  exploitation  of  people  and  things,  and  centralizes  the  extracted  value.  Building  centres  of
calculation is what Google's databases are all about. They “profile” their users through the latter’s
interactions with the databases, configuring users as commodities by offering data-services that in
turn mobilize Google's circuits of extraction of user’s information. Google exploits user profiles for
profits. Google’s business is based on selling the data of people using Google’s services to other
commercial  parties.  On  the  analysis  of  Christian  Fuchs,  people's  unpaid  labour  of  creating
23 “Vision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all perspective gives way to infinitely mobile
vision, which no longer seems just mythically about the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to have
put the myth into ordinary practice” (Haraway 1988:581).
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information is Google's mechanism of exploiting users for profits:Google in processes of economic
surveillance collects a multitude of data about usage behaviour and users’ interests. The Google
prosumer commodity C’ is sold to advertising clients (the process C’ – M’): Google attains money
(M’) from advertising clients, who in return can use the data of the Google prosumer commodity
they have purchased in order to present targeted advertisements to Google users. Google thereby
increases its invested money M by a profit p: M’ = M + p. p is partly reinvested and partly paid as
dividend to Google stockowners (2012:44).  Google's ads sales surpassed the $15 billion dollars
mark during the first three months of 2015 (BBC 2015).24 
Google's  services are  tied to apps luring people to  profile themselves,  as in the case of
Google maps, which we may grasp as a centre of coordination (Suchman 2011). Using Google
maps with Glass  can  be  seen as  pinpointing  yourself  with a  location  sharing  service,  one  that
coordinates people and things distributed across space and time, by relying on canonical means
such  as  timetables  and  routes  to  denote  trajectories  and  distances.  But  to  act  as  a  centre  of
coordination,  the  location  sharing  service  needs  to  become  helpful  in  coordinating  distributed
practices.  This  requires “a stable  site  to which participants distributed in  space can orient,  and
which at any given moment they know how to find. At the same time, to coordinate a system of
widely  distributed  activities,  [participants]  within  the  site  must  somehow  have  access to  the
situation of others distant in space and time” (Suchman, 2011:24).25 Semi stable sites for Google
maps may be articulated by mounting Glass on top of its user's field of view, though as we will see
this is a stability prone to breaking down. Access to the situation of distant others appears to be
made  in  this  case  through  people’s  self-disclosure  of  their  own  positions,  as  shown  in  the
24 For Fuchs the trouble with companies like Google lies not so much in the services provided but instead in the
relations of production of the prosumer (2012:46). 
25 I modified from the quote the word personnel and wrote participants instead to stress how my example from the
video shows Glass screening a Google map, helping to coordinate a situation that is critical in relation to space,
rather than time, by displaying a message triggered by a participant, rather than by personnel from a centre of
coordination, such as a dispatch centre or a control room; two sites referred to by Suchman to exemplify her notion
(2011:24). 
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promotional video when Glass alerts the user that his friend has shared his location: “Paul is 402 ft
away”. 
If  databases  and  applications  are  Google's  key  devices  to  profit  from this  confessional
economy, a way to contest  the marketing of “selves” that complements Glass'  alleged mode of
vision,  is  to  move  sideways  from the  figuration  of  users  as  humans  “augmenting  reality”,  by
refiguring  the  cyborg  (Haraway  1991)  as  a  mean  to  situate  responses  to  the  screen  of  Glass.
Moreover, situating screens helps us to study them as alignments of the surfaces of people and
things,  by  stressing  the  historical  contingencies,  practical  fragilities,  and  situatedness  of  such
alignments.  The  move fuses  “the  ideological  dimensions  of  ‘facticity’ and  ‘the  organic’ into  a
cumberstone  entity  called  ‘material-semiotic  actor’”  (Haraway 1988:595).  Note  in  the  previous
chapter  how  lines  helped  us  to  consider  various  material-semiotic  kinds  of  screens,  such  as
computer  screens,  firescreens,  sunscreens,  etc.  The  heterogeneity  and  multiplicity  of  screens
becomes  evident  when  simultaneously  thinking  about  them  materially  and  semiotically.  So,
thinking  with  lines  as  material-semiotic  actors  turns  screens  –  when  defined  as  alignments  of
surfaces  of  people  and  things  –  into  an  active  and  meaning-generating  part  of  what  Haraway
describes  as  an  apparatus  of  bodily  production,  without  assuming  the  effects  of  screens  as
immediate  but  rather  as  made in  practice.26 For  Haraway,  what  would  count  then  as  objective
knowledge  of  a  screen  must  be  placed  within  the  historically  contingent  practicalities  of  its
alignment. 
26 See chapter 5.
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Breaking Glass
Alternative takes  on “One Day” with Glass,  like that  uploaded on YouTube by “Happy
Toast”, reimagine the user’s situation.27 This satire of “One Day” begins again with a user waking
up, as Glass jumps into action. Also rendered from a first person perspective, now all appears less
well aligned. The title, “Project Dangerous Glasses”, suggests that the point of this parody is to
critique  Glass'  alleged  potential  to  “augment  reality”,  to  make  people  or  things  thicker  by
overlapping their vision with data. “Augmenting reality” or making it thicker seems prone here to
render life more fragile. Actions with Glass appear unstable on screen, as they cannot be always
nicely overlapped onto a single frontal surface. Overlapping actions tend to break down: they may
become dangerously disrupted by one another. For instance, in “One Day” eating at the table falls
out of sight when a message pops up.  In the satire, in contrast, the tea and biscuit remain in sight
during the call, which leads the user to burn his hand (figure 11). The transparency of Glass can be
shattered. Likewise, driving with Glass appears dangerous because its layer of data can repeat or
obscure things (figure 12). Glass appears here to overload and break down rather than augment
reality.
While the Glass promotional video depicts a first person perspective in which no contingent
event, no unexpected activity seems to disrupt the processing of Glass' functions, this depiction may
be contested by showing how Glass' mode of vision creates blind spots, and more generally by
disclosing the problem in taking screens at  interface value (Turkle 1995:19-26),  an ontological
assumption that reduces the screen to what happens  on the screen. As discussed in the previous
chapter,  a  screening practice  cannot  be reduced to  a  single  surface,  because  people  and things
placed  around  and  away  from  the  implied  observer  of  that  surface,  as  signalled  by  Glass'
breakdowns, mess with what the display surface brings into view and leaves out of sight. Actors
27 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ma8NbpCvSwo  (last seen on 25/08/15)
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positioned around and away from Glass' user may interfere with her alignment of perspective.
          Figure 11. Shattering transparency                Figure 12. Overloading reality
      (image taken from “Dangerous Glasses”)  (image taken from “Dangerous Glasses”)
The term blind spot underscores the limits of the observations of the user of Glass. Blind
spots  are  non optional  epistemic enactments,  the excess  “baggage” of located perspectives,  the
constitutive horizons of knowledge practices either modelled or situated in everyday life. Blind
spots are what I relentlessly miss when looking at, touching on, paying attention to, having a gut
feeling of or sensing in general my impression of being, or becoming alive. Blind spots bound the
partial vision I relationally possess. What I can see you may be missing. Blind spots have been
formalized as intrinsic to the observation of implied observers in cybernetics and system theory;
used to think about society, as observing system, by Niklas Luhmann.28 We may catch the blind spot
of  Glass  by  reading  the  promotional  video  from  Google  through  the  satire.  Note  how  Glass
responds exclusively to the commands of the user in the bookstore in the former. When he asks
aloud about the music section,  no one else pays attention or responds. All  communications are
informed,  uttered,  and  comprehended  by  the  machine  with  precision.  In  contrast,  the  flow  of
28 “Reality as such, the unity of the observing system and its environment, the paradoxical sameness of difference, of
inside and outside, remains inaccessible; it is what “one does not perceive when one perceives it”, the "blind spot"
that enables the system to observe but escapes observation. An outside observer can make this blind spot visible by
distinguishing the observed system's distinction as a form that contains both of its sides, but in doing so, any such
second-order observation must rely on its own blind spot and is bound to reproduce the paradox of observation at
the operational level of its own distinction” (Luhmann 1995:XXXIV). 
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significant  interactions  through the  screen  in  the  version  uploaded by “Happy  Toast”  becomes
interrupted by what is made to overlap with such a singular surface. Addressing Glass verbally is
subject to the contingent responses and reactions from people and things around and away from the
user. Note in the parody that the user in the bookstore needs to clarify, to a woman nearby, to whom
his command is addressed; that is, “not you”. Conversely, what is on screen in the satire breaks
down the practical flow of movement with Glass as imagined by Google. That is the case when,
with a pinch of drama and comedy, the satire exaggerates how disruptions can occur by overloading
the screen with information. So while the user inspects the sky, an oversized applet appears to block
his view with useless data; a similar thing happens twice when he checks the time. While walking,
driving, and shopping, Glass spams the view.
Wearing  a  technologically  enhanced  interfacing  device  like  Glass  all  the  time,  without
putting  it  away,  means  staying  within  the  blind  spot  that  Glass’s  surface  creates.  The  implied
observer, seeing always and only through the interface, misses something around and away from
Glass’s  perspective.  Sticking  to  Glass  means  refusing  to  shuffle  around  your  blind  spot:  to
“deaugment yourself” by putting Glass away in order to gain the different blind spot of a Glassless
perspective.  Regardless  of  how  centres  of  calculation  and  coordination  may  be  imagined  to
empower Glass, seeing always through the screen makes it tougher to grasp what lies around and
away from it. Note how actions on and off the graphical display break down in the satire, as people
or things situated around, through, and away from the screen are missed. What may be aligned on
and off the graphical display – defined by what is brought into view through the screen – becomes
dynamically interfered with by what is left out of sight – defined by what lies around and away
from the user, who cannot help but always see through the screen of Glass. In this way, to handle
the screen may be easier if the implied observer pays attention to what is iteratively brought into
view and left out of sight –  around, through, and away from Glass. It appears easier to attend to
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what is on or off the display when people can juggle with their glasses, when they can put them
aside to see around the screen when needed. 
Shakes
Considering  screens  without  reducing  them  to  user-centred  interfaces  seems  helpful  to
rearticulate  situations  where people become figured as the implied observer,  or  the user of the
screen. Aligning users frequently entails designing interfaces imagined to configure the flow of
communications between humans and machines without blind spots. This tends to frame the screen
as  a  component  of  interfaces  configured  to  work  flawlessly,  through  their  predictive  features.
Screens  become single  frontal  surfaces,  graphical  displays  aligned in  always timely  ways with
coded gestures triggering appropriate actions.  But one can move sideways from these displays,
interfaces, and stories of worlds fully rendered through the screen – by noting and dealing juggling
or  dealing  with  the  breakdowns  that  suggest  how  situations  around,  through,  and  away  from
graphical displays mess with screening practices. 
Glass' graphical display implies a dynamic and seamless alignment of people and things,
while Google's video seems to insist on staging Glass encounters as effortless. On the other hand,
the  satire  exaggerates  how  disruptions  might  break  down  Glass'  screening  practices.  In  both
versions, “the user” and “the screen” remain paired. In one story the traffic of data provided by
Google makes everything thicker and “augmented reality” is stabilised through the screen. In the
satire the traffic of data makes everything not only thicker, but also fragile. Nothing seems stable
when viewed through the screen. In both cases, users either excel or fail at using Glass. In both
cases the duration of the videos are edited in advance. They are cut to promote or to parody Glass,
since cinematography is a practice that makes it possible to divide the duration of movements into
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predefined moments (Bergson 1911:332).  The authors of the videos render  visible  through this
technique attempts at marketing or mocking, by displaying alignments “like that of the pieces of
glass  that  compose  a  kaleidoscopic  picture.  Our  activity  goes  from  an  arrangement  to  a  re-
arrangement, each time no doubt giving the kaleidoscope a new shake, but not interesting itself in
the shake, and seeing only the new picture” (Bergson 1911:333). In this sense it appears that the
shakes of seeing through Glass are alternately effaced or exaggerated in the videos. 
         Figure 13. Seeing through   (shake!)        Figure 14. Looking at
(image taken from “Confused Dog”)          (image taken from “Confused Dog”) 
I explore in the next chapter how people and things can juggle with each other by becoming
with screens, but I conclude this one by introducing Emma, a dog who taught me how to look at
screens  by  paying  attention  around,  through,  and  away  from their  alignments.  The  video  that
captured her attraction to screens has been watched online by over a million “You-Tubers”:29 this
domestic video features Emma as a “Confused Dog” trying to come to grips with the graphical
interface of a laptop displaying the video of a cat. Looking at the screen sideways Emma seems to
turn her head sideways to see through the graphical display (figure 13);  and again,  in the next
moment, she shakes her head to smell the backside (figure 14). I read her shaky response to this
29 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mFq_eMv6x2g (last accessed 05/09/15)
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graphical  display as an invitation to  think about  screens  beyond user-centred configurations  by
moving sideways from with the display, to humans and dogs becoming with screens in animal-
computer interactions.
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Chapter 4. Screening with dogs
As suggested with Emma in the last chapter, sniffing and looking behind the display, as one
moment of encountering screens, made us curious about what is located around and away from
them. With the help of more dogs, I consider in this chapter how to approach screens by “becoming
with” them,30 in the moments of movement around, through, and away from their display surfaces.
In this sense, I attempt to delineate an ethnographic way to account for the agencies of screens.
Rather than diving into or through their displays, I devise a way of approaching screens aimed at
grasping their configurations.   
For this task,  I  detail  how a touchy and feely kind of ethnography (Crang 2003),  when
informed by insights from Animal Geographies, suggests a fruitful way to assemble approaches (or
methods) with which to sense screens.  The suggestion can be specified by asking who may become
with the screen, and so may take a place around, through, and away from its display surface. Put
another way, this is an approach to screens that seeks to account for them by sensing how the timing
and spacing of their divisions makes and re-locates places for positioning people and things.31 I
consider in this chapter how conversations from the field of Animal Geographies help to understand
how the articulations of screens create places (or not) for non/humans. 
I locate this analysis within studies of the becomings of people and things. More specifically,
30 I borrow the openness of this question from Haraway's take on agility sport with her dog Cayenne: ”[We] both
know the difference when we have tasted the open. We both know the tear in the fabric of our joined becoming
when we rip apart into merely functional time and separate movement after the joy of inventive isopraxis. The taste
of 'becoming with' in play lures its apprentice stoics of both species back into the open of a vivid sensory present.
That’s why we do it. That’s the answer to my question, Who are you, and so who are we?” (2008:242). In this
chapter I argue that one may find a taste of the open while playing and 'becoming with' in less agile but still
reciprocally inductive biodetection practices  at  MDD, what  Haraway calls isopraxis  when it  comes close to a
poiesis of love.
31 This premise is explored further in chapters 6 and 7.
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I suggest how biodetection or assistance dogs, human trainers, and machine prototypes may become
with screens in two situations: a human-dog collaboration to screen cancer and an alarm system
with a screen made up of animal-computer interactions. Through these cases I describe how the
placement of screens for training divides a patchwork of moments of movement that enable both
humans  and  dogs  to  cooperate  with  things  like  laptops  and  phones,  by  working  and  playing
together. 
I  delineate  how  screens  allocate  such  webs  of  human,  dog,  and  machine  relations  by
grasping their  collaborations in biodetection practices, as training in the contact zone (Haraway
2008), and their cooperation in practices of care as texturing and enfolding architextures (Law and
Lien 2013) of moments of movement. With this reading, I suggest that screens can be effectively
reconfigured in less anthropocentric ways, to be more attuned to the functional requirements and
lively needs of non/human animals. In the process, as discussed throughout this chapter, screens can
articulate the creativities and affects of the animal.
Meeting dogs with important jobs
Clara gets  into her  small  city  car  and moves across the front seats,  stretching her  arms
towards the passenger door to open it for me. It is early in the morning of a grey day in Milton
Keynes,  UK.  During  the  last  few  months,  I  have  been  scheduling  a  visit  to  the  Computing
Department of the Open University.  Dr.  Clara Mancini,  a research fellow trained in knowledge
media,  discourse  theory  and  technology,  has  invited  me  here  as  a  PhD student,  coming  from
Lancaster  University,  to  see  the  work-in-progress  that  she  and her  colleagues  and students  are
crafting  at  the  Animal-Computer  Interaction  Lab.  It  has  been  great  to  learn  more  about  this
interdisciplinary field, based in computer science. As Clara sees it,  studies in Animal-Computer
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Interaction  (ACI)  aim  to  reconfigure  in  practice  the  epistemological,  ontological,  and  ethical
grounds  of  interface  design.32 This  has  been  a  promising  technoscientific  adventure  for  me,  a
primordial  fieldwork soup from which to  address  the question  of  for  whom new materials  for
computer interaction are being developed. I’m struck by the extent to which in the development of
graphical interfaces, from augmented reality to flexible screens, the prototypes are exclusively made
to work for those figured as humans. To take note of how alternatives might stretch the designs of
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) to nonhuman users, Clara is now driving me past the parking
lots of the Open University to visit a charity called Medical Detection Dogs. 
Milton  Keynes  was  planned  as  an  architectural  experiment  more  than  fifty  years  ago.
Perhaps more a large town rather than a city, one of its salient features are its roundabouts. Clara is
driving  us  around  several  of  these  carousels  for  cars,  while  telling  me  more  about  Medical
Detection  Dogs  (MDD)  –  a  registered  charity  working  with  researchers,  NHS  Trusts,  and
Universities.33 MDD's  aim  is  to  train  specialist  dogs  to  detect  the  odour  of  human  disease.
Collaborations  between  the  Animal-Computer  Interaction  Lab  and  MDD  revolve  around  the
designing  of  technology  to  assist  the  dogs  in  tasks  such  as  cancer  screening.  In  recent  years,
research has been conducted by universities and charities like MDD, to explore dogs' biochemical
capacities  to  scent  and detect  diseases  such as  cancer,  by  sniffing  samples  of  urine  and  other
fluids.34
32 I sum up with this phrase the many times that Clara and I talked about ACI during my visit to the Open University.
33 http://medicaldetectiondogs.org.uk/about_us.html  (last accessed 22/06/2016)
34 Studies show how diseased bodies release volatiles with specific odours which a dog can smell. In the case of
bladder cancer, “dogs can be trained to distinguish patients with [the disease] on the basis of urine odour more
successfully than would be expected by chance alone. This suggests that tumour related volatile compounds are
present in urine, imparting a characteristic odour signature distinct from those associated with secondary effects of
the tumour” (Willis et al. 2004:1).
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 Figure 15. Medical Detection Dogs                Figure 16. Play at the workplace
      (photograph by author)     (photograph by author)   
In MDD dogs are trained for this task over a period of months, and both assistance and
biodetection dogs come to work on a daily basis.  On our arrival at MDD we are warmly welcomed
by both the staff and the dogs. I'm happy to meet these dogs with important jobs, to see them on the
chairs (figure 15) or playfully suggesting a break from work (figure 16). While greeting them, I take
note of the placement of barriers acting as screens to bound these dogs, via division of the spaces
meant for play from the places and the moments meant for work. Helping us to align or articulate a
first  encounter,  these  screens  become part  of  our  greeting  ritual:  a  cross-species  salute  making
meaningful  and  interesting  who  we  might  be  for  each  other,  a  respectful  gesture  shaped  by
reciprocal  curiosity  for  one  another,  where  the  question  is  who  are  you  and  so  who  are  we?
According to  Haraway a greeting ritual  is  choreographic.  It  rearranges  the “pace and elements
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within the repertoire that the partners already share or can cobble together” (2008:26).  It  is  an
exchange  of  the  partners'  ontological  portfolios,  so  to  speak,  a  creative  disclosure,  a  dance
informing  through  embodied  communication  what  takes  place  and  who  becomes  a  partner  in
semiotic  trade,  and how such partners  are  fleshed or  somatically  distinguished as  companions,
patterned  by  movements  making  moments,  places,  people,  and  things  present  (or  not)  to  one
another.        
Greeting rituals  are  open-ended ways of  encountering partners  as  Haraway's  companion
species.35 Haraway explains: “I find that notion [companion species], which is less a category than a
pointer  to  an  ongoing  “becoming with”,  to  be  a  much  richer  web  to  inhabit  than  any  of  the
posthumanisms on display” (Haraway 2008:16). Her use of this term for animals is given by the
meanings of the words species and companion; the latter pointing to a sense of keeping company or
consorting while being “with bread” as messmates at table, thus signalling that anybody can be on
the menu; the former addressing a respectful positioning that invites us to hold in regard, to notice
or to look back reciprocally, by paying attention and so esteeming what can begin with such polite
greetings, initiating a “becoming with” that eventually constitutes the polis where and when species
meet (2008:16-19). 
The sort of partnership addressed by the trope of companion species is key for the kind of
work developed at MDD. Thinking with and activating the possibilities of people and things as
companion  species  invites  us  to  acknowledge  that  partners  do  not  precede  their  meetings.
Partnerships grow from mortal encounters with no pregiven answers and no innocent solutions (i.e.
no lack of cost) for deciding what are we to become together. Polite greetings trigger reciprocal
35 In this chapter I use companion species to write about dogs and humans. But in later chapters, I use the expression
“people and things” to designate the partners  webbed or  assembled into apparatuses  like the self  checkout  of
supermarkets (chapter 6) and the automated teller of banks (chapter 7). Nonhuman or human, living or not, partners
emerge and sustain one another: bodies, accessories, organisms, tools, etc. are all matters of becoming with.
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inductions  in  which  partners  struggle  to  recognize  cues  to  each  other's  authorities  (Haraway
2008:220). As discussed below, this reciprocity comes from responses that require training to situate
the timing and spacing of conjoined activities and allocate the places and moments for work and for
play. By way of the attention and respect required in order to respond carefully to one another's
presence, partners become parties available to each other: they “become with and through” one
another. Following Haraway's reading of Vinciane Despret (2004), partners are reciprocally attuned
parties becoming more interesting in relation with each other, “more open to surprises, smarter,
more “polite”, more inventive” (2008:20)  This kind of domestication is a training in cooperation. 
Rob Harris, an experienced trainer of biodetection dogs at MDD, is talking now about the
collaborations that emerge from such coshaping of humans and dogs as partners. After inviting
Clara and me to attend a demonstration of cancer sample screenings by two biodetection dogs,
Daisy and Lucy,  Rob tells  us  about  the  precision  of  detail  required  for  arranging the  carousel
designed for the task (figure 17). Wearing gloves,  he shows us how to manipulate the samples
previously acquired for medical research purposes (figure 18).  The lab’s working model explains
how diseases like cancer and diabetes create biomarkers (e.g. altered blood sugar, volatile organic
compounds)  that  enter  the  bloodstream and  then  exit  through  exhalation  and  excretion.  These
biomarkers  are  sampled  for  dogs  to  scent,  performing  a  screening  activity  to  detect  cancer  or
diabetes in a sample (figure 19). Thus by taking samples of people when they exhale or urinate,
Daisy and Lucy may sniff and then screen the biomarkers of specific diseases in bodies already
diagnosed. 
Sample screening by biodetection dogs is  still  experimental,  which means that  it  is  still
under  study  for  its  value  in  medical  practice.  Researchers  such  as  Taverna  et  al.  (2014)  have
reported that dogs scenting volatile organic compounds of prostate cancer in urine samples can
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achieve over 98 percent of success in screening sensitivity and specificity.  For me that is quite
precise.
    Figure 17. Cancer screening carousel       Figure 18. Samples with/out cancer
               (photograph by author)              (photograph by author)
In this  shared workplace,  samples  that  come from bodies  with or without  a  disease are
arranged  around  the  carousel.  The  dogs  in  the  company  of  human  trainers  and  volunteers
collaborate for twenty minutes, by iteratively moving around the carousel with the samples. This
articulates different  locations or  points  for the dogs to  screen those samples  with a  disease by
sniffing  them.  For  a  biodetection  dog to  acknowledge this  workplace  as  a  serious  playground,
training  collaboratively  means  learning to  focus  on the  specific  markers  of  diseases.  Dogs  are
rewarded when they pay attention to the markers – some dogs prefer  a treat,  some others  like
playing with a ball. Sounds good, but there is a catch. A dog can learn to read a trainer's body,
instead of focusing on the biomarkers, to get the desired reward. As dogs read humans in very
nuanced  ways,  for  the  trainer  it  is  all  about  learning  to  help  the  dog  to  stay  focused  on  the
biomarkers. Both dogs and humans have to stay – in this reciprocally inductive way – with the
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trouble  of  reading  each  other,  by  facing  one  another  within  the  apparatus  assembled  around,
through,  and away  from this  carousel.  Let's  unpack  this  by  looking  in  detail  at  those  screens
attached to  the device,  in  order  to  grasp them through the movements  of  the  dogs around the
carousel. 
            Figure 19. Work model
                              (photograph by author)           
Biodetection dogs screening cancer 
The carousel  is  a  roundabout  of samples attached to metal  plates  serving as  stations  or
positions  for  biodetection  dogs  to  perform  a  course  of  action.  The  task  starts  with  a  release
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command  from  the  human  partner,  triggering  a  circuit  of  the  dog  around  the  carousel.  Here
biodetection  dogs  are  trained  to  approach  and  sniff  the  samples  in  order  to  screen  those  with
diseases. This walk around the plates of the carousel may be trained, more specifically, by arranging
the stations on a  straight line,  to focus on the distances  and the positionings  in between dogs,
humans, and samples. So a course of action with the samples arranged in a carousel, or in a straight
line,  may  end  with  a  reciprocal  reward  for  both  dogs  and humans,  who respectively  obtain  a
desirable treat and valuable information. In the case of successfully or unambiguously screening the
samples,  an honest  semiotic  trade takes place,  expressing joyfully  in  collaborative practice and
embodied communication the result of hard training. 
Lydia  is  one  of  the  many  volunteers  I  had  the  pleasure  to  encounter  at  MDD  while
witnessing  the  performances  of  biodetection  dogs  screening  cancer.  Lydia  is  handling  a  few
samples  prepared  by  Rob,  attaching  each  to  a  metal  plate  coupled  to  a  stand  (figure  20)  and
positioning them carefully  on a  straight  line  (figure  21).  In  this  way,  the  samples  become the
“targets”  to  be  sniffed  by  the  dogs  in  the  event  of  a  meaningful  walk  around  the  place.  The
arrangement  continues  in  another  corner  of  the  room,  where  Rob  places  a  bowl  with  water
surrounded by a  small  fence.  He asks  Lydia  to  bring  Daisy in,  she makes her  wait  inside the
confinement. Meanwhile, Clara is adding a pressure sensor to the plate of one of the stands, to
collect  data  about  the interest  that biodetection dogs may express when scenting a sample; for
similar purposes, the carousel is equipped with cameras registering the moments when the dogs
sniff  the  samples.  The precision  needed to assemble  the  apparatus  for  the  task requires  subtle
attention to the movements through which parties make things available to one another. 
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             Figure 20. Plates and samples           Figure 21. Stands on a straight line
       (photograph by author)          (photograph by author) 
This kind of regard is exhibited in the moments and places around, through, and away from
an alignment of samples. I prepare to zoom my own biomechanical eye into these moments of
movement, now that Daisy is out of the confinement ready to walk around the aligned samples. She
waits standing still for the release signal, looking at Lydia  attentively. 
I note the sort of mutual response that is expected to take place here is not a functional
reaction,  not  merely  triggered  by  the  release  signal,  but  devised  through  a  cascade  of  joyfull
anticipation  (figure  22),  because  the  task  at  hand  includes  the  possible  coming  into  being  of
unexpected  things,  novel  and  loose  from the  grip  of  functional  calculation,  as  training  is  for
“opening up what  is  not  known to be possible,  but  might  be,  for  all  the intra-acting partners”
(Haraway 2008:223).36 The  coshapings  activated  by training  in  cooperation  make methods and
36 As discussed in chapter 5, Haraway's use of “intra-action” follows Barad's agential realism; partners in intra-action 
do not precede their meetings. 
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create  disciplines.  But  these  outcomes  will  not  exhaust  the  collaborative  inventiveness  of
“becoming with”.  Lydia and Daisy know what  may happen next,  but  the moments  and places
around,  through,  and  away  from the  aligned  samples  may  open  up  a  time  and  space  too  for
something  new and  free.  In  this  sense,  Lydia  and  Daisy  are  about  to  work  by  threading  and
becoming  the  threads  of  a  contact  zone  “where  the  action  is,  where  the  interactions  change
interactions  to  follow.  [As  here]  probabilities  alter;  topologies  morph;  [and]  development  is
canalized by the fruits  of reciprocal induction” (Haraway 2008:219).  Sisi!  That is the sound to
release her.
Figure 22. Release
(photograph by author) 
Daisy turns around promptly to make a pass by the first stand, misses it and goes to the
second stand (figure 23); she scents the rest of the samples and turns around again, looking lost.
Dogs like Daisy can only become lab partners, dogs with important technoscientific jobs,  enrolled
in practices of screening by scenting samples, if humans like Lydia can recognize the problem of
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training as that of responding in the contact zone to each other's authorities. So when what becomes
authored by a partner is missed, a breakdown of a course of action takes place. In this case, Daisy
fails to recognize Lydia's authority as exerted around and through the apparatus, as evidenced by
missing a sample. Lydia talks about the matter with Rob, they agree that the problem lies in the
distance between the first stand and the next one. Re-aligning the stands, Lydia moves the samples a
bit closer. Signs of departure such as release sounds are intrinsic to the immanences webbed in a
contact zone. While beginnings and ends may appear arbitrary, to become partners means that no
one can jump over the multiple entry points and exit passages created over a course of action. Thus,
becoming in touch is always remaining in contact, by detaching each other from one course of
action and (re)attaching one another to the next. Contact zones are then better understood as webs
of interdependence with open-ended edges (Haraway 2008:218).
Figure 23. Sniffing
(Photograph by author)
With the  set  of  samples  realigned,  a  new circuit  around them can take place.  After  the
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release sound, dog and human break face-to-face contact  and (by going to  the samples)  Daisy
creates an entry point: a fleeting mark of the beginning of this circuit around the stands, a passage
through the apparatus. Then approaching the plate of the first stand, she sniffs and slows down,
keeping her nose near the sample. She stops, turns around, and faces Lydia (figure 24). She licks,
sits, and waits pointing diligently; for a moment her eyes hover in between Lydia and the stand.
Then another mark, a clicker pressed by Lydia, making a poignant sound to signal the screening of a
positive sample. Lydia and Daisy engage here in a semiotic trade creating data about the sample via
embodied communication.37 In this way, markers like a clicker triggered by a human partner can
affirm a biodetection dog's response while the latter is still facing the sample. This wraps up the
circuit, opening up exit passages for different outcomes crafted during the task at hand: including
the data about the samples, the affects after a job, and the volatile compounds of a cancer. 
Figure 24. Screening
(photograph by author) 
37 Biodetection dogs like Daisy are rewarded in all cases where the samples are correctly screened, including the
positive detection of negative samples only. The acknowledgement of non-literal gestures (metacommunication) is
key here.
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When a smooth circuit  with an unambiguous screening of the samples takes place,  play
dovetails  into  this  workplace.  The grace  of  play may be already felt  and performed during  an
excellent  walk  around  the  samples,  but  in  the  exit  passage  the  circuit  includes  a  moment  of
movement  for  the  joy  of  “getting  it”  in  this  contact  zone.  When work and play  are  fused  by
acknowledging  and  acting  out  the  workplace  as  a  serious  playground,  dogs  stretch  the  joy  of
successful  walks  by getting a  reward and playing some more,  a  contagious  affect  that  reaches
human  partners  as  well.  The  growth  of  loving  bonds  via  reciprocal  induction  matters  in  this
workplace (figure 25). Lydia is bringing Lucy in now, and she says that Lucy gets stressed easily,
and prefers to train with Lydia as she can read her particular body language, and vice-versa. It is
difficult  to  explain  why,  says  Lydia.  But  perhaps  it  is  because  “unexpected  conjunctions  and
coordinations of creatively moving partners in play take hold of both and [project] them into an
open that  feels  something like an  eternal  present  or  suspension of  time,  a  high of  “getting it”
together in action,  or what I am calling joy.  No liver cookie can compete with that!  (Haraway
2008:241). 
Exit passages of well-webbed contact zones throw both trainer and trainee back into “the
open” by enfolding unexpected effects into the moments of movement of a circuit. We can see this
more clearly by paying attention to the screens of the alignment of samples. I have articulated four
moments  of  movement:  a  time  to  release,  sniff,  screen,  and  reward.  Note  how  play  may  be
exhibited  in  the  anticipation  of  the  release,  and in  the  joy  of  a  meaningful  circuit.  Since  play
happens not only during the moments of reward,  when collaboration breaks down, play is  also
ripped apart. In other words, while the fences of our greeting ritual separated work and play, the
metal plates of the carousel and the aligned samples dovetail or diffract work and play together
apart.
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Figure 25. Lydia and Lucy
(photograph by author)
Screens  here conjoin  the  work and play  of  both partners  in  motion,  and separate  those
movements into different moments around, through, and away from the samples. Most helpfully,
markers  such as  the  release  signal,  the  organic  volatiles,  and the  clicker  draw attention  to  the
position  and  division  of  dogs,  humans,  and  samples  aligned  by  screens  here  in  biodetection
practices.  I  build  on the point  developed in earlier  chapters,  that  there is  a practical  difference
between a screen and a surface. To study screens, one has to include the gaps between the surfaces,
to account for screens or screening practices as placing divisions, resulting from the alignment of
surfaces and the gaps between them in particular situations. So, this way of accounting for screen
agencies includes what they may configure through their surfaces, and also how they affect what
happens around and away from them. By looking beyond the visual  display of the surfaces of
screens, I pay attention as well to their capacities for placing divisions. I think this helps to grasp in
practice  how  screens  configure  functions  that  overflow  what  happens  in  the  framing  of  their
surfaces or “interfaces”. In this sense, the screening of samples in the lab may not be reduced to the
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moments when these dogs sniff the metal plates, as this biodetection task depends on a circuit,
performed by both humans and dogs, that stretches around and away from the aligned samples. 
In  the  contact  zones  created  at  MDD  for  biodetection  dogs  to  screen  cancer,  the
interdependencies of the task that thread dogs, humans, and samples together intersect with the
people and the things that articulate the moments of movement needed for releasing, sniffing, and
rewarding the humans and the dogs. In this sense, the moment of release presupposes that people
and things at MDD have already made a space in which to place the carousel or the line of samples.
The moment of release signals how all the surfaces around the stands at MDD – the desks, papers,
chairs, mugs, walls, ceilings, floors, etc. – are all in position ready to bound a circuit around the
samples. It also takes some hard work to align the stands: sniffing is about what follows the release,
a moment of movement around the stands when biodetection dogs take (or don't) each sample into
account,  and  stay  in  touch  (or  not)  with  their  human  partners,  stretching  a  passage  that
acknowledges the placement of the dog's authority. I discussed above how the gaps in between the
stands make a place for the entry points and exit passages of a circuit. Their alignment is needed for
the screening of the samples. The carousel makes this evident by allocating a roundabout of gaps in
between several metal plates, placing stations for dogs to screen the samples. We may also think
about this by taking this place as a laboratory: a kind of experimental site upon which people may
exert a matrix of coordinates. The metal plates can be taken as part of a medical research apparatus
that affixes a set of ordered points and gaps to coordinate or circulate references in practice, as
suggested by Latour (1999). In this way, dogs are not the only ones looping in the circuit around the
aligned stands. In the presence of a positive sample, the dog and the cancer may circulate together,
“with  and  through”  each  other,  since  this  apparatus  co-locates  them  through  “what  is  called
reference, both in geometry (through the attribution of coordinates) and in the management of stock
(through the affixing of specific numbers)” (Latour 1999:32). Precision matters. 
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But  sniffing  accurately  is  not  enough.  What  follows  is  the  actual  task  of  screening the
samples, a moment of movement when the dogs respond to what they sniff through the plates.
While  training with biodetection dogs means iteratively aligning them with the samples,  in the
presence of cancer the dogs themselves become screens, by sensing, filtering, and bringing into
view the disease for a human partner. But at the same time, this action begs the question of how
exactly biodetection dogs detect the volatile compounds of the disease, as researches do not know
how these  biomarkers  become  so  meaningful  for  them.38 On  the  one  hand,  this  apparatus  for
medical research offers a chance for a human partner to witness a biodetection dog's authority while
responding  to  the  samples.  On  the  other,  to  allow  biodetection  dogs  to  detect  cancer  while
remaining silent  about  their  methods may be controversial.  One stark position in  the debate is
captured by the words of Brian Palmer, writing for the digital magazine Slate.com. “Perhaps we
need a small core of well-trained animals to help us figure out what, exactly, the chemical signals
are.  Machines – man’s other best  friend – can take it  from there.”39 Making such machines by
borrowing  from  the  work  of  training  biodetection  dogs  is  indeed  an  option  opened  up  by
reconfiguring the moments of screening the samples.  We can think about  this  as an alternative
located alongside other rewarding outcomes of a circuit. Thus training with biodetection dogs to
screen cancer  may result  in  engineering  a  valuable device  that  aims to  automate the  detection
process. In this case the process would not implicate a human-dog, co-evolving friendship,  but
instead a human-machine interaction, both orientable towards the screening of a disease. So my
only remark is to disagree with inviting biodetection dogs to collaborate in the lab only to be later
disregarded as partners for less organically assembled technologies (such as robot noses to detect
cancer).  Let  “man's  other  best  friend”  take  it  from  here? I  prefer  to  let  humans,  dogs,  and
38 The challenge lies on finding exactly what it is the dogs can smell, because researchers cannot tell what markers
they are sensing.
39 'Roll  Over!  Shake!  Smell  This  Mole!  Are  dogs  really  a  good  way  to  screen  for  cancer?'  By  Brian  Palmer.
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2014/05/cancer_sniffing_dogs_can_dogs_dete
ct_and_screen_for_disease.html (last accessed 15/06/2016)
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machines collaborate. In this case, exemplified by my reading of the plot of biodetection practices
at MDD as training together in the contact zone, partners unlearn assumptions about one another
and enrich each other's ignorance, to borrow Haraway's words. Here I prefer to stay with the trouble
of training with biodetection dogs, the values they attach to science and technology, and the affects
they share with humans in the laboratory. 
The exit passage is a moment of movement that provides an occasion to think about what is
made  in  a  course  of  action.  While  the  creativities  of  dogs  and  humans  are  evident  in  their
collaboration  around  the  carousel  and  the  line  of  samples,  the  derivatives  of  their  inventive
isopraxis expand beyond the moment of screening. One such creation is the pressure sensor that
Clara attached to one of the stands in order to investigate the dogs' confidence in the moment of
screening.  In  practice,  sometimes  a  biodetection  dog  appears  to  signal  more  than  just  binary
answers.  So,  when  working  well,  a  pressure  sensor  can  help  to  discriminate  the  responses  of
biodetection dogs, as the collected data may show that sometimes these dogs utter something else
beyond yes or no. Setting the pressure sensor for the task seems tricky: it should be robust enough
to react to a dog's touch yet precise enough to sense the pressure applied. Yet “getting it” opens up
human-dog  exchanges  in  semiotic  trade.  “It  is  not  potentially  infinite  expressiveness  that is
interesting  for  play  partners,”  Haraway  writes,  “but,  rather,  unexpected  and  nonteleological
inventions that can take mortal shape only within the finite and dissimilar naturalcultural repertoires
of companion species” (Haraway 2008:237).  To train and to play together  in  the contact  zone,
calculations, methods, disciplines, sciences, technologies, etc. are required at MDD for proposing
how people and things may become with and through one another. Nevertheless, play is not tamed
by the rules produced to work out those propositions because “play needs rules but is not rule-
defined” (Haraway 2008:238). Thus while a pressure sensor feeds the calculations of Clara's laptop,
this  task  momentarily  entails  a  letting  go  of  the  literal,  to  open  up  the  binary  patterns  of
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communication embodied in semiotic trade (Haraway 2008:239). I will make this point once more
with  another  example  of  screens  in  Animal-Computer  Interaction,  but  first  I  turn  to  the  wider
question of the place of animals in science and technology.   
Bringing the animals back in again
In a special issue of Environment and Planning D on Animal Geography (1995), Jennifer
Wolch and Jacque Emel note that much social theory remains stubbornly anthropocentric. When it
comes  to  controversies  about  social  or  natural  issues,  they  observe,  the  consistently  invisible
contribution and the suffering of non/human animals tends to be out of the debate. Human “natures
and societies” are rarely called into theoretical or practical question,  as figurations that silently
assume  differences  between  humans  and  animals.  These  distinctions  are  typically  based  on
cognitive capacities of technological expression; in particular, whether tool making is regarded as
infused with linguistic creativity or symbolic communication. In science and technology studies, the
consequence of naturalizing this distinction in social history has been most notably examined by
Latour and Haraway. They critically claim that 'we' have never been modern (Latour 1993) nor
human (Haraway 2008) – meaning that people and things cannot be smoothly reduced to any Grand
Divide of the Social and the Natural. Similarly, Wolch and Emel recall that animals are “central to
environmental sustainability, economic and social order, personal relations and individual identity,
and conceptions of justice and morality” (1995:632). Through this reminder, they bring the animals
back in as non/humans knotted in mortal bonds, rather than as naturally other and detached.
While Wolch and Emel remind us not to take the Human and the Nonhuman as a Grand
Divide, I stretch this insight further to study what might happen when animals are brought back in
to our thinking about screens, without assuming in advance what humans and non/human animals
73
are. I consider the human and the animal as becomings, useful to think with when taken as made in
figurative processes. Made through configurations, the human and the animal are not only symbolic
but lived textures, fleshed out in practice. 
Wolch and Emmel's invitation to bring the animals back in was followed by a series of
further publications (Wolch & Emel 1995, Philo 1995, Philo & Wolch 1998, Whatmore & Thorne
1998, Philo & Wilbert 2000). This new impetus encouraged Geography to think about culture and
nature at the border of Human Geography (Anderson 1995), a push that consequently made a place
in theory for the study of animal geographies. The relevance in Geography of the mutual influence
of non/human animals on each other (a traffic across the non/human distinction) was noted much
earlier in Bennet's (1960) call for a cultural animal geography (Philo & Wilbert 2000:4). While
older traces of the study of animals in physical Geography go back to Zoogeography at the turn of
the nineteenth century, as defined by Philo & Wilbert, Animal Geography focuses on how “animals
have been socially defined, used as food, labelled as pets or pests,  as useful or not, classed as
sentient,  as fish,  as insect,  or as irrational 'others'  which are evidently not human,  by differing
peoples in differing periods and worldly contexts” (2000:5). 
Animal  Geography  is  concerned  in  this  way  with  the  placement  of  animals  and  their
figuration in  nature and society,  as  well  as  with devising ways of  thinking with and living as
non/human  animals.  The  senses  of  place  that  Animal  Geography  is  eager  to  explore  are  the
placement of animals in classificatory schemes – where the empire of “the proper' rules in the place:
the elements taken into consideration are beside one another, each situated in its own 'proper' and
distinct location” (de Certeau 1984:1774 see also Philo & Wilbert 2000:6). Animal Geography can
be interested too in escaping these human orderings, curious about how animals open places for
themselves,  resisting the placement  of  non/human distinctions.40 Here I  highlight  how studying
40 The 'proper'  places  animals  can  escape  from are  conceptual  and  material,  as  well  as  temporal  and  spatial,  in
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screens with animals interpellates matters of placing the animal in technoscience. 
In Animal Geography, Media and Cultural Studies, in Sociology and Anthropology, or in
Science  and  Technology  Studies,  I  find  it  hard  to  find  examples  of  cases  where  animals  in
technoscientific  contexts  are  not placed  as  symbolic  representation,  raw material  or  objects  of
research.  There  are  significant  matters  to  talk about  when animals  are  placed in  such ways in
science and technology.41 But the topic of collaboration between animals and machines, and more
specifically the issue of inviting animals to work with scientific apparatuses,  to perform as lab
partners,  is  rare.  Examples  of  human-animal  collaborations  may be  found at  the  crossroads  of
animal  studies  and  science  and  technology  studies;  take  Haraway's  'becoming  with'  her  dog
Cayenne  in  agility  sport  for  instance  (2008:205-248).  Nevertheless,  cases  of  partnerships  in
configuring  the  animal,  the  human,  and the  machine  in  the  midst  of  laboratory  work are rare.
Studying  then  the  collaboration  of  machines  such  as  screens  and  animals  such  as  dogs  is  a
contribution  to  the  geographical  examination  of  places  where  animals  and machines  can  work
together,  rather  than  appear  as  backdrops  for  configuring  the  human.  Interestingly,  screen  and
animal agencies alike can be misleadingly taken as springing just from their surfaces. It is not just
animals that may be seen as a surface for imagining the limits of the human (Philo & Wilbert
2000:5), but also screens may be reduced to the passive surfacing of a display for and of the human.
This neglects the placement of the divisions between the animal, the human, and the machine as a
creative achievement, a lived difference materially realized by more than human agencies.
classificatory  schemes  and  physical  locations,  from the  wildernesses  'out  there'  to  the  cities  'in  here'.  While
reviewing  literature  for  this  chapter,  John  Law and  Annemarie  Mol  (2002:14)  citing  Michel  Foucault  (1970)
happily reminded me that Jorge Luis Borges tells the story of an odd ordering scheme for animals, the Celestial
Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge. This taxonomy sorts out animals into: (1) those that belong to the emperor,
(2) embalmed ones, (3) those that are trained, (4) suckling pigs, (5) mermaids [or sirens], (6) fabulous ones, (7)
stray  dogs,  (8)  those  that  are  included  in this  classification,  (9)  those  that  tremble as  if  they were mad,  (10)
innumerable ones, (11) those drawn with a very fine camel hair brush, (12) et cetera, (13) those that have just
broken the flower vase, and (14) those that, at a distance, resemble flies.
41 For example see Lansbury (1985) on vivisection; Birke (1994) on feminism, animals, and science; Ryan (2000) on
animal photography; and Franklin (2007) on animal clonation.
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The problem of how animals might be studied in (human) Geography for their  place in
sociocultural  contexts,  including  technoscientific  ones,  is  most  clearly  stated  by  Chris  Philo.
Whereas  in  human  geographies  animals  become members  of  a  society  (at  least  in  theory)  by
accounts  of  their  utility  to  humans,  in  animal  geographies  they must  be seen as  “enmeshed in
complex power relations with human communities, and in the process enduring geographies which
are  imposed  upon  them 'from without'  but  which  they  may  also  inadvertently  influence  'from
within'”  (Philo  1995:655).  Note  how  Philo's  sense  of  enduring  a  geography  points  to  animal
suffering.  But  this  expression  may  be  read  as  well  in  the  sense  of  materializing  concrete
geographies  imposed  'from without',  while  animals  can  offer  a  resistance  'from within'  to  this
process.  These  powerful  utterances  of  resistance  are  tied  to  practices  of  discipline  and
domestication.  Still,  within  this  narrative,  alternative  histories  may  be  performed  across  the
non/human  distinction  (Ingold  2000:61-76).  As  stated  more  recently  by  Henry  Buller,  the
anthropocentric  accent  of  theory,  including  Geography  and  studies  of  animals  in  science  and
technology,  has  given  way to  questions  of  legitimacy:  “to  ‘speak’ for,  to  and with  animals  or
demand  a  radically  different  biopolitical  or  cosmopolitical  engagement”  (2014:310).  For  me,
collaborations  between  non/human  animals  work  well  to  investigate  such  matters.  Carefully
articulated  meetings  afford  the  possibilities  (at  least  in  theory)  of  avoiding  domination.  They
subvert  the  stress  of  creating  ways  for  non/human  animals  to  escape  any  foul  engagement.
Creativity becomes redirected to craft response-able partnerships without “any ‘final peace’ of a
uniform yet predetermined accord” (Buller 2014:315, paraphrasing Haraway 2008:297); and one
example  of  such  creative  and  inexhaustible  making  goes  by  the  name  of  animal-computer
interactions.
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Morphisms and ethnographic approaches in Geography 
The anthropomorphization  of  non/human animals  in  Geography is  a  tricky and perhaps
unavoidable  matter.  Yet  making  people  and  things  anthropomorphic  can  be  detached  from
considering  the  human as  an anthropocentric  essence:  a  fixed attribution  of  specific  organisms
always born human in advance.  As mentioned above, anthropomorphization can rather signal a
traffic  across  the  non/human  distinction.  It  may  be  one  way,  one  tool  to  configure  or  to  give
particular forms: a morphogenesis to shape versions of the non/human. It is not an essentialist,
representative move, but  rather the making of a distinction – a boundary attributed to multiple
people  and  things.  Anthropomorphization  is  one  technique  to  devise  the  non/human;  one
assemblage42 to become non/humans. If  anthropomorphization is a morphogenetic process,  then
rather  than  anthropomorphism  “we  should  be  talking  of  many  different  possible  'morphisms',
whether  these  be  technomorphism,  zoomorphism  or  whatever.  The  claim  is  that  the  term
'anthropomorphism'  actually  'underestimates  our  humanity'”  (Philo  &  Wilbert  2000:19,
paraphrasing Latour 1993:235, 1993:137). Latour's point is that the 'anthropos' and the 'morphos'
together  signal  that  which  attributes  human  shapes,  and  that  which  gives  shapes  to  humans.43
Anthropomorphization  is  a  fleshy  becoming.  But  things  can  be  otherwise  and  people  can  be
refigured.  The  anthropomorphic  is  not  necessarily  an  anthropocentric  configuration,  if  one
considers  people  and things  as  immersed in  processes  of  becoming non/human and otherwise.
Thinking  with  morphisms  is  useful  then  for  putting  into  practice  more  inclusive  (less
anthropocentric) ways of becoming; for example, to configure collaboration as a “common cause
42 See chapter 5. The concept of assemblage has a rhizomatic emergence in various disciplines. For a definition see
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus (1987). For applications in philosophy or science and
technology studies see Manuel DeLanda's A New Philosophy of Society (2006), Bruno Latour's Reassembling the
Social (2005), and John Law's After Method (2004). For a take on Foucault's apparatus (dispositif, device) as an
assemblage see Deleuze's What is a Dispositif? (2007:338-348). 
43 See also Haraway (1989) and Castañeda & Suchman (2014).
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with animals in creating genuinely shared spaces able to sustain them simultaneously if differently”
(Philo & Wilbert 2000:20). 
Grasping how people  and things  morph or  become distinct  entities  is  a  methodological
challenge. I will examine this question by borrowing insights in support of ethnographic approaches
in Geography. I situate the issue as a problem of grasping animals morphing or becoming distinct
non/human entities, when placed “simultaneously if differently” in Animal-Computer Interaction. If
Animal Geography “challenges not only the place and placing of the human and the animal but,
critically, the methods we use to engage with both in relation” (Buller 2015:374), then ethnographic
approaches  to  Geography  seem  crucial  insofar  they  offer  a  reflection  or  consideration  of  the
placements of the animal, the human, or the machine. As Buller observes, “methodologies have
been  the  mechanism  by  which  such  ontological  and  epistemological  divisions  [between
non/humans] have, in the past, been maintained” (Buller 2015:375).44 At the same time, challenges
for ethnographic approaches to animals in Geography are linked to the reminder that animals look
back and express something that might be grasped, at least as an impression, by those who “take
upon themselves the address that an animal addresses to them” (Derrida 2008:14). 
Timothy  Hodgetts  and  Jamie  Lorimer's  (2015)  and  Henry  Buller's  (2015)  articles  on
methods in Animal Geography help me to trace how ethnographic approaches have encountered the
gaze of animals. With them I sense that methods to meet non/human animals become a prosaic
matter of training. Buller writes that methods such as ethnography in Animal Geography need to try
to  disentangle  themselves  from  “the  anthropocentric  and  humanist  social  sciences,  with  their
Durkheimian emphasis on social facts, social institutions, collective intentionality and individual
reflexivity, coupled with, after Mead [1964], the thrust of symbolic interactionism [since they] place
language as a prerequisite basis for entry into the 'social'” (2015:375). Methods to elude the Grand
44 See also Taylor's “Animals, Mess and Method: Post-humanism, Sociology and Animal Studies” (2012) drawing on
Law (2004).
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Divide  can  instead  shift  the  focus  back  and  forth  on  non/human  morphing:  becoming  animal,
human, machine, etc. Buller suggests this is a triple challenge. Animal geographers have to train
themselves  in  'going  beyond'  or  grasping  the  assemblage  of  ordering  schemes  (taxonomical
rankings) by focusing on animals as entangled (enmeshed) with non/human distinctions in their
specific becomings. This is the crossing of their Umwelts, as put by Jakob von Üexkull, a concept
to  signal  the  environment  of  animals,  an  ethological  term  that  appears  in  the  philosophical
approaches to animals created by Heiddeger, Mearleu-Ponty, and Deleuze (Buchanan 2009). Animal
geographers have to practise with non-representational approaches for letting animals 'speak' while
attending to the animal that sees (Buller 2015:376). And for this task, animal geographers have to
keep exploring how to build response-able accounts of their touchy, feely, bodily impression of
what matters to non/human animals.
Writing for ethnographic approaches in Geography and elsewhere, Stever Herbert (2000)
insisted that ethnography gives irreplicable insights into the processes, meanings, maintenances, and
motivations of group formations or collectives: “If sociality and spatiality are intertwined, and if the
exploration of this connection is a goal of geography, then more ethnography is necessary” (Herbert
2000:564).  Ethnography  captures  the  situations,  generalizations,  and  variations  –  i.e.  the
occurrence, redundancy, and change – of meaningful practices. It provides unique approaches to the
daily placement of capacities and motives for the maintenance and variation of signifying processes.
Then for Herbert, “these processes and meanings vary across space, and [they] are central to the
construction  and  transformation  of  landscapes;  they  are  both place-bound  and  place-making”
(2000:550). He highlights how ethnographies may be tuned to grasp the placement of non/humans,
by simultaneously  acknowledging and responding to  the  various  criticism made at  the  time to
ethnography.45 Likewise,  Mike  Crang  (2003)  critically  reviews  the  limits  of  ethnography  in
45 “The aversion  to  ethnography may derive from three  major  criticisms frequently directed toward  it:  that  it  is
unscientific; that it is too limited to enable generalization; and that it fails to consider its inherent representational
practices.  Considered  responses  to  these critiques,  however,  restore  ethnography’s  significance  for  geographic
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Geography.  He  examines  biographic,  visual,  performative,  and  haptic  takes  of  daily  life  as  a
practical  accomplishment.46 In  his  view,  the  engagements  of  researchers  with  those  met  in
ethnographies  (signalled  by  a  touchy-feely  sense  of  proximity)  have  been,  in  fact,  limited  in
touching  and  feeling.47 I  read  Crang's  invitation  to  push  for  the  exploration  of  sensibilities  in
ethnographies as a suggestion to take seriously how research places make sense. I take the point as
made also by Sarah  Pink's  sensory ethnographies:  “I  suggest  thinking of  analysis  as  a  way of
making ethnographic places. Analysis might not [be] always distinguished from other activities. It is
indeed as sensorial a process as the research itself” (2009:3).
Mark  Paterson  (2009)  has  given  an  interesting  assessment  of  haptic  geographies  in
connection with ethnography, haptic knowledges and sensuous dispositions. His paper offers an
“overview  of  the  treatment  of  haptic  knowledges  in  Geography, responding  to  [the]  bodily
sensations  and  responses  that  arise  through  the  embodied  researcher  [after Crang’s  article  on
‘touchy-feely’ methods]”  (766).  Noting  the  haptic  as  a  conceptual  move  coming  initially  from
psychology's  interest  on  (synaesthetic)  bodily  sensations,  as  distinct  from the  classification  of
senses  (e.g.  the visual,  the tactile,  the olfactory,  the gustatory and the auditory),  he suggests  a
“'return  to  the  senses’ within  social  research,  most  notably  within  anthropology,  architecture,
cultural history and sociology, [rethinking] the positioned processes of research through the senses”
(Paterson 2009:767).  Considering  Hayden  Lorimer's  'sensuous  dispositions'  (2005:84),  Paterson
reviews the shift from studying discourses of embodiment, to grasping new ways of feeling that
would “arise through the technologies, disciplines and practices of late modernity” (2009:767).
study” (Herbert 2000:550).
46 This entails a long tradition of studies about daily life with ethnomethodologies. To name just a few tackled by
Crang (2003): Smith 2001; Laurier 2001; Laurier et. al. 2001, 2002; Duneier 2001; Stoller 1997; Dewsbury &
Naylor 2002.
47 “The solid grounding of qualitative fieldwork in the engaged reality of people’s lived experience seems coupled to a
focus upon verbal methods that paradoxically means qualitative work tends to produce very wordy worlds. So, on
the one hand there is a caution about visual methods, for fear of an objectifying realism, and, on the other, a focus
upon discursive construction produces forms of knowledge that are densely textured, in every sense […] I have
suggested that  the response to this need not only be more writerly texts, but also to push further into the felt,
touched and embodied constitution of knowledge” (Crang 2003:501).
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Ethnographic  sensibilities  seem  helpful  for  methods  in  Geography  and  elsewhere  to
(re)build actors,  i.e.  to  extend the associability  of agency to any entity  acting upon another  or
enrolling  an  actor.  Actors  are  devised  then  as  multiple:  as  associations,  as  networks,  or  as
assemblages. They become actants in the vocabulary of actor-network theory, with its attention to
non-human  agencies  (Latour  1983,  Callon  1986).  Actants  would  collect  their  associations
symmetrically, since the conceptual move extends the associability of agency to entities in equal
terms. What is tricky about this approach has been acknowledged  (see Law and Hassard, 1999) and
reworked by listing networks as one mode of association (Law and Mol 2001, Law and Singleton
2005, Law and Moser 2006).48 Philo has stressed how in Animal Geography with actor-network
theory (and after) it is “not foolish to be talking about animals possessing a measure of agency”
(2000:17).  Nevertheless,  for  Philo,  what  animal  geographers  should avoid  is  taking animals  as
'shadowy presences':  animating the  concern of  methods for  their  agencies  while  neglecting the
question of becoming animal, of morphing into different species or entities.49 When animals are
fixed or taken just as nonhumans, they seem to “stay in the margins more than is the case for
humans in,  say,  the qualitative and cultural  turns  of  the discipline  over  recent  decades”  (Philo
2005:829). 
Writing more recently for ethnography in Animal Geography, Buller vouches for different
ethnographic approaches as observational and participatory devices that attend, “on the one hand, to
the performance of routine practice and, on the other, to eventful and troubling interruptions” (2015:
48 Latour has instead modalized the network, in a different way, as a mode of existence. “Networks [net] have a
limitation:  they  do not  qualify values.  Law offers  a  point  of  comparison through its  own particular  mode of
displacement. There is thus a definition of “boundary” that does not depend on the notions of domain or network.
The mode of extension of objective knowledge can be compared with other types of passes. Thus any situation can
be defined through a grasp of the [net] type plus a particular relation between continuities and discontinuities”
(2013:vii-viii) 
49 Animals may not be the only non/human entities 'shadowed' while trying to account for the presence of their
agencies. Attila Bruni (2005) for instance, studying software to manage clinical records, suggest less critically that
“shadowing non-humans requires the ethnographer to be able to orient his/her observations to the material practices
that perform relations, and probably also to devise new narrative forms able to make that performance accountable”
(374).
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4).50 Similarly,  Hodgetts  and  Lorimer  have  emphasized  ethnographies  that  focus  on  “'attitude,
intent, and purposeful action' in animals.” (2015:3). The suggestion is to thread ethnographies by
outlining bodies, movement, being, and knowing together in practices with nonhumans: to account
for knowledges that cannot be thoroughly attributed to human agencies (Barad 2003). The point is
not  to  get  stuck  with  one  approach  to  agencies,  but  to  keep  unearthing  animal  practices  –
ethnographically or otherwise – by turning to further concepts: “to biophilosophy, notably what
[Whatmore] calls  Deleuze and Guattari’s  ‘'vital  topology'  (2002:5),  but also to feminist  science
studies (after Haraway), new phenomenologies of embodiment (inspired by Merleau-Ponty) and
non-representational theories [following Thrift 2000, 2007)] of performance and communication”
(Philo 2005:826, discussing Whatmore 2002).
I  collect  and  use  these  conceptual  resources  conjunctively.  Below I  will  put  them into
practice  by articulating  an  ethnographic  approach to  non/human animals  in  the  geographies  of
animal-computer  interactions,  in  the  placement  of  animals  around,  through,  and  away  from
technoscientific  apparatuses,  in  collaborative  practices  with  non/human  animals  and  screening
machines.  I  attune  my  ethnographic  sensibility  for  the  task  by  focusing  on  performances  and
communications  (by  following  the  attitudes,  intents,  and  purposeful  actions  of  non/humans);
drawing (on non-representational theories of diffraction) in order to grasp a touchy, feely, bodily
way of placing non/humans, thus of spacing and timing their  interactions.51 I think these resources
are  helpful  to  assemble  a  common practical  and conceptual  cause  when  studying  animals  and
screens. They suggest a move away from taking animals and screens only as surfaces that configure
boundaries  of and for  the human.  Instead,  they point  to  the agential  becoming or surfacing of
50 These  ethno-methodologies  assemble  and  devise  multispecies  (Kirksey  & Helmreich  2010)  and  trans-species
ethnographies. This passage by Buller (2014) enummerates just a few: “from Alger and Alger's [1999] study of a
cat shelter to the avowedly 'non-experimental' filmic investigation by Laurier et al. [2006] of dog walking in a
Swedish park;  from Despret's  [2005] ethno/ethology of scientific  engagement  with sheep in the field to Roe's
'experimental  partnering'  in  a  field  of  cows  [Roe  and  Greenhough  2014];  from  Barua's  [2013]  multi-sited
ethnographic reanimation of  elephant  tales  to Davie's  [2013] emergent  cartographies of  monstruous laboratory
mice” (4). 
51 An approach that will be developed further in chapters 6 and 7.
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screens  and animals,  as  figurations  assembled or  materialized  around,  through,  and away from
apparatuses.52
Charlotte's canine alarm system
Like  human-computer  interaction  (HCI),  the  interdisciplinary  field  of  Animal-Computer
Interaction  (ACI)  aims  to  materialize  meaningful  (graphical)  interfaces  for  specific  species.53
According to Clara “ACI can keep CHI [referring to the annual conference on Computer-Human
Interaction]  healthy by  reminding  it  of  what  Haraway  calls  the  “foolishness of  human
exceptionalism”. ACI belongs at CHI because HCI is ACI” (Mancini 2013:9). ACI has grown in the
past years in Europe and the US by studying animal-machine interfaces (Savage et al. 2000) and
designing with and for animals (McGrath 2009). Note the distinction between animal technology
and  technology  informed  by  Animal-Computer  Interaction.  As  explained  by  Clara,  “animal
technology [is] any technology intended for animals, whose development is not necessarily led by
user-centred design principle.  [On the other  hand,  technologies  informed by]  Animal-Computer
Interaction [are] the explicit and systematic application of design principles that place the animal at
the centre of an iterative development process as a legitimate user and design contributor” (Mancini
2013:2).  A game  called  Cat  Cat  Revolution  (2011),  a  positioning  system  in  Human-Canine
Interactions (2011), a mobile pet wearable computer and mixed reality system (2006), and a canine
alarm system designed by Charlotte Robinson (a doctoral researcher of the ACI Laboratory at the
Open University) comprise sound examples of ACI. Asking for whom new materials for computer
52 I unpack the concepts of assemblage and apparatus in chapter 5 and sketch with them two modes of grasping
screens. 
53 Using quite a different vocabulary,  I believe Robert E. McGrath from the National Center for Supercomputing
Applications of the University of Illinois makes a similar point  about the interfaces created by HCI and ACI:
“ultimately,  these systems seek to  create understandable and  pleasurable experiences  across radically  different
conceptual views, to create a virtual world that makes sense to participants with dramatically different behavioural
and cognitive repertoires, with significantly different motivations, and even different time scales. This virtual world
must then be “rendered” to and from sensory and motor events in species specific mappings” (2009:5). Species
matter.
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interaction are being developed, I came in touch with ACI after reading Clara's Manifesto for ACI
(2011) where she states the aim, ethical principles, benefits, and agenda of her grasp of the field. In
my  own  view,  “interfaces”  for  “species-appropriate  computer  mediated  interaction”  (McGrath
2009)  may  be  reimagined  in  less  anthropocentric  ways,  in  order  to  be  more  in  line  with  the
functional  requirements  and  lively  needs  of  non/human  animals.  But  as  discussed  below with
Charlotte's canine alarm system, ACI may tap as well into the creativities and affects expressed in
such collaborations.
Research  methods  to  decentre  the  human  in  favour  of  human-animal  relations  in  user-
centred  design  have  been  discussed  by  exploring  how sensemaking  (meaning)  happens  across
species  with  multispecies  ethnography  (Mancini  et  al.  2012),  or  by  sensing  interspecies  social
awareness; for example, through methods that foster “pawticipatory design,  labradory tests, and
canid camera  monitoring” (Mankoff  et  al.  2005:1).54 Such efforts  resonate  with the insights  of
animal  geographies  and  the  touchy-feely  ethnography  unfolded  above,  since  they  commonly
nominate  less  anthropocentric  ways  of  thinking  about  people  and things,  including non/human
animals.  Science  and technology studies  may be  tuned for  such purposes  as  well,  resulting  in
approaches  to  (human)  animal  and machine  relations  which  can  rely  on  a  kind  of  dancing or
juggling with their becoming (human) animal and machine. Note that it was with the sensibilities
proposed by these methodological inputs that I grasped the plot of biodetection dogs screening
cancer at  MDD, where humans and dogs become in touch and stay in contact by working and
playing together in contact zones: where “all the dancers are redone through the patterns they enact”
(Haraway  2008:25).  Since  contact  zones  are  webs  of  interdependence  with  open-ended  edges,
similar detailed readings that grasp the plots of people and things becoming with and through each
other can focus on the architextures resulting from the dances threaded by the partners. Note that
such readings do not require allocating a “centre” to place species specific “users”, but rather by
54 See also Kirksey and Helmreich (2010) on multispecies ethnography.
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following a course of action and focusing on the textures and architextures (of screens), readers
grasp how parties juggle with becoming (human) animal and machine.
Charlotte's canine alarm system is a phone that affords the possibility for a trained dog,
assisting  a  human in  an  emergency situation  in  the  household,  to  call  for  aid  by  sending text
messages  or  making  phone  calls  to  emergency  numbers,  family  members,  neighbours,  etc.  If
nobody else is  present  in  a  domestic  site  to  support  an assistance dog (when a human partner
suffers,  for  instance,  a  diabetic  coma) then  a  canine  alarm system made for  them can become
helpful.  Charlotte's  prototype  is  not  designed  for  dogs  to  bark  over  the  line,  but  rather  to
communicate an emergency by interacting with the a computer which sends an alarm message or
text.  In this  way,  following Clara,  the system is  informed by animal-computer  interactions and
Charlotte has tried to devise various textures to articulate the semiotic trades between assistance
dogs and her immobile device. One of these textures covers a tuggy-toy Charlotte has added for
these dogs to pull with their mouths in order to seek help (figure 26). The toy is attached to a chain
with a texture that matters as well, for the resistance of the toy to the force applied by the dogs
while pulling with their mouths. Following John Law and Marianne Elisabeth Lien (2013), these
textures are immanent and specific to relations and interdependencies threaded by human partners
and  their  assistance  dogs:  “The  textures  of  the  relations  that  make  up  the  webs  of  practice
characterise whatever is caught up in them. They  differentiate animals from one another” (Law and
Lien  2013:6).  They  may  differentiate,  as  well,  animals  from machines.  In  this  sense,  animal-
computer interactions can be understood as a becoming with by threading, or knotting and cutting,
the material qualities and boundaries of (human) animals and machines. Defining things as caught
up in the textures they produce emphasizes how the becoming of either humans or nonhumans is at
stake when non/human animals meet machines.55
55 The distinction  between people  and  animals  is  made in  practice,  insofar  “practices  enact  people  and  animals
together” (Law and Lien 2012:8)  
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In contrast to biodetection dogs screening diseases in the lab, assistance dogs go around
different  kinds  of  circuits  than  those  outlined  by a  carousel  with  distinct  positions.  Here  dogs
become  part  of  a  screening  task  not  by  facing  metal  plates,  but  by  aligning  themselves  with
apparatuses  whose  ontological  portfolios  take  them  into  account  as  nonhuman  “users”,  e.g.
apparatuses  to  assemble  and  devise  species  specific  emergency  responses,  while  texturing  and
enfolding  them into  a  web of  relations  of  humans,  dogs,  and machines.  These  “architextures”
pattern  the  practical  achievement  of  interfacing  partners,  as  a  juggling  with  the  becoming  of
(human) animals and machines. Again with Law and Lien, these architextures are choreographic.
They are the textures of choreographies (think about greeting rituals as setting up the dance floor to
constitute a polymorphous polis when and where species meet). Architextures “have to do with
ordered arrangements [of relations within and between practices] The latter extend across space […]
And they also extend across time” (Law and Lien 2013:7). In later chapters I focus on sensing the
timing and spacing of arrangements around, through, and away from screens.  But for now let's
spend time grasping the architextures of Charlotte's phone by detailing the moments of movement
around, through, and away from the tuggy-toy. 
I had the opportunity to witness this phone in action during the Summer Science Exhibition
of the Royal Society (London 2014). There, Charlotte and Clara, along with more researchers from
the Open and Lincoln Universities, accompanied by the staff and also the dogs from the charities
Medical Detection Dogs and Dogs for the Disabled, were all invited to demonstrate their work-in-
progress with technosciences made with and designed for dogs. Charlotte's canine alarm system
was immobilized (attached) to one of the large white panels framing our stand branded “technology
for dogs” (figure 27). Her phone was exhibited as one example of ACI. I had a chance as well to
cooperate here by helping to talk about technologies for dogs with the “public”. (At the end of that
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long week the script I crafted by repeatedly going with people around the stand, showing them the
many ongoing studies and prototypes, had more elements of anthropology, sociology and politics
than of design, computing, and psychology). From a video shown along with a simulation of a
prototype of Charlotte's alarm system, I borrow figures to describe the actions of assistance dogs
around, through, and away from the tuggy-toy. I discussed earlier the audiovisual format of a public
demonstration of technology. Now I detail how a course of action textures and enfolds the moments
in which a human, a dog, and a machine may “become with” each other, through situations whose
architextures bend around, through, and away from Charlotte's canine alarm system.
     Figure 26. Charlotte's canine alarm system                 Figure 27. At the Royal Society exhibit     
           (photograph by author)           (photograph by author)  
                         
  
The video shown as part of the exhibition was produced by collaborators in the ACI lab of
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the Open University. It was filmed at MDD and features Lydia acting a diabetic coma (falling on the
floor, becoming unconscious) and Lucy going around MDD (the household), pulling the tuggy-toy
attached to Charlotte's phone, and bringing it back to comfort Lydia as well as herself. Note these
four moments are part of an open list of movements of the course of action, which may happen
otherwise.  Since  no  breakdowns  are  shown  in  the  video,  Lucy  responds  promptly  and  goes
smoothly  around,  through,  and  away  from  the  alarm  system  back  to  aid  Lydia.  For  Lucy  a
s(t)imulated  circuit  may begin  when Lydia  drops  to  the  floor  and in  this  specific  moment  the
relation  between  Lydia  and  Lucy  is  marked  and  affected  by  Lydia's  sudden  immobility  and
immutability:  by  her  unconsciousness  texturing  a  “becoming  still”  that  Lucy  tastes  when  she
approaches to  kiss her  face (figure 28).  This works also as a release sign through which Lucy
detaches  herself  momentarily  from  Lydia,  or  to  put  it  von  Üexkull  terms,  their  Umwelts  are
separated. 
        Figure 28. Sensing Lydia's texture        Figure 29. Pulling the tuggy-toy
      (image taken from the ACI lab video)    (image taken from the ACI lab video)
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Lucy  traces  next  a  moment  of  movement  towards  Charlotte's  canine  alarm  system,
threading  a  meandering  passage  around  the  textures  of  the  architecture  of  MDD,  staged  as  a
household.  Here,  it  is  through  Lucy's  patch-work  of  putting  together  moments  of  movements
choreographically  that  a  web of  relations  between her  and  Lydia  may be  further  textured  and
enfolded in  architextures  that  include Charlotte's  canine alarm system. Such notable passage is
edited  out  from the video,  skipping to  the next  moment  when Lucy approaches  the  tuggy-toy,
performing  a  division  by  pulling  it  away,  and so  cutting  it  apart  from a  box that  contains  an
“Arduino” processor (figure 29).56 This small computing device reacts to the detachment of the
tuggy-toy by sending a text message or making a phone call (figure 30). It is the separation of the
toy that allows Lucy to trigger the alarm system, and eventually draw the attention of a family
member  or  neighbour  to  their  screens  and  the  emergency  situation.  This  division  screens  the
situation by creating a text(ure); moreover, it is by juggling the tuggy-toy between parties that the
dog and the screen may become significant for each other, they may become a dog and a screen for
one another. Articulating the care dogs have for their human partners, this apparatus creates a digital
screen that makes sense for Lucy to care for Lydia; furthermore, the creativities of this moment of
movement open up an exit passage through the  architextures of the course of action for Lucy to go
back to Lydia (figure 31). Together, apart, together again – this is a multipartner dance of knotting
and cutting together apart, all the way down. 
56 The alarm system includes a Raspberry Pi B+ and Arduino Leonardo. “The Arduino was used for input and output
control and the Pi to control audio and internet connection” (Robinson et al. 2015:341).
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Figure 30. Making a phone call     Figure 31. Caring for Lydia
                   (photograph by author)                 (image taken from the ACI lab video)
Again,  in  contrast  to  biodetection  dogs  screening  cancer,  assistance  dogs  face  not  an
apparatus  for  medical  research  (at  least  not  in  the  video  looping  during  the  Royal  Society
exhibition) but an emergency situation that may be stressful for them – in sites where the care
(rather  than  the  authority)  expressed  through human-dog relationships  becomes  articulated  and
reconfigured with an apparatus that includes a screen in the architexture of this contact zone at
MDD. Aligning a screen in ACI arranges a patchwork of moments of movement, in which (human)
animals and machines become meaningful for each other. By grasping such courses of action in the
making of their webs of relations, we refigure the human and nonhuman as a distinction of lived
texture, fleshed or aligned without centring their agencies around a single species.
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Chapter 5. Folding my office
I depart now from my friends at MDD, but highlight once more a key insight that I explored
with them: screens are alignments made in action that arrange significant displays (bringing cancers
or emergencies into view, leaving other things unnoticed). The displays of cancer and emergency,
what is brought into view with dogs, can be felt as a “texture” (Law and Lien 2013) or quality that
characterizes the partners in the partner's web of relations. I examine the divisions of screens next,
to think about their limits as un/en/folded or stretched beyond their displays. I discuss how paying
attention beyond displays contributes to studying screens, by situating two screens in my office's
workplace and unpacking them with the writing of the chapter. While writing I detail my mode of
grasping these screens as part of a fold that I call my workplace. To complement the allegory of my
workplace as a fold, I address with the help of assemblages and apparatuses what these screens
bring  into  view and what  they  leave  out  of  sight.  These  concepts  emphasize  how actions  can
articulate screens, enveloping them within multiple and heterogeneous arrangements. The notion of
action as assemblage articulates screens as performed, while arrangements read as apparatuses of
bodily  production  delineates  enactments  of  screens  as  parts  of  open-ended  configurations.  For
Haraway, making a living disciplines action as patterns of aligned sequences, but play disrupts these
recurrences.57 Here, I tinker with her point by doing alignments with two screens named Vig and
Ben. I share my performance of such alignments with them, where “I” articulate how “we” hang
together by displacing one another, knotting and cutting the limits of our actions and arrangements
at my workplace.
57 “Play makes an opening. Play proposes... Functional patterns put a pretty tight constraint on the sequence of actions
in time... The sequences in a serious conspecific fight or in any other of the important action patterns for making a




How have we grasped so far the displays of screens? In chapter 3, with the example of
Google Glass, we considered how screens, when seen as single surfaces, produce observers that
appear to attend exclusively to the figures displayed. They miss something about the screens they
are looking at, something that is left out of sight, by confining themselves to the display. Against
such occulo-centric reduction of the screen to the display, we began to grasp screens as practical
alignments, bringing something into view and leaving something else out of sight. In chapter 4, with
the cases of dogs screening cancer and collaborating in the design of screens in Animal-Computer
Interaction,  we detailed how such alignments may be articulated by humans and dogs,  making
screens by assembling a course of action around, through, and away from the cancer samples and
the canine alarm system.  
If  textures  display  people  and things,  but  leave  something else  out  of  sight,  screens  in
animal-computer interaction entail partnering up in order to unfold the actions that bring something
into  view,58 and  enfold  something  else  that  is  left  unnoticed.  Unfolding  actions,  enfolded  into
arrangements. What is the fold? It's a figure to draw boundaries, the insides and outsides of people
and things, always in-the-making, sorted in practice rather than prefixed. Therefore, by unfolding I
mean that the partners thread the actions through which they become meaningful for one another in
a  web of  relations,  and by enfolding I  suggest  that  screens  can  become significant  in  animal-
computer interaction, insofar they help partners to relate to one another within that web of relations.
The  figure  of  the  fold  features  prominently  in  Leibniz's  philosophy.  Here  I  follow  Geoffrey
Bowker's ‘plea for pleats’ (2010). For Bowker, the fold as allegory can help science and technology
studies  to  remain  mindful  of  the  multiplicity  and  the  insides  and  outsides  of  technoscience
(2010:123-139).  The  fold  may  be  useful  to  think  about  sociotechnical  devices.  I  grasp  my
58 The Oxford English Dictionary tells us that the middle English terms unfurl and unfold are etymological roots of
the word display.
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workplace with folds as performed and performative of the insides and outsides of two screens.
Drawing on studies of screens in workplaces (Luff et al. 2000, Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002), I
focus on two screens as part of my workplace grasped as a fold, to sketch my ongoing ways of
performing the workplace’s boundaries, of un/en/folding them with the display of screens.  
According to  Bowker's  assessment  of  science  and technology studies,  particularly  when
inspired by social  constructivism, there appears  to  be a tendency to “avoid philosophizing and
valuing:  our  task,  it  seems,  as  social  students  of  science  is  to  represent  their  categories  [the
categories  of  those  under  study],  not  to  develop  our  own”  (Bowker  2010:123).  Bowker  then
introduces Leibniz's fold as a metaphor to make a way of reading science – pleats would keep
nature  and  culture  undivided,  folded  onto  each  other  when  studying  them.  If  his  plea  can  be
extended to sociotechnical devices,  our grasping of screens will  propose to look at  displays as
alignments  –  bringing  something of  nature  undivided  from culture  into  view,  but  leaving  also
something else  out  of  sight,  separated from view.  Here my workplace  is  what  screens  help  to
assemble in my office by knotting or putting together people and things around this office I share
with fellow students. In this way I'll read, with the concept of assemblage, the unfolding of my
workplace.  Complementing  this  reading,  I'll  grasp  with  the  concept  of  apparatus  what  I  sense
screens  divide  and  conceal  as  enfolded  beyond  them,  around  and  away  from  their  displays.
Considered together, unfolding and enfolding enable an account of screens as alignments. 
I find the notion of assemblage – taken as a method for making present the hinterland of
relations that “generates presence, manifest absence and Otherness” (Law 2004:42) – attractive for
reading  screens  as  bringing  something  into  view.  John  Law's  concept  of  assemblage  helps  to
address screens without reducing them to their display, supporting a closer engagement with the
methods that we need to approach these material configurations. I also find the notion of apparatus
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helpful,  taken  as  a  method  to  make  present  the  hinterland  of  relations.  Apparatuses  can  be
understood with Michel Foucault as arrangements of light and shadow, most famously in the figure
of the panopticon (1977). They resonate with an understanding of screens as concealing something
strategically, while bringing something else into view. In this sense, I take apparatuses as a method
to address the hinterland of relations of screens, a diffractive method informed by Karen Barad's
reading of Foucault's apparatus through a realist ontology borrowed from physicist Niels Bohr. For
Barad,  apparatuses  are  about  interfering  and messing  with  what  I  read  as  Law's  hinterland  of
relations – “apparatuses are specific material reconfigurings of the world” (2007:142).
Let's  begin to grasp the hinterland of screens with the help of Natasha Myers’ work on
crystallographers, giving a body to and having a feeling for molecules (2008). Myers studies the
body-work of crystallographic model-building:  of constructing,  manipulating and so embodying
protein  models  in  the  lab.  Her  detailed  account  of  molecules,  crystallographers,  models,  and
computer  screens  being  unfolded  through  the  modelings  of  chemists  and  their  own molecular
embodiment of proteins,  points us to practices and stories where bodies and matter co-produce
bodily volumes:
As she [Diane] tells the story, she contorts her entire body into the shape of the misfolded
protein. With one arm bent over above her head, another wrapping around the front of her
body, her neck crooked to the side, and her body twisting, she expresses the strain felt by the
misshapen protein model. “And I'll get this pained expression”, she tells me. “I get stressed
just looking at it... It's like I feel the pain that the molecule is in, because it can't go like
that!” She feels compelled to fix the model. She mimes a frantic adjustment of the side-
chain by using one arm to pull the other back into alignment with her body, tucking her arms
in towards her chest and curving her torso over toward the core of her body, demonstrating
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the correct fold. With a sigh of relief, she eases back into a comfortable position in her chair.
The  comically  anguished  look  on  her  face  relaxes  back  into  a warm  smile  (Myers
2008:165). 
 
Myers  narrates  in  this  thickly  descriptive  passage  how intimately  Diane,  a  professor  of
chemistry,  head  of  a  crystallography  research  lab,  embodies  a  protein  that  she  feels  has  been
misfolded  badly  in  a  model.59 Note  that  Myers  corporeal  take  on  Diane's  affective,  molecular
embodiment  proposes  that  models  do  not  exist  in  the  hand  or  in  the  head,  as  Ian  Hacking
distinguishes  them  (1983:216).  She  describes  instead  the  material  and  conceptual  meshing  of
models  in  the  modeler's  embodied  imagination  (2008:165).  Her  point  is  that  crystallographic
models  may not  only  be  inscriptions  displayed  on screen:  “More  than  visual  traces,  marks  or
inscriptions, three-dimensional physical models explicitly blur the boundaries between automated
machinic production and the skilled work of scientists, and between the intellectual and physical
labor of research” (2008:169).  Myers'  idea of unfolding as giving fleshy volume to models,  of
modeling  by  embodying,  dissolves  the  notion  that  models  are  sufficient  to  represent  protein
foldings. Antti Salvast proposes that Myers’ corporeal work can inform studies of screens when
used to display markets. For Salvast,  body-work is “a resource – or in other words, a form of
‘screening’– when using a control room computer monitor. This observation corresponds with other
case studies on computer-based civil engineering work (Suchman 2000) and modeling of proteins
with computer software (Myers 2008)” (2011:162). Likewise, I see my body-work of writing as a
mode of grasping screens in my shared office. Thinking with Myers, I will refer to my workplace as
assembled  by unfolding  or  giving  volume to  figures,  like  icons,  modeled  for  and through  the
displays  of screens.  Body-work is  a  way to grasp what  screens  bring into view.  In this  way  I
59 A protein acquires a characteristic fold when a polypeptide changes from a random coil into a functional structure.
Myers body-work elicits the reversal of the process of protein folding as embodied or unfolded by the body-work of
chemists. 
95
apprehend60 my workplace as an embodied articulation – where I perform screens without well
defined limits, as I am produced by the actions that make me hybrid collectif (Callon and Law
1997).61 
I will complement this grasping of the display of  screens – on the other hand – with my
fingeryeyes sensing what screens leave out of sight.62 Fingeryeyes is a portmanteau I learned from
Eva Hayward (2010), to express how we may proceed whenever we attempt to grasp the ways in
which screens relate to wider apparatuses of bodily production. Hayward tells us, in a paper on cup
corals or  Balanophyllia elegans,  grasped at a lab in California,  how they are “full of touch, of
sensing, or rather of being literally tact, touch; their tentacular senses – their fingeryeyes – respond
to surface effects, caressing. [The] being of cup corals is a haptic-sensory apparatus” (2010:577).63
Like  B.  elegans,  if  screens  may  also  be  about  being  touched,  how  can  we  grasp  them  as
companions,  equipped  with  disparate  optic-haptic  sensations?  I  use  Hayward’s  fingeryeyes  to
explain the tentacular visuality of cross-species encounters and to name the synaesthetic quality of
materialized sensation. Perceptions are moved (affected) by the movements and actions that they
60 This apprehension is inspired by Whitehead's prehension, which is a de-centering of the mind in the question of
perception in philosophy. “Where Berkeley speaks of the mind, Whitehead will speak of a process of prehensive
unification and generalize it to all that exists” (Stengers 2011:117). For Whitehead the individual is creative nexus,
the concrete passage of elements, insofar an element names anything “that has parts and is a part, but also that has
intrinsic features, we say that the individual is a 'concrescense' of elements” (Deleuze 1993:88). We encountered in
chapter 4 the three characteristics that Deleuze attributes to Whitehead's prehension. First, a datum is expressed in a
subject as behavior, affect, conscience, perception, or emotion by way of a knot, from datum to datum. Second, by
prehending screens as event, or equating screenness with the geneses of an event, the passages between datums
articulate the display of screens. Third, satisfaction appears then as a “final phase, as self-enjoyment, [marking] the
way by which the subject is filled with itself and attains a richer and richer private life” (Deleuze 1993:98). We read
how dogs and humans enjoyed collaborating around the samples to screen cancer, because Whitehead's sense of
enjoyment formulates the satisfaction, according to Isabelle Stengers, of interpreting “conjointly (that is, without
opposition, hierarchy or disconnection) what we usually describe in mutually contradictory terms, for example,
freedom and determination, cause and reason, fiction and reality, or mind and matter” (2008:104). 
61 Similar to the notion of texture, hybrid collectif is a term that locates agency in heterogeneous webs of relations.
Individuals  are  collectif  for  Michel  Callon and  John Law, but  collectifs  are  not  collections of  individuals:  “a
collectif is an emergent effect created by the interaction of the heterogeneous parts that make it up” (1997:98). 
62 We could stay with my body-work to grasp what screens leave out of sight, maybe in a rhizomatic way. But I prefer
to approach screens with fingeryeyes. They help me to reach into the ways in which people and things are touched
back by what screens conceal. 
63 Steven Helmreich suggests in How Like a Reef (2010) that “the idea of reading coral represents an opportunity for
reconstructing our understanding of the cultural and scientific politics of the sea — or, better, for reconfiguring such
understandings, since coral must be read not simply or only as a sign, but as a figure” (as part of the series Party
Writing for Donna Haraway, http://partywriting.blogspot.co.uk last accessed 13-12-15)
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provoke in other organisms. Stirred by the ripples of investigation that emerge in the arrangement
that we may touch, senses are amalgamated, superimposed, forging cross-species reticulations and
sites of solid-arity (Hayward 2010:580).
Hayward is  addressing multi-species  touch with her  fingeryeyes  in  the  case of  humans,
animals, and machines of “different sight, sense, sensibility, and sensuality” (2010:580). It is the
overlapping  of  the  senses  that  –  for  Hayward  –  makes  fingeryeyes  “diffract  seeing  through
touching; optical groping, or tactful eyes, haptically and visually orient the sensual body across
mediums”  (2010:582).  I  think  Hayward's  fingeryeyes  elicits,  with  the  sense  of  being  touched,
Haraway's  unfixed  species  “becoming  with”  each  other,  the  open-endedness  of  specie  and  the
possibilities  for  all  people  and things  –  named,  or  not,  as  human or  non human –  to  become
companions.  I  consider  in  this  way that  screens,  when  they  touch  people  back,  can  enfold  or
envelop them into larger,  multiple,  and heterogeneous arrangements.  Being touched by screens
entails a chance to apprehend them as differential companions to species. This denotes screens,
following  Haraway,  as  parts  of  “webbed  bio-social-technical  apparatuses  of  humans,  animals,
artifacts,  and institutions  in  which particular  ways of  being emerge and are sustained.  Or not”
(2008:134).  Haraway's apparatuses should not be taken as disembodied infrastructure.  They are
arrangements that  condition the possibility  for the (re)production of knowledge (1991:197) and
techno-biopolitics  (1991:208).  Her  notion  of  apparatus  is  tuned  to  situate  and so  visualize  the
hinterland of  relations  through which  bodies  grow across  mediums,  folded  onto  each  other  or
enfolded into arrangements that figure them in specific ways.  In this  way arrangements can be
grasped as apparatuses of bodily production, and fingeryeyes as a sensuous device that helps to
bring into view the arrangements hidden by screens when they enfold people in places such as
offices.
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Below, with the work of my body writing and my fingeryeyes interrogating some of the
larger  arrangements  that  make these lines  possible,  I  will  read  the  unfolding of  my workplace
through the display of a discarded screen I named Vig, after picking it up from the bins in my
Department. And I will grasp the enfolding of what builds my workplace with the display of a
screen I named Ben, after a friend gave it to me before leaving the Department. We will discuss
respectively with Vig and Ben what screens bring into view by focusing on the writing of the
chapter, and what they leave out of sight by moving away from my office and considering my
workplace at home. The notions of assemblage and apparatus will connote the stories as well as
suggest modes of touching and being touched by screens. With Vig and Ben I convey my own
reflections on reading, grasping, and so becoming response-able for encountering and receiving
screens.  
Unfolding Vig
 Vig appeared next to the Sociology Department's bins closest to my office in Lancaster
University (figure 32). Vig is bulky when compared to thinner and lighter screen technologies. This
is why someone threw Vig away, I thought, or maybe Vig does not work anymore; it was abandoned
there because of this, perhaps a student finished her research and dumped Vig, had no need for it
anymore and abandoned it. Maybe Vig does work and this, I presumed, could be what I need in
order to pick up screens, to grasp them through encounters.  Speculating in this way I took Vig from
the bins and made space for it on my desk. The circuits worked and Vig has stayed with me since
then. I named this screen Vig by alluding to its brand, Viglen Ltd. 
While considering whether  to  study Vig,  María Puig de la  Bellacasa convinced me that
relating and caring have conceptual  and ontological  resonance (2012:198).  But I  don't  care for
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discarded screens like Vig so much out of nostalgia. I feel more preoccupied by not wasting their
material  components.  Their  considerable size matters.  Vig takes up lots  of space,  though I  can
manage to make a place for it,  there cornered against the wall next to the window. Yes it does
remind me of the many hours I  spent with such screens,  playing computer  games when I  was
younger.  Vig is  a  screen that  I  found. That circumstance made me feel responsible for it.  Still
bringing Vig into my office helped me to consider  it  as  an addition to  a  particular  workplace.
Offices  exist  in  many  kinds.  And offices  are  situated  as  well  as  part  of  wider  apparatuses  of
production,  tied to different workplaces.  So,  I  think with Vig about my office as one of many
workplaces  where  people  spend  long  hours  making  a  living  around,  through,  and  away  from
screens.
Figure 32. Vig          Figure 33. Cathode ray tube 
     (photograph by author)                   (Wikipedia's CRT entry)64   
Moving things around a desk is part of the productive activity of a workplace. Desks in
particular make great spaces to work as people use them to associate things,  in places such as
64 1. Three electron guns (for red, green, and blue phosphor dots) 2. Electron beams 3. Focusing coils 4. Deflection 
coils 5. Anode connection 6. Mask for separating beams for red, green, and blue part of displayed image 7. 
Phosphor layer with red, green, and blue zones  8. Close-up of the phosphor-coated inner side of the screen
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workshops,  homes,  or  offices.  Planes  or  trains  may  have  tables  that  can  be  used  as  desks  to
construct a workplace.  Latour notes how desks seem to be hubs of productive units  (1979:48),
laboratories  in  his  case,  putting  together  materials  and texts  coming from outside the lab (e.g.
electricity,  scientific publications) with those coming from the inside (i.e.  experimental results).
Likewise,  by  placing  Vig  on  my office  desk,  it  would  become part  of  a  productive  nexus,  an
academic  hub limited  by a  personal  workplace  within  a  shared  office.  This  includes  the  usual
suspects  of  the  academic  office  space:  a  chair,  a  desk  with  drawers,  printed  articles,  books,  a
calendar.  While  the  edges  of  this  desk  help  to  outline  the  limits  of  my  workplace,  my things
sometimes end up on the desks of my friends with whom I share the office.  Still  it  is such an
assemblage of things that  belong to a workplace that  I  want to call  a fold,  which envelopes a
spacing. I  imagine it  as stretching a passage.  A snapshot of the fold in question: consider how
incorporating  Vig  into  my  workplace  required  me  to  hold  it  firmly,  walk  with  it,  and  so  by
embracing it, literally to bring Vig into the office. By way of this alignment Vig became part of my
workplace.  Then  I  left  Vig  on  the  chair,  looked  around  and  thought  it  would  be  impractical,
considering Vig's size, to place it against the wall on the centre of the desk. A better alignment
turned out  to be against the corner.  And through these alignments,  some things,  including Vig,
became un/en/folded (linked)  within the situated arrangement  of things of an office that  is  my
workplace.
In short, to pick up Vig demanded that I pay close attention to the practical alignments of
people  and  things  of  this  office.  I  have  referred,  so  far,  to  that  attention  to  screens  taken  as
alignments  of  surfaces  in  terms  of  a  juggling  with,  to  say  how screens  cannot  be  grasped  by
reducing them to single frontal surfaces. As I proposed in chapter 3, to juggle with screens one has
to attend rather to contingent alignments of surfaces. In this sense my juggling with Vig was not
over after placing it on the chair. To fire up Vig, I had to shove aside a pile of printed articles,
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notepads, and scattered cables. While making enough desk-space for Vig, I knelt to plug its cord
into the electrical circuit. The power plug was saturated but I found a power strip with available
plugs nearby. Vig's display, still disconnected from a computing device, showed a message: no input
found. The image appeared blueish but the message was readable. I had no PC to plug in at the
time. I experimented during that week with Vig by trying to set up a clone, to copy the haptic
display of my mobile phone – in the same way a digital display may be cloned on a large flat
surface,  for  instance,  before a  conference  presentation.  I  stopped carrying my laptop after  that
during my summer walks  to  campus.  I  wrote in  the office with Vig,  my mobile  phone,  and a
wireless keyboard.  I made a draft  of this chapter that way but someone took my phone during
fieldwork in Milton Keynes. I managed to get a good grasp of Vig's textures, before Ben came
along. 
Let's note what I grasp when I work with Vig by unpacking its cathode ray tube (CRT).
CRTs are electron “guns” embedded in vacuum tubes aiming at a fluorescent surface (figure 33).
They act as a source of electrons emitting a beam which passes through means to accelerate and
deflect  the  electrons,  creating  an  image  on the  surface.  CRTs  owe their  large,  deep  shapes  to
vacuum tubes  made usually  of  lead  glass.  The inner  side  of  a  CRT surface is  often  a  coated-
phosphor layer  with green,  red,  and blue zones.  Pixel-images are  created through magnetically
controlling the intensity of the electron beam, while  the front  area of the tube gets scanned (a
pattern  called  raster).  Note  that  these  displays  made with CRTs during  the  Second World  War
became  at  the  time  closer  to  radars,  having  less  to  do  with  entertainment  than  with  military
surveillance.65 Whenever  I  work with  Vig,  I  get  a  feeling of  its  CRT.  Spending time with Vig
generates in  me a particular  impression of  being in  my shared office,  where I  unfold or enact
practical  alignments.  For example,  the CRT inside Vig can display these words with a kind of
65 The first computer games (“Tennis for two” and “Space Wars”) were respectively played on an oscilloscope and a
radar-like round CRT screen (Gere 2006:147-149).
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texture,  which  helps  me  to  perform  the  atmosphere  of  my  workplace,  taken  as  a  fold.  More
specifically, I  edit  this  chapter  by  using  the  toolbar  icons  of  a  writing  software  which  has  a
particular texture given by my juggling with Vig. I grasp the icons, click them, cutting, pasting,
acting  them out  to  write  the  chapter.  Eliciting  this  atmosphere  of  my  workplace  is  a  way  of
signalling that workplaces are performed.  And in this  sense Vig can be unfolded as part  of an
atmosphere by making alignments  that  bring textures  into view (leaving something else out  of
sight). 
Talk of a fold's atmosphere captures the liveliness of articulating practices or embodying
actions. In other words, what I feel is not just by being an observer of Vig's display, not only by
looking through or reducing my attention to a single surface.  I'm not just clicking on icons by
interacting  with  figures  modelled for  computers.  My body-work unfolds  the icons  around Vig,
articulating  a  wider  course action  that  includes  the  moments  when I  click  them.  Consider, for
example,  how such unfolding  may  commence  when  I  approach  Vig,  aligning  myself  with  the
surfaces surrounding us. Who and what goes by the name of all of “us” here: Vig, myself, mouse,
window, desk,  chair,  or  stapler  eventually  becomes part  of  our juggling,  but  without  saying in
advance  who juggles  with whom.  This  is  one  way of  grasping Vig  –  as  event,  as  assembling
electron  beams  materializing  a  display  of  digital  figures,  embodied  through  and  around  Vig's
display.  Drawing  on  Myers,  I  make  sense  of  my  embodiments  of  Vig's  on-screen  icons  –  of
operating  systems modelled  for  phones  (like  “Android”),  personal  computers  and laptops  (like
“Ubuntu”). With Myers' sense of the embodiment of three-dimensional models, I give a body to
figures like icons modelled for computers, assembling them beyond their flat display on screen,
extended by my eyes and hands touching, sliding, clicking, and so acting these icons out three-
dimensionally.
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Of course there are many more models to (mis)fold; not just operating systems, but software
based on various coding practices, as well as algorithms running on disparate computing machines.
In any case, I begin by moving around Vig, folding a workplace in my office, to articulate Vig's
display – because an alignment to give a body to the toolbar icons can start  a  moment before
placing my “self” in front of “the” screen.66 Meeting Vig fills my office with connected events
knotted to the event of performing my workplace. Here both Alfred North Whitehead and Gilles
Deleuze delineate a way of giving Vig a body, wherever events unfold courses of action (Whitehead
calls them passages of Nature) that make of screens non-singular events.67 According to Deleuze's
reading of Whitehead's concept of event, screens interestingly feature as that which allows events to
emerge. “Events are produced in a chaos, in a chaotic multiplicity, but only under the condition that
a sort of screen intervenes. […] Like a formless elastic membrane, an electromagnetic field, or the
receptacle of the Timaeus, the screen makes something issue from chaos, and even if this something
differs only slightly” (1993:86 italics in original).68 If we grasp Vig's display of icons as an event
that helps me to unfold my workplace, where does this alignment end? I think that when the limits
of screens cannot be well drawn the boundaries are made in practice – this is the point I want to
make by grasping Vig's on-screen figures as event. 
This  is  a  move to  counter  the tendency to  reduce  screens  to  single surfaces,  restricting
attention to their displays by portraying the screen as an interface. In order to avoid getting stuck
with this  (mis)representation of screens,  I suggest that we grasp them in practice as contingent
66 As discussed in chapter 3, the tendency to see screens as single surfaces regards people as users placed in front of
the display. 
67 We stray into the philosophy of events to talk about digital icons by asking how to account for their configurations
when I give a body to them beyond their display. Screening icons with Vig as a contingent alignment of surfaces
would eventually  unfold a  pattern  of  connections,  knotting people  and  things together.  Note that  extension is
Deleuze's  first  condition  or  component  to  embody  (patch)  entities,  grasped  eventually  as  “waves  of  alterity”
infinitely sequencing courses of action, endlessly overflowing the boundaries or blind spots attached to people's
senses (see chapter 3). Once icons are considered as events around events, properties of the alignments of Vig's
display  may  be  seen  as  divisions  bringing  the  icons  into  view,  intensions  rather  than  extensions,  the  second
component of events. Intensities then “enter on their own accord in new infinite series” (Deleuze 1993:77). 
68 Chaos, events, and screens, whatever they may be, would always come together into existence. “Chaos does not
exist; it is an abstraction because it is inseparable from a screen that makes something – something rather than
nothing – emerge from it” (Deleuze 1993:86).   
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alignments  of  surfaces  that  assemble  something  into  view,  following  John  Law,  by  making
something present, leaving something out of sight as manifestly absent, while Othering something
else (2004:14).69 Let's read then with Vig how these boundaries of my workplace are enacted, how
its insides and outsides become unfolded in practice by bringing something into view and leaving
something else out of sight. A snapshot of the boundaries in question: to write these lines with Vig I
sit at my desk, tap the keyboard, pause, read, erase –  sipping from a cup of tea. Then I turn myself
around, and leave the cup next to the window, breaking face-to-display contact with Vig. While the
vapor of the tea condenses on the glass, I approach a shelf to look for a book and come back to the
desk, never leaving the fold of my workplace. Stretching it around Vig, I keep myself momentarily
in touch with the things at my desk.70 Thus if we think now about its boundaries, my workplace
does not have one definitive shape. In practice what belongs inside the fold – that is, what belongs
to my workplace at one moment – is open-ended in relation to the next. So while working with Vig,
some things of my workplace were made present, by telling you about my movements; some things
were made manifestly absent, like the floor, by giving them a contextual character; and some things
were Othered – for example, when I was working with Vig and drinking tea, note that the window
became a part of my workplace.71 Affixed to a thick frame holding the cup of tea, the window
assisted  the writing of  the  lines  by helping  at  that  moment to  hydrate  me.  Therefore  not  only
bounding the office but aligned by working with Vig, the window mattered in the unfolding of my
workplace. The same goes for the shelf of the office, when the passage of the action of writing
became extended around Vig.  I  got  up,  found the book, and came back.  Like a road unfolded
through  a  tunnel,  my  workplace  was  stretched  through  the  office.  And  through  this  practical
69 What is made manifestly absent, in relation to what is made present, can be understood as contextual; in other
words,  presence and manifest absence are both textures made in practice; and Otherness can be understood as
texturing, too, a wider  hinterland of what can pass unnoticed in a situation, such as the work of  screens at  a
workplace. 
70 As the book I took, Donald Hislop's edited collection on  Mobility and Technology in the Workplace, tells us by
echoing John Law (2002): “objects [and subjects] rely on two spatialities for their perpetuation. On the one hand,
they require stability in Euclidean space. On the other hand, they require stability in what [Law] called 'network
space'” (2008:19). I talk about the timings and spacings of the people and things of supermarkets and banks in
chapters 6 and 7.
71 I discuss below how Othering things that matter for my workplace also means to miss the apparatuses at work in
Lancaster University. 
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assembly of my workplace, Vig can be left out of sight as well. Even when Vig's CRT is turned
“on”, the display can be made manifestly absent or Othered, placed at the limit or outside of my
workplace. 
Enfolding Ben
The grasping of a course of action with a screen may be felt  as flowing the other  way
around: not unfolded and so enfolded in subjects, but enfolded in (as a part of) an apparatus of
bodily production, thus unfolding subjects and objects too into alignment. Alignments of this kind
may be understood as a particular method of assembling screens. They become useful in grasping
how devices may be central for apparatuses revolving around the exploitation of people and things.
Let's consider that flip of the winding flow of action with a screen I named Ben after Li-Wen Shih –
a dear friend of mine in the Sociology Department – finished her research and gave me her LCD
screen (figure 34) and a cactus she did not want to abandon.
Ben's  material  components  are  lighter  and  thinner  compared  to  Vig's  cathode  ray  tube.
Named after the brand – BenQ – Ben has a frontal surface made with liquid crystals to display
digital  images.  Liquid  crystal  displays  (LCDs)  are  a  quite  common  screen  technology  –  only
matched in popularity today by displays made with light emitting diodes (LEDs). Ben's smaller size
makes it easier to place on my desk. Note how CRTs and LCDs show images differently. The latter
may  use  ambient  light,  but  LCDs  frequently  include  a  back-light  lamp,  commonly  a  cathode
fluorescent lamp.72 LCDs can be called flat panel displays because they laminate adjacent layers of
materials (figure 35). Liquid crystal is an interesting word denoting matter acting as a liquid and a
72 The variety of components has quickly become daunting. To make an extensive account I would have to tell you
something about  ionized  gases  (plasma displays),  thin-film transistors,  cold  cathode fluorescent  lamps,  glossy
effects, video graphic adapters, aspect ratios, resolutions, contrast, gamma, and refresh rates, plane line, in-plane,
and advanced fringe field switchings, vertical alignments and viewing angles, pixel-pitch, lag, as well as black
levels.
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solid, and molecules flowing between these states, so they may become oriented and polarized in
specific positions. This serves to modulate beams of light traveling through the laminated surfaces
in which liquid crystals are coated. Different phases classify the ways in which liquid crystals may
be arranged. Note, for example, when affected by high temperatures, how some liquid crystals go
into an “isotropic phase” – causing molecules to flux randomly and to interfere with the display of
on-screen images. 
     Figure 34. Vig and Ben         Figure 35.  Liquid crystal display
      (photograph by author)                      (Wikipedia's LCD entry)73 
“Nematic” is another phase of liquid crystals, within temperatures that make it possible to
electromagnetically manipulate the molecules into parallel positions, torquing them along that axis
to bend (shape) the light passing through them. This is called a (super) twisted nematic field: in
super mode the molecules are torqued in greater angles, a key feature to enhance the precise use of
73 1. Vertical filter film to polarize the light as it enters. 2. Glass substrate with ITO electrodes. The shapes of these
electrodes will determine the dark shapes that will appear when the LCD is turned on. Vertical ridges are etched on
the surface so the liquid crystals are in line with the polarized light. 3. Twisted nematic liquid crystals. 4. Glass
substrate  with  common  electrode  film   (ITO)  with  horizontal  ridges  to  line  up  with  the  horizontal  filter.  5.
Horizontal filter film to block/allow through light. 6. Reflective surface to send light back to viewer
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liquid crystals for image display. One patent for this effect was first filed in 1970, but work with
liquid crystals had commenced almost a century before, framed at the time as a material curiosity.
Since the 1980s LCDs began to be produced in industrial quantities and eventually outnumbered
CRTs when “electronic industries recognized that  the dream of the wall-hanging television had
become a reality” (Kawamoto, 2002). 
Barad uses diffraction as an optical metaphor and a physical phenomenon to understand
apparatuses through an approach that she calls agential realism. This ethico-onto-epistemological
methodology is  about  diffraction.  Unlike  reflection74 diffraction  is  a  method for  addressing the
conditions of mattering:  making differences  that  matter  within patterns  of  matter  and meaning.
Diffraction  aptly  points  to  entanglements  of  spacetime,  of  spacetimemattering  in  its  ongoing
re(con)figuration (2007:223-246).75 Therefore note that it  is because of the entangled natures of
visualization and touch, as dynamically reconfiguring (altering) the conditions of possibility for
behavior, affect, conscience, perception, or emotion, that I can diffractively co-produce with my
own fingeryeyes  what  matters  for  the possibilities  to  inhabit  with Ben the larger  arrangements
(apparatuses of bodily production) that make our conjoined articulation of any course of action
(im)possible.  
Ben touched me as soon as  Li-Wen appeared with it  in  my door.  I  took it,  and had to
displace  things  on  my desk  again  for  this  screen  that  I  received  with  all  the  pleasures  of  an
74 Diffraction is about overlapping waves and the formation of interference patterns. By thinking with diffraction,
Karen Barad and María Puig de la Bellacasa have followed and expanded Haraway's suggestion of working with
interference patterns and diffraction (as exchangeable tropes), to avoid onto-epistemologies based on images of
reflection and reflexivity that figure knowledges as practices to isolate (mirror) nature or culture. Both are optical
phenomena but diffraction does not reflect either nature or culture. So while diffraction portray knowledges and
their consequences as situated naturalcultural practices of becoming with matter and meaning, reflection imagines
knowledges as abstract, observational practices, where matter and meaning become fixed and transparent proxies of
nature and culture.
75 By making diffractions Barad rejects the assumption that there are determinate objects with determinate properties
and corresponding determinate concepts with determinate meanings, preassigned independently of the conditions
needed to resolve the inherent indeterminacies posited by the measurement of phenomena. Barad proposes the
neologism intra-action to coin her view of the entangled nature of nature and culture as “naturecultures”, echoing
Haraway (1991, 2008).
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unexpected  gift.  Later  I  borrowed  a  PC  from  another  department  friend,  Liviu  Alexandrescu,
manufactured also by Viglen  Ltd.  I  plugged Ben to  this,  and connected  both to  the  local  area
network  (LAN)  and  the  Internet.  Now  I  work  with  Ben  when  I  leave  the  laptop  at  home.
Diffractively  reading  these  screens,  they  appear  to  push  each  other  and  mutually  exclude  one
another,  while  I  juggle  with  their  digital  figures,  fleshing  them  out,  and  becoming  evidently
enfolded by them, by their textures now enveloping the office through Ben's display, intersecting
my body, stretching my “self” and “the” screen away, into wider apparatuses of production. This is
another way of grasping Ben – as phenomena arranging liquid crystals, materializing digital figures
that I embody through and around Ben's display. In this way with Hayward I make sense too of
Ben's on-screen figures. Here my fingeryeyes twist, cut, and so extend, prosthetically, the fold that
is  my  workplace,  the  daily  pocket  I  inhabit,  into  crossed  overlapping  directions,  enfolded  by
apparatuses that most times prearrange looping sequences (circuits). With them, I take note of what
I repeat on a daily basis while I work with Ben (e.g. turning its display “on” and “off”), to go
through or unpack the consequences of unfolding my workplace. 
Here is a snapshot of the entanglement in question: like Vig,  Ben is  made with various
materials which I can account for, by stretching this study into the practices of the manufacture of
plastics,  metals,  or  glass.  Such  materials  are  extracted  and  crafted  together  by  apparatuses  of
production that I may grasp by moving away from Ben, but without losing touch with how they
make  sense  for  me:  by  helping  to  show  what  Ben  displays  as  part  of  my  workplace.  While
displaying  these  lines,  Ben  is  energized  through  an  electrical  grid  whose  particular  history  of
production  and distribution  I  may  unravel.  At  my workplace  these  industries  overlap  with  the
commercial,  pedagogical,  and  legal  apparatuses  –  to  name just  a  few –  at  work  in  Lancaster
University.  Grasping  a  screen  like  Ben  as  phenomena,  to  consider  the  various  arrangements
entangled with its display, entails reading this workplace diffractively through the apparatuses of
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bodily production that enfold Ben and me,  helping us to become cuts of a specific  academic76
apparatus. 
As Barad  notes,  this  sort  of  cut  is  both  ontic  and semantic  (2007:148),  an agential  cut
differentiating people and things around my office.  It  determines the boundaries and properties
within  the  meaningful  screenings  of  Ben's  digital  figures.  Agential  cuts  are  “specific  material
(re)configurings  of  the  world  through  which  the  determination  of  boundaries,  properties,  and
meanings  is  differentially  enacted”  (2007:148).  Barad  understands  these  cutting  practices  as
material-discursive  ones,  insisting  that  concepts  can  be  materialized  by  apparatuses  and  their
articulation  of  objects  and  objectivity.  In  particular,  these  practices  are  intra-actions,77 through
which specific  determinacies,  along with  complementary  indeterminacies,  are  enacted  with  the
phenomena  produced,  bringing  forward  entangled  matters  and  meanings  made  in  open-ended
configurations. Barad's framework sets as her task to rework and stretch Niels Bohr's philosophy-
physics,  as  an  epistemology  where  the  agencies  of  observation  cannot  be  subtracted  from the
phenomena they help to  enact.78 In  her  agential  realism,  objectivity  (as attributed not  solely to
objects)  refers  to  becoming accountable for  marks  on bodies,  for  specific  materialities  in  their
differential mattering. 
I  can  account  for  Ben  in  this  way  by  noting  how it  matters  to  diffract  my  workplace
differently.  Take the case of taking Ben home; that is,  to switch it  off,  to disconnect the video
graphic adapter from the PC, and to unplug Ben from the electrical  circuit,  to wrap it  up very
76 As mentioned in the acknowledgements, I pursue a PhD in STS under a scholarship scheme called Becas Chile,
managed by Conicyt, the National Committee of Science and Technology of the Government of Chile. The scheme
frames the recipients as advanced human capital in higher education and legally bounds PhDs (“the investment”) to
return to Chile for four years or more. As an international student in Lancaster, I also have a Tier 4 visa provided by
the UK Government.
77 The nature of the possibility of interference and the study of the marks that entities leave on each other's bodies as
they matter, including our own marks and markings as humans, is captured in Barad's material-semiotic neologism
intra-action (2007:149).
78 “We are responsible for the cuts that we help to enact  not because we do the choosing (neither do we escape
responsibility because “we” are “chosen” by them), but because we are an agential part of the material becoming of
the universe” (2007:178). 
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carefully,  to  lift  it  firmly with  my arms,  and to  leave  a  dust-mark  on the surface  of  the desk.
Relocating  Ben by detaching it  from my workplace,  I'd  move then out  of  that  fold,  managing
somehow to close the office door behind us.  After  heading to  the Uni underpass bus stop and
commuting with Ben placed on my lap,  we would walk for twenty minutes  to my home, Ben
traveling  firmly  in  between  my arms.  And once  again  struggling  to  open the  door,  we would
(finally) arrive home – go in, down a small corridor, turn left and enter a studio with a wooden
table, a room arranged as an office in a friendly house I share with more people. Relocating Ben
here would entail not only to detach it from a place, and to dynamically reattach it to another:
underpass,  bus,  street,  studio.  Threading this  course of  action  with Ben also  means  to  cut  the
apparatuses  that  would  make  it  possible,  to  make  a  difference  that  enfolds  Ben differently,  in
another workplace, cutting it from the apparatuses at work on campus, through those that make
possible  my  commuting  back  home;  only  to  attach  Ben  as  part  of  those  state  and  domestic
apparatuses that would allow me to unfold my workplace,  now stretched like a passage of the
house.
Screens feature at  the heart  of Barad's  main examples of how agential  cuts dynamically
(in)determine  the  conditions  of  possibility  and  separability  between  apparatus  and  phenomena
(people  or  things).  These  are  mostly  borrowed  from  experiments  in  quantum  mechanics  that
demonstrate  how (paradoxically)  electrons  and photons (i.e.  matter  and light)  can act  either  as
waves  or  particles.  Here  screens  are  placed  as  grating  screens  (endowed  with  gaps-slits)  and
detection  screens,  as  parts  of  apparatuses  that  agentially  cut  and  so  separate  the  agencies  of
observation  from  the  phenomena  observed:  matter  or  light  acting  as  wave  or  particle.  Barad
includes  classic  examples  of  experiments  in  quantum  mechanics  –  Thomas  Young's  two-slit
experiment,  Einstein  and  Bohr's  gedanken  experiments  –  as  well  as  her  own  quantum  eraser
(delayer)  experiments;  all  featuring  screens  (2007:79,  82,  101,  103-105,  266-267,  307,  314).
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Interestingly  one  example,  the  Gerlach-Stern  experiment,  exhibits  what  Barad  calls  a  “smoke
screen” enacted by Stern's  cigar-smoking habits  acting  as  a  significant  part  of  the  apparatus  –
aiming  to  find  traces  of  space  quantization  but  eventually  providing  evidence  of  the  spin  of
electrons: “The cigar is a 'condensation' – a 'nodal point', as it were – of the workings of other
apparatuses,  including class,  nationalism,  economics,  and  gender,  all  of  which  are  part  of  this
Gerlach-Stern  apparatus”  (Barad  2007:167).  Barad  is  diffracting  and  cutting  the  Gerlach-Stern
apparatus  through  other  apparatuses,  through  the  cigar  grasped  as  a  nodal  point;  much  like
Whitehead's  prehension,  formulating  and  knotting  events  through  other  events.  In  a  Bohrian
ontology the point is then to grasp phenomena through their constitutive exclusions (cuts). In a
Whiteheadean  ontology,  on  the  other  hand,  the  point  is  to  grasp  events  through  their  seized
inclusions  (knots).  Nevertheless,  just  like  Deleuze's  reading  of  Whitehead  appears  to  suggest,
Barad's  reading  of  Bohr  never  posits  the  boundaries  of  screens  as  intrinsically  fixed,  but
apprehended  as  a  diffraction  that  blurs  sharp  edges,  while  still  determined  to  make  precise
screenings.  
Knotting and cutting 
An attentive  reader  may have  noticed  already that  these  senses  of  knotting  and cutting
assemblages  and apparatuses,  respectively tied  to  events  and phenomena,  have  been lurking in
between  the  lines  of  the  previous  chapters.  This  mode  of  thinking  about  complementary  yet
mutually  exclusive  arrangements  with  screening  devices  (which  I  evoked  in  chapter  2)  then
suggests  how  screens  shake79 our  assumptions  about  touching  them  as  single  surfaces,  by
reorienting  our  attention  to  the  moments  of  movement  around,  through,  and  away  from  their
displays.  This  way  of  studying  screens  attends  to  hinterland  (his)stories  that  unfold  how their
79 In chapter 3 we discussed how to shake off the trend of reducing screens to single surfaces by looking with Emma
at screens, around and away from them, and not only through their displays. Such shaking can be grasped  with
Merleau-Ponty's sense of flesh as well as with Barad's entanglement of agencies and objects of observation.
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alignments  make  sense,  and  to  arrangements  that  enfold  the  possibilities  of  aligning  screens.
Reading screens  within folds  allowed us  to  distinguish their  multiplicity  and differentiate  their
possibilities  of  inclusion  and exclusion.  In  this  sense,  I  unpacked with Vig  and Ben stories  of
screens  at  my workplace.  We detailed  the body-work of  incorporating  Vig into  my workplace,
reading  its  boundaries  as  unfolded  by  further  knots  or  inclusions.  And  we  also  grasped  with
fingeryeyes  what  screens leave out  of  sight  by detaching Ben from my shared office and then
(re)imagining the boundaries of my workplace as enfolded into the underpass, the bus, and the
streets  by further  cuts  or  exclusions.  I  was inspired to  grasp screen in  these ways by Maurice
Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) notion of flesh, discussed in Jannet Vertesi’s work on Seeing Like a Rover
(2015) as embodied seeing.  For Vertesi  the team members that steer the Mars Explorer Rovers
would “not project themselves outward, into the body of the rover as human proxy. Rather, they
themselves  adopt  the  rover’s  bodily  apparatus  with  its  unique  bodily sensitivities  in  order  to
understand and interact  with Mars” (2015:176).  Alluding to  Merleau-Ponty example of  a  blind
person, Vertesi  is  contrasting the ways in which a stick can be manipulated or apprehended to
navigate the local surroundings (fold). Consider how by tapping on the nearby surfaces to grasp
them:
the blind man's stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself,
its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch,
and providing a parallel to sight. In the exploration of things, the length of the stick does not
enter expressly as a middle term… To get used to a hat, a car or a stick is to be transplanted
into them, or conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of our own body. Habit expresses
our power of dilating our being-in-the-world, or changing our existence by appropriating
fresh instruments (Merleau-Ponty 1962:143). 
It is this function or position of an alignment with things to navigate places that makes them
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no longer objects, for Merleau-Ponty, but parts (to say it with Barad) of the agencies of observation
of an apparatus. And in this sense I unfolded the action of (re)writing the chapter through Vig's
display. Conversely, by touching around instead of through the “stick”, anyone enfolding the Mars
Explorer Rover or Vig may apprehend them as objects of the focus of an observation:
To see an object is either to have on the fringe of the visual field and be able to concentrate
on it,  or  else  respond to  this  summons  by actually  concentrating  upon it  […] The two
operations  do  not  fortuitously  coincide  […]  It  is  necessary  to  put  the  surroundings  in
abeyance the better to see the object, and to lose in background what one gains in focal
figure . . . because objects form a system in which one cannot show itself without concealing
others (Merleau-Ponty 1962:78).
 I  enfolded Ben in this  way by grasping my workplace  as  an open-ended configuration,
whose  assembly  I  fleshed  out  by  locating  us  as  cuts  of  the  apparatuses  at  work  in  Lancaster
University. 
Note then by grasping around and through Vig we articulated movement as unfolding or
knotting  attachments,  while  we moved away with Ben from my shared office to  my home by
enfolding  or  cutting  detachments.  In  this  way we distinguished  assemblages  from apparatuses.
During  my juggling  with Vig,  the  moments  of  movement  around,  through,  and away from its
display  did  not  appear  so  sharply  differentiated  by  cuts.  They  were  unfolded  together,  added,
annexed,  knotted  by  way of  a  passage  that  I  took as  a  practical  enactment  of  a  workplace,  a
“recursive self-assembling, in which the elements put together are not fixed in shape, do not belong
to a larger pre-given list but are constructed at least in part as they are entangled together” (Law
2004:42). The notions of assemblage and apparatus allowed us to read Vig and Ben as event and
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phenomena.  Maybe because of their  conceptual  similarities and differences,  they are helpful  in
rejecting modes of grasping without  folds or dividing and reuniting nature and culture through
synthesis  of  processes.  Building  on this  complementarity  of  assemblages  and  apparatuses,  that
allowed us to grasp my encounters with Vig and Ben, these notions have been helping me to detail
how actions with screens flow both ways, by signaling the handedness of alignments.80 It might be
useful to discuss agential realism as a method that would also make entities manifestly absent and
Othered  (Law  2004:84-96);  maybe  as  a  specific  account  of  heterogeneity  that  focuses  on
“unambiguous  communication”  (Barad  2007:115,  174,  339)  of  mutually  exclusive  yet
complementary  phenomena.81 This  entails  further  groundwork  as  well  as  speculation  to  better
situate all sorts of material-semiotic actors, enfolding and unfolding one another. 
In  the  chapters  that  follow  I  continue  exploring  material  figures  to  annotate,  with
assemblages  and  apparatuses,  the  unfoldings  and  enfoldings  of  screens  aligned  in  specific
situations. In particular we have been sensing so far moments of movement by learning how to
move sideways in order to grasp and so articulate  screens. In chapter 6 and 7 I apply this lesson to
expand on how people and things unfold and enfold actions around, through, and away from the
screens of the supermarket self checkout machine and the automated teller machine of banks. In
chapter 6 I study the course of calculative action with self checkouts by unfolding moments of
movement around, through, and away from them. Likewise, in chapter 7 I investigate the course of
financial action with automated tellers by enfolding moments of movement around, through, and
away from them. Complementing one another, the unfolding of knots features in chapter 6, while
80 By handedness I mean the opposite orientation of human hands i.e. their chirality. “Human  hands  are the most
universally recognized example of chirality: the left hand is a non-superposable mirror image of the right hand; no
matter  how the two hands are oriented,  it  is  impossible for  all  the major  features  of  both hands to  coincide”
(Wikipedia's chirality entry retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chirality last accessed 26/06/2016).
81 Barad's reading of Bohr's complementarity implies a mutual but generative exclusion: an agential cut through a
measurement that separates the agencies of observation (the effect) from the features of objects (the cause). An
exemplary case is Young's double-slit experiment (see also Plotnitsky 1997:134-172). Relations of mutual exclusion
and complementarity of phenomena account for how matter and bodies “differentially materialize as a particular
pattern of the world as a result of the specific cuts and reconfigurings that are enacted” (Barad 2007:176) 
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the enfolding of cuts characterizes chapter 7.
Note that I might also read self checkouts with cuts and automated tellers with knots, but ex-
changing assemblages and apparatuses does not undermine their combined use to study screens – it
increases  the  kinds  of  thoughtful  readings  of  relations  that  matter  for  the  stories  told  in  both
chapters. I include two further figures (khipus and pukaras) to highlight knots in chapter 6 and cuts
in chapter 7. These figures are not Euro-American. One reason to work with such Inka figures,
following  Law,  is  to  stress  that  –  perhaps  –  “Euro-American  culture  doesn’t  really  have the
language that  it  needs  to imagine possibilities of this  [fractal]  kind” (2002:3):  the kind of non
singular  screenings  we  have  been  studying,  during  moments  where  what  matters  before/after
placing ourselves in front of a display relates to movements around, through, and away from a
screen. In this sense the stories that follow use topological figures to study the timing and spacing of
screens. 
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Chapter 6. Supermarket self checkouts
With  supermarket  self  checkout  machines  (figure  36)  this  chapter  defines  the  notion  of
calculation as a knotting practice, by considering a sense of calculation borrowed from an Inka
device  called  khipu.  Khipus  are  talking  knots.  One talks  with  them by making  knot-numbers.
Khipus need to be knitted to calculate. Note the knots have to be un/tied from the strings – in
specific positions – to designate numbers (figure 37). Khipus were used in the Inka Empire for
accounting  purposes  in  demographic,  military,  or  agricultural  surveys.  Khipukamayuqs  (knot
maker/reader,  knot-authority)  would  wear  khipus  around  their  necks  (as  accessories)  and  be
summoned to  narrate  with  their  own fingeryeyes  the  knotted  stories  folded  into  them.  Khipus
remind us to  stay in touch with our accounts,  to pay attention to  the figures  enfolded into the
material  and semiotic  knots  people and things  use to  calculate.  Thus by reading self  checkout
machines  with  khipus,  I  suggest  in  this  chapter  how people  and things,  while  moving around,
through,  and away from self  checkouts,  remain  attached to  the  consequences  of  calculation  in
supermarkets.
Checking people and things out in supermarkets depends upon a wide range of actions from
both shoppers and machines – and from the entangled gestures of other actors such as employees
assisting the purchase, or the baskets/bags carrying the goods. Breaking down this bundle of actors,
attached  to  interactions  with  the  graphical  displays  of  the  self  checkout  machine,  situates  the
chapter in the longer history of supermarket self service practices. By grasping and folding an open
list of moments of movements, I attempt to extend here our calculative imagination of supermarket
stories. 
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      Figure 36. Self checkout purchase point               Figure 37. Khipu with multi-colored cords82     
        (photograph by author)                                              (khipukamayuq.fas.harvard.edu) 
                                            
With  my  fingeryeyes83 (Hayward  2010),  I  will  argue  that  self  checkouts  participate  in
configuring  the  temporalization  of  the  spaces  where  calculable  goods  are  collected  in  the
supermarket,  and where they  are subsequently  carried  outside  (e.g.  to  the  public  street).  I  will
examine in detail how self checkouts are a part of action on the shopping floor, as people collect
goods around the aisles, when they queue to pay for their collected goods, when they (struggle to)
articulate self service purchases, and when they move away from supermarket buildings with  the
goods they have purchased. And I will discuss how to stay in touch with such a distribution of
agencies, enabling and troubling the computing and screening of automated purchases, by grasping
the knotted circuits of this collective market device (Muniesa, Millo, and Callon, 2007).
The  sense  of  the  market  as  a  collective  device  proposed by Michel  Callon  and Fabian
Muniesa (2005: 4) defines markets as encounters of actors that calculate compromises on the values
of  goods  and  services.  Such  collective  devices  are  assembled in  supermarkets  by  putting  into
82 A khipu's threads are cut  with specific  lengths,  arranged and coloured to signify different  values.  Importantly,
making numbers with khipus entails both knotting digits and enfolding accounts into threads, particularly accounts
of people and things.
83 See chapter 5.
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practice encounters with algorithmic configurations,  a phrase coined by Callon and Muniesa to
insist  that  economic  algorithms  cannot  be  defined  in  the  abstract,  i.e.  “independently  of  the
conditions and the material limits of their execution” (2005:26). This chapter draws on Callon and
Muniesa to propose two arguments about the algorithms of self checkouts in the configuration of
super-market devices. These algorithms are designed for self service practices to screen purchases,
which in turn bounds the calculative apparatus of the supermarket. These algorithms may be further
reconfigured by abstracting the calculative space of the supermarket  into a  situation where the
whole calculative apparatus may become assembled on a computer screen, as is the case when
people shop for groceries online. 
If online the shopping floor may become a website, and the queue line a delivery list, the
machinic purchase computes and screens the insides and the outsides of the supermarket all through
the graphical interfaces of desktop, laptop, or mobile devices. Yet if we make a purchase with a self
checkout, the insides and outsides of the supermarket are calculated and displayed through, but also
around and away from the graphical interface of the machine, which in turn bounds the shopping
floor and queue lines. So, both practical cases differentially compute and screen the supermarket.
They assemble the self service zones and passages of this calculative apparatus. Because shoppers
encounter multiple ways of attaching/detaching themselves while moving goods with super-market
devices, in order to better grasp the assemblage of the various ways of knotting the cuts, of cutting
together/apart  the  algorithmic  configurations  of  self  checkouts,  I  break  down the  moments  of
movement with such market devices into four chronotopes (Bakthin 1981).  The chronotope in this
context is a fusion of spacetime co-produced with the graphical displays of machinic purchases, and
the alignments and detachments of goods from supermarkets. 
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Cashing in 
A number of self checkout ‘purchase points’ are aligned in front of the bench where I am
seated. These belong to a local supermarket in Lancaster, UK. I came into this place two hours ago,
dripping water from the rain pouring outside. It  is Sunday. The supermarket will  close in three
hours.  People  pass  by  pushing  carts,  carrying  hand  baskets.  The  bench  located  near  the  main
entrance  is  made  of  wood;  I  sat  there  to  see  people  using  the  touch-screens  of  self  checkout
machines  (to  pay for  their  groceries).  But  then  I  became curious  about  the  practical  perimeter
between the spaces designed to collect goods in here, and to carry those goods out there. I began to
look at how self checkouts help to enact the insides and outsides of this place, wondering about the
moments when people differentiate and move along these spaces, by taking these machines into
account. 
But just looking from afar was not enough to grasp how this supermarket might become
bounded. I got up and went shopping with my eager fingeryeyes. One by one I selected goods
around  the  aisles,  using  a  basket  I  picked  up earlier.  Then  after  making  my way through  the
shopping  floor,  I  approached  the  zone  where  the  self  checkout  machines  are  located.  There  I
bumped  into  a  short  queue.  Usually  at  peak  times,  I  thought,  there  would  be  more  people.  I
scrutinized other shoppers while queueing. They were holding hand baskets or some hand held
goods. Shopping carts  are  not  allowed in this  self  checkout  zone.  Neither  is  buying more than
fifteen items. After making my way through the queue line,  I  approached one of the available
machines and put the basket with goods, or the items for the machine, on the left  side. Here I
became “the  user  for  the  machine”.  I  gestured  with  the  modelled  capacities  of  its  algorithms
screened on the display, and with the machine’s pressure sensing, item scanning surfaces. To start a
purchase, I grasped the graphical interface and touched a button. The self checkout then asked me if
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I had my own bags. If so, one needs to place them on a surface attached to the right side. At this
point the machine appeared ready to scan the items. I turned around the goods to find the codes on
their surfaces, and then I aligned them with an infrared scanning device. 
After  the  machine  signalled with a  beep that  an item had been scanned,  its  description
appeared  on  the  screen.  When  buying  fruits  or  vegetables  the  weight  of  the  items  has  to  be
measured. I signalled this by choosing an option from the haptic display, and by placing these items
on a second surface with a pressure sensor just below the touchscreen. Then I put the correctly
scanned items on another pressure sensing surface, attached to the right side of the machine. After
scanning the goods I had to selected one payment method. Cash, credit or debit cards are the most
common options. Slits for coins and bills are often cut into self checkouts. Devices to read credit or
debit cards tend to come attached to the machines, which may also ask shoppers if they have a
loyalty card provided by the supermarket for repeat customers. The machine then reminds me to
collect  my  items.  Although this  process  of  purchasing  goods  seemed  automated,  an  employee
typically lurks around the machines to assist shoppers with their purchases, or to confirm their ages
if buying alcohol. It turns out such assistance is frequently needed. 
       
When passing by the self checkouts or the cash registers of a supermarket you may find
yourself immersed in a kind of restless noise. When in use, self checkouts beep and utter words a
lot.  Almost  every  interaction  and  any  infraction  is  followed  by  a  sound.  I  could  close  my
fingeryeyes and more or less thoroughly describe a purchase just by listening to the machine. I
know that someone has become a user for the machine when she aligns herself with a self checkout,
and places her finger on the touchscreen to start a purchase, because then it says “please scan your
items”. Every time an item is scanned the machine will beep – if the item is not placed afterwards
on the surface attached to the right side, I hear the self-checkout say “please put the item in the
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bagging area”. These words are repeated obnoxiously until you comply. In all the machines I've
encountered,  this  voice  has  a  female  tone.  And when someone touches  the  pay button  on  the
touchscreen, the machine will voice a demand to select a payment method. After the user is done
with her payment, it would tell her to collect her items, and then it would thank her for buying at
that  specific  supermarket.  All  this  beeping echoes  the  attention  demanded by the sequences  of
gambling machines (Schüll 2012).     
These atmospheres that affect my fingeryeyes at the self checkout machine may be more
broadly unpacked within  the  history  of  supermarket  encounters  that  enfold  the  shopper  in  self
service  practices.  The basket  still  in  my hand reminds  me of  how collecting  the  goods in  the
supermarket  was  not  always  the  business  of  the  shopper.  Before  self  service  practices  in  the
supermarket,  there were counters with mechanical  or electromechanical  cash registers,  where a
customer would meet a shop assistant whose job was to collect the goods and assist customers
through the purchase. When self service practices were introduced in 1916 by a US grocery shop
called Piggly Wiggly (The Independent 2011), the design of the store (figure 38) began to articulate
the movement of shoppers around the goods by unfolding shopping floors with aisles around the
shelves, tagging the sections and prices of the goods, and designing into the self service store a
radically different sensorium for people to experience the shopping floor and the purchase point. 
There's a story of a scandal when Lord Sainsbury brought the concept of self service to the
UK in 1950. The new layout of the shop provoked a response from a high society shopper – a
judge's wife – who threw the basket violently at Lord Sainsbury when she realized that she was
being asked to do the work of a shop assistant (The Independent 2011).  But at  the same time,
according to the online report  of the Woolworths Supermarket museum,84 the new concept had
diverse benefits – “improved customer service with no need to wait at each counter, leading to
84 http://www.woolworthsmuseum.co.uk/1950s-firstselfservice.htm (last accessed 17/06/2016)
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larger average purchases; more space to sell merchandise and fewer tills and service points where
needed; and labour saving by having fewer people tied up ringing up customers’ purchases a single
item at-a-time” (Woolworths website). This online museum curates the large transformation of a
grocery shop into a self service store in Cobham, Surrey. It walks us through the ways in which the
new layout in 1955 relocated the checkouts desks at the front of the store, providing baskets and
signalling “in” and “out” doors, acquiring cash registers that could add up purchases, as well as
“taller counters with more products on sale.” 
Figure 38. The Piggly Wiggly self service         Figure 39. Employees at Woolworths' first
      store in Memphis, Tennessee, 1917                             self service store in Cobham, Surrey, 1955
      (Wikipedia's Piggly Wiggly entry)          (woolworthsmuseum.co.uk)
Interestingly,  the  museum's  website  mentions  as  well  that  “each  British  director  had
reservations about self service and feared that Cobham shoppers would consider the approach un-
British.”  Here  I  am  struck  by  the  similarity  of  this  statement  with  another  passage  of  The
Independent news  story  on  self  checkouts  where  I  learned  about  the  incident  involving  Lord
Sainsbury,85 which adamantly points out that the machine signals “a trip to the supermarket which
85 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/how-britain-became-a-self-service-nation-
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involves no interaction with other human beings whatsoever: a population for whom a robot-voice
chanting 'unexpected item in the bagging area' has become the rage-inducing mantra of 21st-century
shopping.” While I would agree from my own experience that people might sometimes use self
checkouts to avoid contact with other people, the case is that this self service practice is also always
enacted in ways that are more or less fragile,  depending on the gestures and capacities at  play
during  the  machinic  purchase.  Assistance  from a  human  employee,  in  turn,  is  not  only  often
required, but queues around the self checkouts also entail a kind of intimacy, a feeling of proximity.
The  assistance  needed  when  an  interaction  with  a  self  checkout  machine  breaks  down
resonates  with  the  assistance  customers  may  need  on  the  shopping  floor  as  well.  Here  the
Woolworths museum's website informs us that, when the new layout of the Cobham self service
store was introduced, scripts were memorized for women employees (figure 39) to deal with the
complaints of customers, and a series of slogans and messages were hung up to explain how it all
worked. According to The Independent: “for a while, customers were guided around the shelves by
an  employee,  known  as  'the  hostess',  in  order  to  alleviate  the  anxiety  of  being  lost  in  this
bewildering  new environment”  (2011).  The self  checkout  as  an innovation  of  supermarket  self
service practices may indeed generate a bewildering new environment. It seems as yet unclear just
how this machine may reshape the supermarket self service practice of grocery shopping.86
Among the  reasons  cited  to  provide  these  beeping  money  machines  are  their  promised
increase in efficiency and speed for a customer to checkout. For retailers they would seem to be
attractive because they require fewer employees, and could help to free up space on the shopping
2241830.html (last accessed 16/06/2016)
86 Studies (RBR 2009, 2013) by a retail banking research company have stated there were 27,000 shipments of self
checkout  machines  in  2012,  and forecast  nearly  60,000 by 2018.  The studies  say that  the Asia Pacific  had a
prominent growth in shipments in 2012, with Australia and Japan being the largest markets. The US remains the
largest region. Sales are expected to spike in 2013, as a result of a major rollout by Wal-Mart. Some figures on
manufacturers are also given: NCR corporation is today the largest vendor of self checkouts, adding up to 70% of
global shipments in 2012; the next largest world supplier is Wincor Nixdorf (13%), delivering most of its machines
to western Europe; Fujitsu comes in third place (8%), selling units mostly to the US. 
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floor.  On the other hand, opponents claim that they are not necessarily faster than staffed cash
registers, they are difficult to interact with, they restrict personal contact between people, and they
allow novel  ways to  shoplift  (BBC 2009).87 I  aim to  entangle  to  the  knots  of  the  history  and
controversies around self service supermarkets with my own ethnographic stories. If enacting the
supermarket  by  ourselves  means  translating  the  work  of  shop assistants  or  employees  to  shop
customers  or  consumers,  these  stories  are  about  the  co-production  of  people  and  things  as
employees, customers, and goods. By grasping this plot with my fingeryeyes I make sense of what
is configured for people when they touch the haptic interface of the self checkout machine, and I
trace the bodies and boundaries that we inhabit in the supermarket, to attempt to respond to self
service practices by moving sideways from their displays. 
Breaking chronotopes
According to Susanne Bodker (1990: 22), a breakdown of the human-computer interface
arises in a situation where a practical conflict signals a loss of articulation between “the assumed
conditions for the operations on the one hand, and the actual conditions on the other; between the
human reflection of the material conditions, and the actual conditions” (1990:27). This approach
adopts  a  definition  of  a  breakdown based on an  epistemology informed by geometrical  optics.
Breakdowns occur when, like a crack on a mirroring surface, what becomes actualized does not
reflect what is assumed in the design of an interaction through a human-computer interface. But if
we pay attention  to  how an ongoing breakdown is  articulated  in  practice,  the  register  of  such
situations may also catch how people tend to move sideways from machines to grasp/look for ways
of resuming an ongoing interaction.  
87 For instance, a man in Los Angeles “walked into the local Walmart, grabbed a 42” Sanyo Plasma TV, removed its
price tag and affixed one that would scan for only $4.88. He then proceeded to the self checkout where he paid
$4.88 for the TV. When he was stopped at the door, he produced a receipt for a TV he had purchased earlier that
day. His plan was to then return the TV he purchased earlier and keep the one he paid $4.88 for” (The Consumerist
2007).
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A breakdown means not a stop, but a sideways shift of action. Note that breakdowns signal
distributions and alignments of agencies: when something breaks down or is broken down, what
forms a part of a collection becomes reordered. In a mundane sense, to maintain, repair, or recycle
broken things is to put them together differently. Insofar as breakdowns always reconfigure actors
within dynamic situations, their reorderings might be grasped by taking apart the constitutive course
of action into its moments of movement. Breakdowns of the supermarket – including breakdowns
of the interaction with a self checkout machine, and the self checkout machine as a breakdown of
the supermarket – can be articulated into particular chronotopes. I use Mikhail Bakthin's sense of
the chronotope as a time and space amalgamation where people and things, driven by particular
narratives,  experience  and  experiment  with  living  impulses  and  form-shaping  ideologies.
Chronotopes  are  historical,  a  chronotope is  a  place  “where  the  knots  of  narrative  are  tied and
untied”  (Bakhtin  1981:250).  They  are  as  much  about  genres  as  they  are  about  production.
Chronotopes tell stories that generate times and spaces to render material specific configurations of
people and things. “Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise,
space becomes  charged  and  responsive  to  the  movements  of  time,  plot  and  history”  (Bakthin
1981:84). Chronotopes remind me of the promotional genre of Google Glass, audiovisual materials
animating  on  a  single  screen,  seemingly  without  trouble,  haptic  envelopments  and  ubiquitous
automations  of  mobile  displays.  Chronotopes  are  material-semiotic  fusions  of  time  and  space
dovetailed  into  each  other,  cut  together  apart  around,  through,  and  away  from  one  another.
Chronotopes partly resonate with Albert Einstein's space-time in relativity theory: “what counts for
us is the fact that it  expresses the inseparability of space and time” (Bakthin 1981:85, cited in
Morris 2009:184). 
Chronotopes  resonate  beyond  their  application  in  literature,  with  a  sense  of  TimeSpace
developed by Jon May and Nigel Thrift (2001) in geography. What matters is how chronotopes
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handle time and space: as generative of practices and generated in practice. Insofar as time and
space are produced everywhere, “the means by which a particular sense of time comes into being
and  moves  forward  to  frame  our  understandings  and  actions  –  are  in  turn  both  multiple  and
dynamic” (May and Thrift 2001:3). Ordering time through distinctions like the A-series and B-
series of time (the former sorts out time in terms of past, present, and future, while the latter in
terms  of  before/after  (Gell  1992:149-190))  not  only  reduces  time to  a  cultural  construction  of
temporal maps and images, with the risk of affixing its relation to space, but also cuts short the list
of instruments and devices to flesh out time, the way it is materialized through multiple social
disciplines, text(ures), timetables, and rythms (May and Thrift 2001:4-5), which open up in turn
ways of denoting moments of time. Bergson's sense of duration, mobility and time taken together,
in particular, points to moments without a pregiven extension, or impossible to articulate in fixed
series of time – such as days, weeks, and years in calendars; or seconds, minutes, and hours in
clocks. Bakhtin's chronotopes precisely capture time's multiplicity and heterogeneity in the way
series of time cannot. It appeals to the practical situatedness of a story's action to distil modes of
timing from the doings of people and things; for example, stories of what takes place in the queues
and shopping floors of supermarkets co-produce different practical modes of timing, which cannot
be reduced to one another. 
For Bakthin, chronotopes do not designate time and space as transcendental categories that
enable  cognitive  subjects  to  somehow  go  beyond  the  materiality  of  objects.  They  are  rather
narrative realizations of the quantities and qualities of time and space for particular people and
things. Chronotopes entail motifs to inhabit more than mathematical abstractions. Or “to be more
precise,  the  concept  of  time  and  space  as  mathematical  abstractions  itself  defines  a  specific
chronotope that differs from other chronotopes” (Morson and Emerson 1990:367).  Chronotopes
bring forth the productive variety of genres, their space-time generating capacities. According to
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Morson and Emerson, “for Bakthin, what is true of geometries of space is also true of chronotopes.
We live, so to speak, in a universe of heterochrony” (1990:368). Chronotopes unfold passages of
time where dominant stories become merely one alternative within a wider set of possibilities. They
are for Bakthin the ground for activity, not solely present or subjected to representation but rather
what makes it (im)possible (Morson and Emerson 1990:367). The suggestion of a chronotope is a
chronotope, a way of making by telling time and space. When we make our stories, there would be
no escape from (thinking with) chronotopes.  
I approach the agential multitude of chronotopes by storytelling with my fingeryeyes. I take
hold of chronotopes to account for the supermarket in terms of a co-production of shopping stories,
people, and things associated with the courses of action of the displays of self checkout machines. I
focus, more specifically, on the computer screen of the self checkout, to grasp how this money
machine  can  become a  part  of  supermarkets  by  aligning  self  service  shopping  practices.  I  am
inspired by the work of Suzanne Fraser on queues for methadone maintenance treatment (2006),
and her use of chronotopes in conjunction with Karen Barad's sense of intra-activity. In the context
of the methadone dosing point, Fraser sets out to explore how “the specific actions of time and
space coproduce each other as a chronotope of the queue, and how this chronotope helps materialise
particular methadone subjects” (2006:193). Focusing on the waiting periods of the queue; that is, a
specific temporality of the methadone maintenance treatment, one that is not strictly distinguishable
from other parts and forms of life, Fraser wants to avoid a distinction between a normal temporality
against which a methadone temporality that materialises undesirable (unproductive, disorderly, or
illicit) subjects may be contrasted. To do so, she takes into account how actions around the dosing
point fold back into the chronotope of the queue, considering with Barad's intra-activity how time
and space are constituted together in ways that do not pre-exist  people and thing.  Space,  time,
subjects, and objects rather co-produce each other, so chronotopes are not taken in her account as
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ground for consciousness, but as encountered in their specificities (Fraser 2006:194). 
With these insights we can begin to grasp breakdowns as signalling the variety of times and
spaces  through  which  courses  of  actions  around,  through,  and away  from the  displays  of  self
checkouts can be assembled. Breakdowns are not effected by the misalignment between what is
actualized and assumed in a course of action. They are rather a product of the ongoing genres and
the shifting generations of chronotopes reconfiguring the distribution of agencies of people and
things. Specific subjects and objects, like methadone and retail junkies, are always produced as
parts  of  chronotopes,  and they may breakdown and deal  with the breakdown of  the parts  of  a
chronotope by moving entities, including themselves, around or away from it. The breakdown of
face-to-face  interactions,  and  of  interfaces  of  all  kinds,  invite  us  to  move  sideways  from the
confrontation  of  people  and things  –  either  within  a  particular  time and space  or  into  another
dovetailed chronotope. All of these subtle moments of movement depend on what we do with our
stories, and how we may respond and become responsible for their powerful geometries of time,
plots, and history.
Market devices
Shopping stories make the supermarket a noteworthy example of a mechanism of sorting,
for people figured as consumers and things figured as goods (Callon and Muniesa 2005:1235). The
supermarket  articulates  the  history  of  a  calculative  space  in  which  goods  can  be  related  and
compared by shoppers. A selection of goods must happen because this space is not infinite, it has a
boundary which means that some goods are displayed on the shelves, other goods are deposited in
the background of the shopping floor, and some goods are excluded from circulating within the
supermarket  altogether.  These  arrangements  may  be  iteratively  ordered  by  three  elements  that
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would define supermarkets as organized collective market devices: calculable goods, calculative
agencies, and calculated exchanges (Callon and Muniesa 2005:1231). 
Market devices point to a pragmatic turn in the study of market and economic activities
(Appadurai  1986;  Cochoy  2007;  du  Gay  and  Pryke  2002;  Kjellberg  and  Helgesson  2006;
MacKenzie,  Muniesa,  and Siu  2007;  Miller  2005).  They  are  a  way of  referring  to  the  always
“material  and  discursive  assemblages  that  intervene  in  the  construction  of  markets”  (Muniesa,
Millo,  and Callon 2007:2).  They particularly highlight the materiality of economic settings and
dispositifs;  and  they  further  address  the  collections  and  distributions  of  goods,  agencies,  and
exchanges  in  so  called  market  encounters,  where  subjectivities  and  objectivities  are  not  pre-
contained in (what may be taken apart into) separate actors. Far from being external to each other,
economic actors in market assemblages come in multiple bundles. They appear as actants (Latour
1996) in the early vocabulary of actor-network theory, not given but heterogeneously produced in
practices or  agencements, so that performances broadly render things, behaviours and processes
economic, and being economic notably becomes a path-dependent feature, a story of people and
things  carried on by events and trajectories,  an historical  qualification of  calculative times and
spaces (Muniesa, Millo, and Callon 2007:4).  
In  the ongoing genres  and generative  shiftings  of  the supermarket,  calculation  does  not
necessarily mean to establish mathematical operations, but more fundamentally to make a practical
distinction between things or states of someone's world, to detach and to reattach them as parts of
the different worlds of people and things, and to imagine and estimate “courses of action associated
with  those  things  or  with  those  states  as  well  as  their  consequences”  (Callon  and  Muniesa
2005:1231).  This  broad  definition  has  the  double  advantage  of  eluding  a  simplification  of
calculative  agents,  taken  either  as  subjects  making  decisions  through  rational  preferences  and
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competencies, or as subjects that rarely calculate and instead use not-well-defined criteria to make
decisions. When calculation is considered instead as a process of attachment and detachment, the
people  and things  taken into  account  have  to  be considered,  moved,  arranged,  and labelled  to
become calculable in a space broadly defined as the “account itself but also, by extension, as the
surface  on  which  the  entities  to  calculate  are  moved  (literally  or  by  delegation)”  (Callon  and
Muniesa 2005:1231).
When  self-checkouts  participate  in  a  market  encounter,  what  renders  their  calculation
meaningful on screen, and helps them to be part of an exchange agreement in a calculative space,
can be described as  a  distributed configuration of  calculative  agencies,  a  mundane algorithmic
configuration:
They: a) circumscribe the group of calculative agencies that are to be met, by making them
identifiable and enumerable; b) organize their encounter, that is, their connection; and c)
establish the rules or conventions that set  the order in which these connections must be
treated and taken into account (formats, queues, etc.). Algorithmic configurations calculate
encounters differently, depending on the way in which they perform these operations; each
concrete market corresponds to a particular mode of organization (and calculation) of the
connection between singular supplies and demands. (Callon and Muniesa 2005:1242). 
In  this  sense,  a  market  becomes  not  an  abstraction  from  a  supermarket  but  rather  an
abstraction of the times and the spaces of a supermarket:
Algorithmic configurations are real sociotechnical arrangements. The 'market' does not exist
independently of them. Analyses of concrete and abstract markets were dissociated for a
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long time, simply because the mechanisms of aggregation and composition of supply and
demand,  organized  within  these  arrangements,  were  disregarded  and  simplified  to  the
extreme (Callon and Muniesa 2005:1242). 
As practical  abstractions brought  into concrete  calculative times and spaces,  algorithmic
configurations are always chronotopical. They are full of genres and generative stories, filled with
material-semiotic figures and projects of reconfiguration of people and things. Chronotopes and
algorithmic configurations may work together: chronotopes can inform algorithmic configurations
by  highlighting  the  histories  of  different  markets  devices,  and  algorithmic  configurations  can
perform chronotopes by associating their  concreteness and abstractness.  By extension,  breaking
down  chronotopes  follows  the  ethnographic  suggestion  of  paying  attention  to  the  details  of
algorithmic  configurations.  Chronotopes  can  help  then  to  grasp  the  capacities  of  algorithmic
configurations,  their  circumscription  of  agencies,  organization  of  agential  encounters,  and
establishment of rules to order and account for agential connections. 
Let's  move on to  break  down an interaction  with  the  haptic  display  of  a  self  checkout
machine, and consider chronotopically how actors hang together in each moment of translation of
our reading, through four calculable, calculative, and calculated surfaces of the supermarket: the
shopping floor, the possible queues around self checkouts, the positions to interface with them, and
the passage to take the goods away. Insofar as this list does not reduce the courses of actions with a
self checkout to their graphical displays, it  remains open for other supermarket stories. The list




 If  we  translate  a  pragmatic  take  on  calculation  to  the  supermarket,  the  imagined  and
estimated courses of action around, through, and away from the graphical interface of self checkout
machines,  insofar  as  they inform the boundaries  of the shopping floor,  are  associated with the
making of  detachable  and calculable goods.  When entering a  supermarket,  for  instance,  I  may
estimate how many products am I likely to purchase, which informs my preference to collect them
with a basket, a shopping cart, or nothing at all; and has consequences on my choice of paying at a
cash register, at a self-checkout if available, or not paying at all.
To be collected, goods have to be met as objectified and singularized things. An objectified
good means that even something rather abstract may hold together. It may be taken as stabilized,
definitive, and definable, grasped through its valued properties for the application and transfer of
property  rights,  and thus  made  capable  of  becoming  detached  from the  supermarket  shelf.  An
objectified good is made valuable through the previous design and qualification of the good; but
also when the market participants meet for a transaction, and even afterwards if the participants
grasp each other’s responses and take them into account in a future purchase (Callon and Muniesa
2005:1233). A singularized good means that even something rather abstract may be made capable of
becoming reattached to the body of a consumer, who is often prefigured to receive it. This work of
adjustment points to a process of co-elaboration of participants in any market exchange (Callon and
Muniesa 2005:1234). 
The shopping floor can be taken as a spatio-temporal account of what makes collected goods
calculable,  through their  objectification,  singularization,  and coproduction,  insofar as it  displays
them in conjunction with the material-semiotic surfaces of grocery lists, consumers, hand baskets,
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bags, shelves, employees, price tags, infra-red codes, cash registers, self checkout machines, etc. In
this sense, to differentiate where goods may be collected in here and carried out there, all these
things  or  entities  are  associated  in  ways  that  bound  the  shopping  floor  to  translate  or  better
materialize particular employees  and customers.  In this  time and space they can articulate  new
things or entities. For instance, when a purchase is made a receipt is produced. And then, crucially,
any of these things or entities, and particularly goods, might also be detached from one another, to
“leave the calculative space and circulate  elsewhere in an acceptable way (without  taking with
[them] the whole calculative apparatus)” (Callon & Muniesa 2005:1231). 
The  consumer  around  the  shopping floor  engages  with  and  is  configured  in  relation  to
preformatted  and  precalculated  information,  supplied  mostly  by  the  supermarket  (Callon  and
Muniesa 2005:1238). Moreover, this consumer comes in clusters or bundles, notably through the
use  of  close  or  remote  attachments,  facilitated  by  shopping  baskets  or  mobile  phones,  which
respectively collect people to shop in narrow groups or support purchase decisions at a distance
(Cochoy 2008:27). Nevertheless, while the practices of exchange of a market encounter can be
aggregated or knitted differently, the supermarket enfolds figures of consumers that invite us to
commit to shopping by postponing calculation; in particular, shopping carts or baskets can create a
buffer  or  storage  zone which  is  able  to  temporarily  dissociate  choices  from payment  (Cochoy
2008:20). When the number of items grows in the shopping cart or basket, the commitment to the
shopping also increases as it becomes problematic88 to put items back in the shelves, and so to
reverse the direction in which the goods are collected. Hence Franck Cochoy notes, in his detailed
study of the shopping cart,  that at  the end of the journey the consumer's commitment becomes
confirmed,  with  almost  all  people  carrying  some  goods  to  purchase  (2008:20).  This  delay  in
88 It  becomes  problematic  for  consumers  to  return  their  goods  not  only  because  that  entails  returning  to  the
corresponding  shelves,  but  also  because  committing  to  the  purchase  entails  increasing  the  stack  of  items,  so
reaching inside the hand basket or shopping cart and pulling out a collected good becomes tricky; the bigger the
pile the harder it gets.  
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calculation translates budgetary into volumetric constraints. While this effect may be counteracted
by making shopping lists, it also indicates how the purchasing and  planning capacities of shoppers
can “relegate arithmetic preoccupations to a position of secondary importance” (Cochoy 2008:23). 
If  the  calculation of  prices  may not  be what  is  at  stake on the  shopping floor,  Cochoy
proposes  that  another  kind of  calculation takes  place:  qualculation,  a  practice that  is  about  the
evaluation  of  choices  in  the  absence  of  calculation.89 Qualculation  breaks  down the  distinction
between pure calculation and judgement,  and then  fuses  qualitative  estimation  and quantitative
calculation. Again (shopping) lists are a good example of qualculation, as they can leave us “utterly
perplexed because of their implicit and imprecise character” (Cochoy 2008:26). The shopping list
allows an assortment of goods that does not have to follow the coherent logic of organization of the
supermarket shelf, so that consumers on the shopping floor may feel “the irresistible gap between
the often generic items of the list and the highly diverse supply of the shelves” (Cochoy 1999). I
grasp in this moment of shopping a movement, that subtly bridges qualculative distances through
estimating the value of the goods, how shopping floors are a chronotopical account of what makes
goods  calculable.  I  pay  attention  here  to  shoppers  making  face-to-shelf  and  face-to  basket
alignments (figures 40 and 41), noting their commitments to the purchase:
Supermarkets  are  one  of  the  rare  places  where  people  look for  'objects'  rather  than  for
'social'  relationships.  This  bent  towards  objects  is  all  the  more  remarkable  when  the
surrounding  people  are  fairly  numerous.  In  supermarkets,  observations  shows that  each
'other' (and his/her shopping cart) is an obstacle on the route between the single consumer
and the 'other things' he/she tries to grasp. Human beings and carts screen inter-objectivity:90
everyone slaloms between carts and bodies that hinder his/her progress; each one waits for
89 For a discussion of the concept of qualculation and agency see Callon and Law (2005).
90 See Latour (1996).
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the other's move so as to get to the shelves (Cochoy 2008:29).     
  Figure 40. Face to-shelf91             Figure 41. Face to-basket        
   (photograph by author)        (photograph by author)
Nevertheless,  if  the  shopping  floor  acts  as  a  screen  for  people  and  things  to  become
particular consumers and goods, this surface may work together with the displays of self checkout
machines. They may co-produce a perimeter where people may also move sideways from their
commitment  to  the purchase,  so their  attachments  to  and detachments  from the  goods may be
reversed. While self service practices are about translating work from employees to consumers,
even when payments are delayed or goods are dissociated from points of purchase, people may
leave  them aside,  move sideways out  of  the  supermarket,  and avoid  an encounter  with a  cash
register or a self checkout. Since the cost of going through the payment of goods can always be
reattached  to  the  shopping  cart  or  basket,  people  in  here  may indeed stay  in  touch with  their
eventual retreat out there, that is, beyond a material-semiotic boundary screened by the purchase,
91 I thank my dear friends Marina Calota and Liviu  Alexandrescu for enacting a self service purchase through the
supermarket. 
135
where the wider consequences of carrying goods cannot be conveniently dismissed any longer.
Closing  hours,  in  particular,  mark  a  moment  where  the  shopping  floor  turns  around
movement  for  staff  to  perform  ordering  and  cleaning  tasks,  which  translates  work  from  the
consumers  back  to  the  employees.  In  this  sense,  nocturnal  supermarket  activity,  according  to
Cochoy, “performs management not as textbook knowledge, but as situated practice: through its
pragmatic garden activity, supermarket staff shows us that market framing is about adopting the
consumer's point of view 'physically' rather than 'intellectually': in moving at night into the very
space and position consumers will occupy during the day, the supermarket gardeners experience the
consumer's  own gestures  with  their  senses  and bodies”  (2007:114).  These  prolific  “gardening”
activities react to the fragile things that might break down in the gap between the shelf and the
basket, or to the goods that may be abandoned halfway through the purchase – scattered around to
avoid their payment, as people can reverse the direction of their attachments to and detachments
from the supermarket. In short, both order and mess are generated daily on the shopping floor.
Queue line 
Making people and goods present  on the shopping floor  also entails  making manifestly
absent the work of other things or entities that may be detached, moved, arranged and ordered
around  and  away  from  the  supermarket.  The  work  of  employees  in  the  background  of  the
supermarket, or in the chains of distribution that supply the shopping floor with goods, for instance,
may be  manifestly  absent  from the  shopping floor.  But  also the work of  other  people such as
cleaners and accountants, and the powers of nonhuman participants such as electrical systems or
water networks, may be disregarded or left out of sight when shopping around the aisles. While
encounters with all these labourers may be easily (dis)missed on the shopping floor, queue lines
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articulate shoppers in ways that allow us to pay attention to other activities than shopping in a
supermarket. Queue lines themselves offer a trace-like figuration of bodies, one that is reminiscent
of the worldly webs through which supermarkets are constantly tendered for shoppers, by sorting
what is made present, what is kept manifestly absent, and what is Othered from the shopping floor.
Queues of the supermarket are often stretched around the aisles and across their face-to-shelf
positions.  Such queues  break  down the  space-time of  the  shopping floor:  a  particular  waiting,
queuing to make a purchase isn't about the calculation of prices. And insofar the shoppers also
ignore the goods shelved around them, queuing is not about qualculation either. Instead queues
resonate  more closely  with the  approximation  of  distances  of  people and things  – that  is  with
another  kind of calculation: calqulation (Cochoy 2008:30).  This expression is  derived from the
French word “calquer” (to trace a model):
In the action of tracing, there is not only the idea of copying, but also that of adjustment.
Using tracing paper requires a double aptitude: the purpose is not only to 'trace again' the
lines of the original copy, but also to adjust the translucent paper to the model. Let's now
imagine that such patterns may be reciprocal, as if two people with their respective tracing
papers met on either side of a window pane, the one trying to adjust/trace the drawing of the
other, without having anything at the onset and without knowing who holds the original.
This  hypothetical  scene  helps  us  to  understand  what  'calqulation'  is  all  about  (Cochoy
2008:30). 
While  in  the chronotope of  the  shopping floor  people's  timing and spacing seem rather
independent from one another, in the chronotope of the queue we are more evidently subjected to an
adjustment of bodies,  a synchroduration really  dependant  upon the calqulations of one another.
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Queuing offers a different moment of movement around the display of the self checkout. When
queuing I encounter people and goods differently than when collecting goods. On the shopping
floor touch has more to do with detaching goods from shelves and reattaching them to ourselves,
but in a queue line bodily encounters mean to stay in touch at a distance. In this zone I move by
aligning myself with the spaces between the queueing bodies. People adjust to each other while
tracing the queue line. Here I become in touchless touch with other bodies carrying goods and
waiting for an available point of purchase. Since my fingeryeyes do not touch the people in the
queue line, I hold on to them by grasping that alignment or array that enfolds our neighbouring
bodies.
Fraser (2006) reads this chronotope by using Barad's agential realism. For her queues are
particular phenomena, a becoming through the intra-action of temporal conditions with specific
spatial  arrangements.  Drawing  on  the  generative  spatio-temporality  of  drug  use  conjoined  or
dovetailed with the production of individualized agency, Fraser argues that the methadone dosing
point should be understood as showing characteristics found elsewhere in  life  (2006:194).  This
insight strikes me as an invitation to compare Fraser's observations with the queues at the purchase
points of supermarkets. For instance, both queues entail a site of anxiety, as well as of boredom and
frustration, for both methadone clients or supermarket shoppers. And also positions in these queue
lines are not easily  maintained. The amount of people queueing in dosing points and purchase
points is similarly constrained by the number of counters and the concern of institutions with public
order and the security of their services.
In  this  sense,  Fraser  follows  Barad  to  insist  that  methadone  clients,  like  supermarket
shoppers, are intra-actively co-produced with the queues they inhabit: “clients, themselves already
multiply  co-constituted  phenomena,  intra-act  with  the  chronotope  of  methadone  maintenance
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treatment (that is, the queue – itself also always already multiply co-constituted). In the process,
both the client and the queue impact on each other,  reproducing each other differently” (Fraser
2006:199).  What matters here is  that the queue,  as a chronotope of the clinic,  acts as much to
produce specific subjects as it  does to treat them; similarly,  the queue of a self  checkout,  as a
chronotope of the supermarket, acts as much to generate particular shoppers as it does to extend a
service  to  them.  The  shopping  floors  and  the  consumers  may  be  tied  and  untied,  or  enfolded
together, cut together apart (Barad 2007), diffracted through to “become with” each other in self
service practices. 
While  we  may  confront  people's  backs  in  the  queue,  the  face-to-body  figures  of  this
alignment  can  take  unpredictable  shapes  and  directions,  particularly  at  peak  times,  so  that
(especially  express)  supermarkets  may  equip  their  points  of  purchase,  including  self  checkout
zones, with ordering devices to dictate (regulate, discipline) the embodiment of queue lines. This is
a strategy that often builds on how people move sideways from each other in the queue line – in
snake-like patterns – in  order  to  bend the alignment.  But  it  is  also an ordering that  frequently
ignores how people might also move away from the queue line, if the time to wait is too long. The
calculative apparatus of the supermarket often tries to tame and direct the queue by adding stripes
and stands or marks on the floor. In the absence of these device, to navigate the obstacles around the
purchase points people bend their bodies to curve the queue line and so to literally go around their
troubles. Ordered and messy trace-like patterns are plots of calqulative alignments.
The queue offers a moment of movement sideways from the aisles and the shelves,  not
following a passage that reverses the directionality of the attachments and detachments of people
and goods,  but  an alignment  that  directs  them toward  a  purchase  point.  Attending here  to  the
histories  of  self  service  practices  may  materialize  consumer  subjects  that,  following  Barad's
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phenomena, can intra-act with the queue line to respond differently,  and so interfere with their
supermarket  stories,  while  waiting  to  move collectively.  Queues  at  the  self-checkout  machines
situate bodies in a trace-like patterning of people and things. Queues remind us of how we are
always a part  of a specific time and space,  joined in ways that  are irreducible to consumption
patterns on the shopping floor of a supermarket. Queues materialise particular subjects: here we
may become different people than the consumer, configured for us on the shopping floor, if we
inhabit queues as intimate places, spending time to attend to our overlaps with other people and
things.  
Purchase point
The chronotope of a  supermarket  purchase offers  a third moment of  movement around,
through,  and away from the haptic  display of  a  self  checkout.  When approaching an available
machine,  this  space  of  interaction  breaks  down  the  space-time  of  the  shopping  floor  –  or
alternatively  the  queue  line.  Since  here  purchases  are  algorithmically  articulated  through  the
graphical interface of self checkout machines, I encounter goods differently than when my body
was collecting them. As Callon and Muniesa propose, “the purchase is not the result of a subject-
object  encounter,  both  external  to  each  other,  but  a  process  of  attachment”  (2005:1234).  The
purchase  wraps  up  the  ways  through which  calculable  goods  are  objectified,  singularized,  and
coproduced;  it  bundles  how they  become attached  to  specific  consumers.  Most  importantly,  it
designates as well an exit passage for the consumer to detach herself and the collected goods from
the supermarket. 
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Figure 42. Shifting goods around the interface          Figure 43. Accessing the payment slots
       (photograph by author)                                               (photograph by author)   
Self checkouts are frequently mounted in enclosed containers whose content can be seen
only when employees handle the storage of money, or provide service to their electro-mechanical
circuits. I try to watch without drawing attention to myself, after making a purchase, how three
employees now expose the inside of a self checkout. One of them is retrieving small boxes with
cash inside,  while  the  others  stand around the opened machine.  It  seems as  if  they attempt to
conceal  the  perimeter  of  the  self  checkout,  left  vulnerable  by  the  task  of  opening  it.  When
employees  interact  in  this  way  with  these  machines,  consumers  are  not  allowed  to  use  them.
Disclosing the concealment  of the self  checkout  excludes it  from bounding the shopping floor,
which  in  turn  breaks  down the  consumer's  exit  passage.  Still,  insofar  as  the  display  of  a  self
checkout, already designed to work on the shopping floor, hangs together in practice with users,
currencies,  and  things,  it  bounds  their  transactions  within  the  supermarket  and  proliferates  a
variegated production of goods and attachments by profiling customers. This machinic moment
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particularly  entails  moving  things  around the  interface,  while  keeping  myself  aligned  with  the
touchscreen, and then moving away from the supermarket rather than around the shopping floor.
This self service purchase uses my eager fingeryeyes to shift goods in order from one side of the
interface to the other (figure 42), it lures me to swap money between the outsides and the insides of
my wallet and the payment slots (figure 43), it designates with a receipt my ownership over the
collected goods (figure 44), and it allows to move beyond the shopping floor of the supermarket
(figure 45). 
            Figure 44. Producing a receipt   Figure 45. Moving beyond the shopping floor
      (photograph by author)             (photograph by author)   
To touch a screen here means to be touched back, a transfiguration of ourselves in touch
with others. I grasp this self checkout zone in my own body-work (Myers 2008) of translating things
and  money,  in  response  to  the  specific  modalities  of  a  purchase  rendered  calculative  through
reciprocal  touch.  In  turn,  the  sensuous  proximity  with  this  machine  allows  me  to  grasp  quite
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literally the perimeter between the chronotopes that collect the goods in here and then carry them
out there. In the supermarket purchase, I feel how this kinetic encounter is a dance where subjects
and objects may exchange positions. People may be materialised as users/consumers, as objects of
economic design; and self checkouts may be personified as cashiers/employees, as subjects of a
market exchange. In this entangled way, the purchase configured into the self checkout orchestrates
an algorithmic moment of movement that breaks down with the qualculative and calqulative times
and spaces of the shopping floor and the queue line. 
Research in this site can take Callon and Muniesa's algorithmic configurations quite literally,
simultaneously marked by the capacities of the machine and the gestures of a “user” aligned in step-
by-step  procedures  for  calculations.  Algorithms  of  self  checkouts  indeed  can  be  followed  to
effectively  enact   a  purchase,  yet  this  is  far  from consistently  the case.   This  is  because,  as  I
emphasized  earlier,  translating  work  from employees  to  customers  by  means  of  a  self  service
machine encounters resistance from shoppers as well as conditions that computers need to meet.
According to Frank Levy and Richard J. Murnane in 'Dancing with Robots' (2013), a computer may
replace a human in a task only when two conditions are thoroughly satisfied: first “an information
condition: all information necessary to carry out the task can be identified and acquired in a form
that computers can process”; and second, “a processing condition: the information processing itself
can be expressed in rules” (7).  While rules might be programmed for self checkouts to enact a
purchase,  for  them to  gather  all  of  the  information  necessary  to  perform this  task  effectively
becomes tricky, and prone to breakdown.
As one example, the Wall Street Journal (2013) highlights, after interviewing several former
employees, a particularly demanding issue for checkout workers: identifying fruits and vegetables.
Since these delicious items may be sold by units and without price tags, checkout workers need to
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identify them with their own fingeryeyes and without infrared scanners. Some workers say it takes
up to a few weeks or months to memorize the correct codes, while others continue double checking
with a book of codes. In any case, the article claims that self checkout machines, in contrast to
human  cashiers,  cannot  tell  “shiitakes  from  Shinola.  Instead  of  identifying  your  produce,  the
machine asks you, the customer, to type in a code for every leafy green in your cart. Many times
you'll have to look up the code in an on-screen directory. If a human checker asked you to remind
him what that bunch of the oblong yellow fruit in your basket was, you would ask to see his boss”
(Wall  Street  Journal  2013).  Self  checkout  machines  cannot  easily  differentiate  “shiitakes  from
Shinola” because their own fingeryeyes – their haptic displays, their sensor pressure surfaces, and
their infrared scanners – are tied to messy practices that neither qualculate or calqulate, but calculate
market  encounters  with  algorithms that  divide  the  labour  of  screening  a  purchase,  and further
distribute such task collaboratively between the user and the machine. To quote Melville's Moby
Dick, “it is a mutual, joint-stock world, in all meridians” (1922:63). 
Note that sometimes it is the self checkout machine that does the screening for a consumer;
sometimes  is  the  consumer  who  performs  the  screening  for  a  self  checkout.  Alternatively,
sometimes it is an employee who becomes the “user” doing the screening for the consumer and the
machine; sometimes the customer explicitly needs help from the employee (for instance when a
purchase needs approval or when the machines run into network connectivity issues, and employees
can further help with an unscannable item or by removing unused baskets). And sometimes it is the
customer who remedies a breakdown by herself (for instance when a self checkout warns of an
unexpected item in the bagging area, I may reverse the action by removing whatever is bothering
the machine from the pressure sensor surface. This does the trick most times). After checking out
my groceries for a while in this way, I have actually learnt to dance decently with the checkout
machine. Just like the workers from the Wall Street Journal article – who eventually learned to
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identify and then memorized the codes of fruits and vegetables – I have learnt to identify a few of
the rules of the action encoded into self checkouts, and I have memorized them through my own
body-work of going through the purchase – that is, by moving goods around the machine while
staying  aligned  with  the  touchscreen.  Nevertheless,  sometimes  breakdowns  become  rather
irreversible situations – if items are too heavy so that they break down the pressure sensor surface,
or if the customer has no cash or coupons, or the purchase won't go through the secure network.
Even when the information condition of a purchase is translated more or less successfully
both  by  the  user  and  the  machine,  the  processing  requirements  expressed  in  the  algorithmic
engagement can exasperate the shoppers. Self checkout machines may invite you to put your own
bags in the bagging area, but for some reason the pressure sensor surfaces, all designed for the
computer to gather information to perform this specific step in the purchase, often fails to sense
them. So for the machine to meet such practical requirements, I would then remove the bags and
wait a few seconds to try again, which often works. Nevertheless, allocating goods to the pressure
sensor surfaces I still experience issues that test my own patience as well as the performance of the
algorithms configuring  the  purchase.  In  particular,  when the  machine  gets  locked down in the
“unexpected item in the bagging area” message, I cannot escape from the situation by myself. If
there is no available employee nearby to assist me, then I must move sideways from the machine:
abandon the breakdown but not the self checkout zone, to look for another available self service
point of purchase. Or alternatively, not without frustration, I might turn around to go back to the
queue line, and contemplate using a staffed cashier.  Filling up the breakdowns of this chronotope
conjoins the shopper and the employee in an ontological dance (figure 46) on the shopping floor
with the machine, which displays for each person a specific access (figure 47) that limits their
algorithmic configuration. 
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       Figure 46. The self checkout                     Figure 47. Employee security
                        dancing floor                                       access card
              (photograph by author)                                (photograph by author)   
When  the  purchase  is  ready  to  be  closed  by  the  payment,  the  dance  of  customers,
employees, and machines is taken – in at least in two directions – beyond the self checkout zone.
First, making a payment entails that the shopper moves on from her face-to-sensor and face-to-
scanner positions to her face-to-slot configuration, in order to access the available entrances and
withdrawals  for currencies  to  pay.  The self  service payment  situates consumers  in  front  of the
touchscreen in  the centre,  to  bound the moments  of movement around the aisles  and purchase
points, so that when consumers pay they face an alignment at the boundary of the shopping floor, a
point  where  they  stop  looping  through  the  collection  of  goods  and  are  directed  out  of  the
supermarket. 
Surely consumers aiming to dance decently with a self checkout are responsible for their
payments, but once the purchase goes through they also become attached to the wider consequences
of those payments: to what they buy into when they go through shopping floors configured to profit
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from their actions. Moreover, the payment produces information about the purchase, luring the user
to disclose not only her wallet but also her identity, and through the use of credit, debit, and loyalty
cards, the payment reaches into different circuits of currencies that may attach profiles to purchased
goods. This extension of the calculative apparatus stretches into the “back office” of the machine,
which manifests the absence of certain parts of its configuration at work in the self checkout zone.
In other words, to subtly catch what allows consumers to calculate with self checkouts requires me
to extend my fingeryeyes into the storage, maintenance, concealment, and policing of money data,
to reach something that is manifestly absent in the presence of the purchase, just because consumers
are not supposed to deal with this part of a supermarket's algorithmic configuration. After touching
the haptic display, I look for wired or wireless connections that extend the machine as a part of
centralized lines of database storage.
While focusing the attention of the user on the screen, money machines like self checkouts
tend to conceal the material-semiotic threads, the hardware and software, allowing them to work
together in zones designed to make data flow (MacKenzie 2002) through architectures for things
always  in-formation.  Let  me  offer  one  alternative  to  this  mundane  problem,  by  turning  my
fingeryeyes to the pages of the manual and overview of another self checkout machine, the IBM
Self Checkout System 4845. This text92 details  how that machine is  made of a cash module,  a
security module, conveyors, and bagging areas. Among the security options of this self checkout
machine  one  may  find  authorization  software,  bar  code  scanner  scales,  security  curtains  that
measure  item  dimensions,  and  bagging  area  scales  that  verify  scanned  items  when  they  are
packaged.  The  text  discloses  the  back  office  as  well  (figure  48),  that  is,  the  point  of  server
controllers (POS),  the network server,  a  networking device (a  hub/switch),  and the back office
system server (BOSS). 
92 http://tvintec.com.vn/upload/file/products/ibm-self-checkout-systems_592.pdf  (last accessed 17/06/2016). The self
checkouts I engaged with during my ethnography were made by NCR, but I could not find data of the assembly of
their machines. 
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It  is  this  security  module  that  highlights,  most  prominently,  how  the  purchase  directs
consumers into a passage where their attachment to goods becomes rather irreversible. Note how
even when the consumer may bypass the security options and, with the help of the employee, still
reverse the course of action of the purchase in the last minute – for instance, by unscanning and
returning an item – as soon as the purchase is wrapped up by the payment with a debit, credit, or
loyalty card, reversing or erasing the data collected by the back office of a self checkout becomes
much harder than reversing or refunding the payment of the purchase. It seems this is the case
because the business of the back office of the self checkout entails collecting information to profit
from consumers by turning them into well  known customers,  that is,  into subjects from whom
someone (who?) may learn to identify and so extract more value on each  purchase.     
        Figure 48. IBM Self Checkout 
            System 4845 back office
        (IBM Self Checkout System 4845 overview)
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To think  more  generally  about  how to  make  present  the  consequences  of  the  manifest
absence of calculative agencies, such as the algorithms of the back office of self checkouts, I will
discuss in the conclusion of this chapter how I think people in calculated market exchanges may
aptly respond to this line in the centre – an ordering line that became present when I confronted the
display of the self checkout in wrapping up my purchase, but also when I faced the ordering of the
parallel aisles to collect goods, and the straight ordering of the parallel lines to queue for a purchase
point. This line in the centre of the supermarket may be grasped as well in the straight ordering of
the parallel doors and walls, through which consumers pass when they leave the shopping floor.
Shopper's exit passage
Let's sum up the three previous moments of movement bounded by the purchase, which
designates an exit passage for the consumer. First, on the shopping floor the action of calculating
the value of goods is delayed by the production of a buffer zone: a specific space where goods may
be  detached  from  the  shelves  and  attached  to  the  consumer;  and  a  specific  time  meant  for
consumers to make a commitment to the purchase. I unpacked on the shopping floor how making
goods calculable is  about the embodiment  of qualculations,  that is,  about  the estimation of the
values of the goods in the absence of calculation. To shop on those particular floors, people need to
thread a knot between their face-to-shelf and face-to-basket positions without losing their grasp of
the relation between the highly diverse supply of goods from the shelves and their desire for things.
Lists sometimes help in sorting out the gap. However, calculations can still  take a place on the
shopping floor, which entails the chance of reversing the direction of the action of collecting goods,
largely without consequences for the consumer. Goods can be taken out from their hand baskets or
shopping carts,  and dispersed across the shopping floor.  And in this  sense the closing hours of
supermarkets allow employees to reorganize the shopping floor more discreetly. Such gardening
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activities may be observed at times by the shoppers during opening hours as well.
Second,  when consumers  move  away from the  shopping  floor;  that  is,  towards  an  exit
passage through which they can detach themselves and their goods from a supermarket, they can
bump into a queue aligned to a purchase point, which can be placed in a self checkout zone or
equipped with a staffed cashier. In a queue line the action of calculating goods is delayed by the
production of a second buffer zone: a specific space where consumers may be detached from the
aisles  and  attached  to  other  consumers;  and  a  specific  time  meant  for  consumers  to  pattern
themselves with other bodies, to the point that queue lines always truncate the individual “selves” of
self  services  by  forcing  people  to  act  with  others.  I  unpacked  in  the  queue  line  how making
calculative  agencies  is  about  the  embodiment  of  calqulations,  that  is,  about  the  tracing  of  the
boundaries of actors in the presence of their  (intra-)actions.  To queue in those particular floors
people need to thread a cut between their face-to-other body positions, without losing their grasp of
the alignment. Qualculations might also happen in the queue if shoppers, instead of assuming face-
to-body positions, adopt face-to-basket positions in order to gaze at each other's items. 
Third,  in the machinic purchase the action of calculating goods is made possible by the
reduction of the buffers zones that delayed the purchase. This is a specific space where shoppers
detach themselves from the aisles and attach themselves and the goods to a self checkout; and a
specific  time meant for consumers to  wrap up the purchase,  and then to leave through an exit
passage.  I  unpacked  in  the  machinic  purchase  how making  calculated  exchanges  is  about  the
embodiment of algorithms, that is, about the step-by-step dancing of the procedures for calculations
in the presence of calculable goods and calculative agencies. To purchase in those particular zones,
people need to thread and cut the knots between their face-to-scanner, face-to-sensor, and face-to-
slot positions without loosing grasp of the touchscreen in the centre and the goods on the sides.
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Employees sometimes help in sorting out the purchase. Calculations happen algorithmically every
day in the self checkout zone, which entails that the direction of the action of purchasing becomes
rather  irreversible.  After  a  purchase  people  may  want  to  return  their  goods,  which  they  can
accomplish with the help of employees, but in the case of a satisfying exchange overall there is
nothing left to calculate. Through the machinic purchase, shoppers and goods become entangled
with the self checkout's back offices, where shoppers may become well know customers.  
Thinking about the shopping floor, the queue line, and the machinic purchase in terms of
qualculation, calqulation, and calculation, as different practical algorithmic configurations, already
allows us to grasp two features of the shopper's exit passage. First, the direction of the action of the
purchase through the shopping floor and the self checkout zone changes, from being more to less
reversible to becoming rather irreversible in the exit passage. Second, within the shopping floor, the
queue line, or the machinic purchase, shoppers can pay attention to how people and things are made
present and manifestly absent for them in the supermarket. And they can grasp too how the people
and  things  that  are  made  manifestly  absent  might  suddenly  become  present  and  vice-versa.
Nevertheless, I sense as a consumer in the supermarket that it is quite a different question for me to
grasp what is Othered: what remains further concealed and so never present or manifestly absent, on
the shopping floor or in its background. 
In other words, and because the exit passage I must go through to move away from the
shopping floor with my goods is one of the many ways of detaching people and things from the
supermarket,  this  chronotope often  entails  to  other  or  to  divide  and conceal  from me the  exit
passages  of some people and things of the supermarket.  However,  one may think that  the exit
passage is where all people and things, living or not, always turn to when any other chronotope
breaks down. This passage, bounded by several doors and walls, leads outside the supermarket.
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After collecting my items, I begin to walk through a path that collects people moving away with
their goods from the supermarket, which dovetails the shopping floor inside and the public street
outside. I approached my exit, passing through the main doors (figure 49) of the shopping floor and
through the  main  gate  (figure  50)  enclosing  the  parking space,  still  signalling  the  insides  and
outsides of the supermarket.  In this  chronotope,  people and things eventually break away.  Exit
passages make a space that keeps consumers moving towards the outside, but also provides them
with a time to think about what may have been left  unnoticed inside.  As shoppers, I think the
reminder matters not only if one forgot something at the self checkout, but also because this can be
a time to grasp what takes place and for whom in a supermarket.
           Figure 49. Main door             Figure 50. Main gate
          (photograph by author)                       (photograph by author)
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The supermarket as device
The specific  algorithmic configurations that inform self  checkouts entail  an embodiment
around, through, and away from their graphical displays, an exchange that signals a rather practical
agreement  between  the  supply  and  demand  of  the  supermarket.  I  traced  this  as  a  course  of
calculative trials, moments of movement where goods became knotted to shoppers in ways that
directed  them through  the  calculative  apparatus  of  the  supermarket.  This  agential  compromise
settles trials of calculative strength, as according to Callon and Muniesa market encounters produce
a “compromise not on values but on the instruments that calculate values” (2005:1239). In this
sense, while grasping qualculations, calqulations, and calculations, we have explored just a few of
the  market  devices,  including  the  self  checkout  machine,  that  help  us  consumers  to  reach  a
calculative  compromise  with  what  is  made  present  and  what  is  made  manifestly  absent  in
encounters with supermarkets. I considered as well the exit passage, a chronotope to highlight a
specific moment of movement where there is apparently nothing left to calculate, so that I could
offer a space and a time for curious consumers to think about what is Othered for them through this
passage.
In  the  exit  passage,  I  may  recall  how  algorithmic  configurations  gather  agencies  with
asymmetrical calculative powers: 
from the design down to the display of  products  on shelves,  series of professionals are
involved, all exploring the consumer's distributed world the better to integrate the product
into  it  by  playing  skilfully  on  the  product's  qualifications.  Facing  the  consumer  are  a
multitude  of  professionals  armed  with  computers,  studying  his  or  her  movements  and
calculating margins down to the last cent or gram (Callon and Muniesa 2005: 1238). 
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Thus asymmetrical calculative powers are at work on the shopping floor, where there are
trials to calculate which aisles should consumers go through, which goods they should desire, and
how they should collect them. In the queue line, where there are trials to calculate the movement
between the  queueing bodies,  what  distance  should  we leave  for  people  to  go through.  In  the
machinic purchase, where there are trials to calculate which goods should consumers buy, how
much money should they spend, and which payment method should they select. In all these trials of
calculative strength consumers meet a line in the centre of the supermarket; that is, an ordering line
spread in the parallel layout of the shopping floor, in the alignments of queues shaped by stands and
stripes, in the purchase where consumers confront the touchscreen to display goods and to pay for
them, and in the customer's exit passage where consumers detach themselves and their goods from
the shopping floor by going through the line that bounds the supermarket’s insides from the public
space beyond. Most importantly, consumers deal with the line in the centre of the supermarket as a
matter of asymmetrical calculative powers. Facing a line in the centre matters because it signals the
calculative  strength  of  the  apparatus  of  the  supermarket,  particularly  when  a  choice  is  made
available  for  consumers  to  shop  around  the  aisles,  when  an  alignment  is  made  available  for
consumers to wait around the purchase points, when a zone is made available for consumers to
check out goods through a machine, and when it seems there is nothing left to calculate within a
passage made available for consumers to leave through the supermarket’s doors and walls. 
While purchases settle market encounters,  it  is not always the case that consumers must
remain  weak  in  relation  to  the  power  of  supply,  and  the  desire  for  profit,  configured  in  the
supermarket. On the one hand, avoiding impulsive buying, or spending time comparing prices, are
already robust strategies to respond to the algorithmic configurations of the shopping floor. The
same becomes valid for the queue line, where people can help each other to signal the alignment
more evidently, where it begins or where it leads, without need of calculative props like stands and
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stripes. In the case of self checkouts, it is still possible for consumers to remain anonymous, if we
avoid profile and subjection to unwanted customer services by paying with cash instead of credit,
debit, or loyalty cards. On the other hand, calculative powers indeed have their limits,93 so it would
be rare to find a specific customer with the capacity to open a supermarket just for herself, on a
Sunday night, if she forgot to buy milk and cookies. The same goes for finding a customer with the
capacity to decide the shape and rhythm of a very long queue in an overcrowded shopping floor, or
with the power to modify the prices and payment options of self checkouts.  
Let me conclude by underlining how the shopping floor bounded by the purchase may be
articulated  differently,  and  so  what  counts  as  a  supermarket  may  be  reconfigured  as  well  by
mounting  its  insides  and  outsides  beyond  the  immutable  immobile  doors  and  walls  that  often
conceal it. Again the Woolworths museum’s website offers a telling example of this possibility, a
mobile shop:94
One of the more bizarre episodes of Woolworths' history was the 1957 launch of a mobile
shop [figure 51], which was intended to be the first of a fleet. A single decker 'Green' bus
was purchased from the London Country Bus Company and converted into a small self-
service  shop.  It  was  filled  with  a  selection  of  household  items  and  toiletries.  A
"Manager/Driver" was appointed along with two Sales Assistants […] While it was warmly
received by some shoppers, local traders hated it, particularly in established towns which
didn't  have a Woolworths  store.  They lobbied local  councillors to  ban the mobile  shop,
93 Which is the case for self checkouts as well, not only because it is practically hard to gather all the necessary
information for them to perform their part of the purchase, but also since the algorithmic rules that inform the
process must be expressed, for instance, in a polynomial rather than exponential time. Otherwise the user risks
getting stuck with the machine in algorithmic time (the halting problem) and other computational troubles. This
suggests that people meet in the machinic purchase two ways of thinking about complexities. One coming from
complex system theory as a general characterization of a whole with many parts that interact with each other;
another  one  coming from computational  complexity theory  as  an  axiomatic  take  on the  resources  needed for
executing algorithms.
94 http://www.woolworthsmuseum.co.uk/50s-mobileshop.htm (last accessed 17/06/2016)
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pointing out that it did not pay rent and rates or employ local people. They said that the
lower running costs gave the chain an unfair advantage (Woolworths Website). 
Even as the 'Woolworths on Wheels' (WoW) was a “political minefield” according to the
museum's website, this experiment effectively “embraced the principles” of the purchase as a self
service  practice,  reconfiguring the moments  of  movement of  such an experience,  the shopping
floors, the queue lines, the machinic purchase, and the exit passage, to fit into a bus (figure 52).
This  is  a  concrete  though  bizarre  situation  where  the  supermarket  can  be  abstracted  into  and
mobilized to different places, one that helps me to suggest that the chronotopes unpacked on the
shopping floor, in the queue line, the machinic purchase, and the exit passage, may be reassembled
together differently insofar as the supermarket is calculated and screened not only through, but also
around and away from the purchase point. Such configuration dovetails the moments of movement
of  the  purchase  into  each  other.  There  they  remain  mutually  performative  and  reciprocally
differential, only if consumers collect goods around the aisles and queue around the purchase point,
and  thus  exit  the  shopping  floor  by  moving  away  from  these  specific  surface  circuits  of  the
supermarket. 
      Figure 51. WoW – outside              Figure 52. WoW – inside
               (woolworthsmuseum.co.uk)                            (woolworthsmuseum.co.uk)
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On the  other  hand,  there  are  configurations  of  the  supermarket  where  the  moments  of
movement may be reassembled together differently by computing and screening them only through
the purchase point;  that  is,  when consumers don't  have to  collect  goods and queue around the
shopping  floor,  but  through  market  devices  such  as  mobile  phones  loading  the  websites  of
supermarket  stores.  There the shopping floor  becomes a  site  online,  the queue line  becomes a
delivery  list,  the  machinic  purchase  computes  and  screens  the  insides  and  the  outsides  of  the
supermarket all through the graphical interface, and the exit passage becomes a delivery route that
employees with their trucks, instead of anonymous consumers with their bags, have to go through
by stretching out  to  reach well  known customers.  There  consumers  exit  the shopping floor  by
identifying themselves in  the purchase and checking out goods specifically through the surface
circuits of such online supermarkets.  This is a concrete though less bizarre situation where the
supermarket  can  be  abstracted  into  and  mobilized  to  different  places,  but  one  where  the
consequences of the moments of movement bounded by the purchase remains to be grasped in
detail. 
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Chapter 7. Spacing the ATM
Extending  the  investigation  of  the  temporalities  of  screening  through  self  checkouts  in
chapter 6, this chapter expands on the spatialites of the courses of action bounded by a computer
screen when passing through automated tellers. My sense of the expression ‘passing through’ is
borrowed from the pukara, a toponym for fortress-like places surrounded by walls, to stress the
troubles of becoming in touch with the people and things enfolded into accounts. Passing through
automated tellers underlines how people and things do not simply assemble a course of action with
an  apparatus  in  a  place,  but  rather  participate  in  the  assembly  (or  co-production)  of  action,
apparatus, and place. Staying with that trouble requires people to knot accounts by staying with a
course of action, attaching and detaching themselves by stretching and cutting their ways, through
the different bounded places around, through, and away from the ATM apparatus. 
In the previous chapter I used khipus to reimagine how to stay in touch with accounts of the
supermarket,  to  pay  attention  to  the  times  enfolded  into  the  knots  used  to  calculate.  Here  I
reimagine, with the walls of pukaras, how to subvert these knot figures, as they are enfolded into
accounts  of  the  bank.  Pukaras  bound  people  inhabiting  particular  lives  that  include  knotting
practices in order to make those lives accountable. The pukara of Chena in Chile, for example, was
an astronomical observatory. Stretching and cutting a course of action are gestures that I grasp with
pukaras as figures that deal with multiple bundles of pleats or folds: figures attuned to the material
durability of envelopings (Deleuze & Strauss 2006:242-247). As bundles of folds, the walls that
bound pukaras offer a resistance to anyone passing through. These folds are parts of an apparatus
stabilizing the slippery and fragile distinction of living inside or outside of this topos (figure 53).
Likewise,  passages  can  be  stretched for  smooth  movement  between these  insides  and outsides
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(figure 54). But passages of access may be cut as well: “Others” can break down the folds and take
over the stronghold. Such confrontations may lead to the fortification of pukaras with an apparatus
that exhibits, in the features of its walls and passages, the capacity to signal what may be out of
bounds.  So this  apparatus  configures  a  line  in  the  centre  to  screen  the  lives  enfolded into  the
fortress. 
               Figure 53. Inside a pukara95            Figure 54. Passage of access96      
            Pukara of Quitor                         Pukara of Quitor
      (photograph by author)       (photograph by author)
With pukaras I explore the subversion of a fortification of knots by way of creation; in this
case, by refiguring money to suggest a resistance to the line in the centre. To withdraw cash with
automated tellers is clearly a course of action that lures people to disclose themselves at a cash
point. However, withdrawing cash with the machine is also a practice secured only partially by the
95 One of the various online sources for this image is http://goo.gl/tu16yN
96 I borrow this image from Jen Pappas' blog: http://notavacation.wordpress.com/tag/pukara-de-quitor/
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various locations of a bank. Thus, a list of moments of movement around, through, and away from
automated tellers can begin in public places for private use (like a street),  as well as in private
places  for  public  use  (like  a  supermarket),  where  the  protections  for  these  machines  may  be
assembled. 
These  strongholds  are  never  given,  but  rather  are  produced relationally  or  composed in
practice,  through  the  generative  meetings  of  people  with  machines  designed  for  self  service
banking,  and  with  landscapes  whose  material  and  semiotic  points  of  spatial  reference  (lines,
surfaces, volumes) make it possible to mix a strongroom with an extension of the counter of a bank.
As a meshing of two banking devices, the counter and the strongroom, the automated teller may be
materialized  with  a  line  in  the  centre  that  persuades  users  to  disclose  themselves:  to  identify
themselves as individual clients whose profiles are aggregated by banks to make a profit. 
I sketch a method with figures aimed at messing with this practice. By moving sideways97 at
a cash point, I think people that can respond to the automated teller's line in the centre with gestures
that  subvert  its  mode  of  addressing  clients  ‘with  a  personal  touch’.  Moving  sideways  is  a
positioning during the course of action with one another body. In this chapter I outline how moving
sideways  at  the  cash  point  may  leave  users  undisclosed,  opening  up  places  for  currencies  to
circulate outside of the daily financial circuits of banks, detached from the line in the centre of
automated tellers.  
97 On moving sideways, see chapter 1.
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Cashing in 
On Penny street,  I reached into the pockets of my blue jeans and pulled out my brown
wallet. An instant ago in the town of Lancaster, while walking down the damp pavement, I searched
for my debit card, found it in between some old bus tickets, and raised my head to scout for an
automatic teller machine. There is a market down this street, where local products are sold two
times per week, by people who are now busy weighing fresh veggies, preparing take away meals,
sorting out books, magazines, records. The preferred method of payment here is cash, which I need
to withdraw from a cash point nearby. There are several alternatives: I could try the bank to make a
withdrawal,  or get cash back from an express supermarket.  But  now using an automated teller
seems to me more practical and a bit quicker. Nevertheless, unlike the self checkout tellers of the
supermarkets,  these machines articulate banking services in a multitude of places which can be
modified daily. Thus here, within this mutable market in the town centre of Lancaster, a layer of
industrious people troubles my grasp of an automatic teller capable of extracting my account details
from a card, given to me by a bank. Reading the card's brown strip will not be possible, it has been
wiped out from use and most machines will now refuse to authenticate my cash withdrawals. But I
suspect some helpful automated tellers are still able to process my requests by reading my card's
silver chip. I look around. My attention jumps between the old buildings and the market – while this
public place called Penny Street, the usual shapes, sizes, and locations as I remember them, appear
suddenly blurred out.  
I feel lost in translation. I try to reimagine this place without the street market networked on
top of its otherwise rather immobile geometry. Eventually I manage to spot the automatic teller,
sticking through a rectangular hole in a wall, blipping next to a white tent assembled this morning
as a part of the street market, which leaves hardly any space to queue behind the cash point. I
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approach the place sideways, moving parallel to the wall, to queue by drawing an L shaped figure in
between my body and the cash point. Someone is using the automated teller. While waiting I watch
her making a cash withdrawal. I lean over to see her introducing her plastic card through an access-
slot. In turn the machine asks her for her PIN number. She covers the keyboard with her left hand
while typing it. After that someone else approaches the queue.
The  menu  patterns  here  can  vary  widely  among  automated  tellers,  but  in  all  cases  the
algorithms coded into the machines equip users with particular ways of passing through the self
service  cash  point.  For  instance,  note  that  some  machines  return  the  user's  card  before  the
withdrawal  of  cash,  while  others  do  exactly  the  opposite.  Likewise,  this  machine  now in  use
dispenses one specific currency (£ or UK pounds). It makes a grinding noise too,  if you listen
closely,  when sorting out the cash withdrawal.  Most automated tellers can create a log of their
activities,  and  may  print  a  receipt  on  demand.  Wrapping  up  the  withdrawal,  a  beeping  sound
reminds  the  user  to  collect  her  cash  and  card.  Detaching  her  fingeryeyes  from  the  graphical
interface, she moves away by walking through an exit passage, parallel to the wall and the white
tent.
So far we may notice that there is a multitude of places, and a variety of ways, in which
automated tellers articulate a course of action – in order to pass by a cash point. Let's begin to
unpack  these  multiplicities,  by  addressing  this  literal  “hole  in  the  wall”  now  in  front  of  me.
Touching  the  rectangular  cuts  on  the  rough  wall,  the  hole  reminds  me  of  how banks  initially
accepted  the  use  of  automated  tellers,  to  expand  office  hours  and  to  multiply  the  points  of
distribution  of  cash.  In  1930,  Luther  Simjian  began  experimenting  with  this  idea,  eventually
patenting a prototype called the Bankograph. Still it was much later, in 1961, when the Bank of
New York decided to install the machine in the city of New York, to work primarily as a safety
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deposit  box.  The Bankograph was an automated  teller  without  any dispensing features,  it  only
accepted  envelopes  with  coins,  cash  or  cheques.  Importantly,  for  bank  customers  to  trust  the
automated teller  with money was an issue from the beginning. In the case of the Bankograph,
sceptical customers were assured they would see their  money again,  by taking a picture of the
deposit.  Hence the name Bankograph. This photograph-proof was taken by a microfilm camera
inside  the  automated  teller,  but  this  banking  experiment  did  not  catch  on.  Simjian  much  later
explained that the only people using his  machines were “prostitutes and gamblers” (History.com
Staff 2010).98
While the  Bankograph did not  attract  enough clients  to  make a  worthwhile  investment,
during the same decade more prominent stories of automated tellers emerged, with devices that
would dispense cash for  a  user  now with a  card.  By replacing candy with cash,  in  1965 John
Shepherd-Barron conceived an automatic teller machine much like a kind of chocolate dispenser,
after being late on a Saturday morning for his usual visit to the bank to withdraw cash. Shepherd-
Barron's conceptual design of a self service machine proposed to disentangle the distribution of
cash from the  opening and closing  hours  of  the  bank.  Desiring and trusting  the money in the
machine was a precondition for the concept to succeed. The machine did catch on this time. In
1967, Shepherd-Barron and his printing firm De La Rue convinced Barclays Bank to host the new
self service machine, the automated teller, in Enfield High Street, North London, the first of six
prototypes to be installed in the United Kingdom. The machines invited users to introduce a four
digit  PIN number,  but  unlike  today's  automated  tellers,  they  used  paper  vouchers  imbued  for
security reasons with a slightly radioactive isotope – carbon 14.99 In turn this token was used to
dispense £10 notes – one at  a time. The radioactive paper vouchers were then retained by the
98 http://www.history.com/topics/inventions/automated-teller-machines  (last accessed 17/06/2016)
99 The coding on a magnetic strip of the user's bank account details was coined by a start-up called Speytec in 1969,
marketed by a company name Burroughs, and hosted by the Midland Bank (Wikipedia's ATM entry retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automated_teller_machine  last accessed 26/06/2016). 
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machine and sent back by post. 
These machines did not yet constitute a new financial network, of their own kind. They were
not connected to one another. Likewise, other contemporary tellers to the Bankograph – such as the
Bankomat hosted by Nixdorf or the automated tellers hosted by the Westminster bank and built by
the engineering and locking companies Smith and Chubb – used punched rather than radioactive
cards, but still remained disconnected from each other's self banking services.100 Eventually, these
ATM companies  would  not  catch  up with further  developments  in  technical  infrastructures  for
forthcoming automatic  teller  machines:  “IBM engineers worked to develop the rails,  pipes  and
standards on which other elements of the payments ecosystem – such as credit cards and point-of-
sale terminals – would eventually depend. By the early 1980s, however, ATM manufacturers such
as Chubb, De La Rue and Docutel had failed to keep up with further developments in computing
and electronics” (Bloomberg 2013).101 Building networks for these machinic self banking services
was an assembly task taken up internationally, “independently though simultaneously in the United
Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and Sweden” (Wikipedia's ATM entry).102 
A telling  case of  how the  capacities  of  automatic  tellers  proved of  value  comes with  a
blizzard that hit New York City in 1977 – an event that paid off the risky investment of Citibank,
that year spending over $100 million (US dollars) to install  automated tellers all  over the city.
Banks were closed for days and “ATM use increased by 20 percent. Within days, Citibank had
launched its  by  now familiar  'The  Citi  Never  Sleeps'  ad  campaign […] posters  and billboards
showed customers trudging through snow to get to Citibank ATMs.” (History.com Staff 2010). In
the 1980s, NCR Corp. and Diebold Inc., two companies from Ohio, US, would effectively take over
100 The conception of the networked automated teller is controversially credited to Donald Wetzel and his company
Docutel of Dallas, US.
101 http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-03-27/how-the-atm-revolutionized-the-banking-business          (last
accessed 17/06/2016)
102 Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automated_teller_machine  (last accessed 26/06/2016)
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the supply of ATMs for the next two decades. These companies capitalized on “deregulation and the
banking industry’s growth across retail markets” (Bloomberg 2013) while introducing features like
multi-functionality (money transfer and balance enquiries) and the horizontal dispensing of cash, a
feature that helps to reduce jams while dispensing bills. Bernardo Batiz-Lazo notes that automated
tellers soon freed banking staff to perform more 'high-value' services than dispensing cash, such as
insurance,  mortgages  and stock-market  trading,  explaining  that  the machines  then “became the
backbone  of  the  payments  system,  and  opened  the  door  to  telephone  and  Internet  banking”
(Bloomberg 2013). Microsoft Corp. around that time began expanding their operating systems into
personal  computers,  but  also  into  automated  tellers,  while  Triton  Systems  Inc.  and  Tidel
Engineering LP created cheaper machines that used dial-up rather than dedicated phone lines, and
so opened the door for other companies to install independent machines, dispensing cash for a small
fee in grocery stores, bars, casinos, etc. All secured a piece of the business and contributed to the
rise of the mundane becoming of the automated teller as a terminal of a “bank's central computers,
enabling online verification at the point of transaction” (Bloomberg 2013).
A recent  benchmarking study103 developed by the company Value Partners  for the ATM
Industry  Association  (ATMIA)  shows  that  the  growth  rate,  transaction  volume,  and  values  of
automated tellers are very different among local regions, though in these segments they mostly
exceed their GDP growth rates (2014:7). The study highlights the disparities of the cost of cash,
hardware,  and transaction processing within the retail  banking sector,  despite the similarities of
tasks performed by automated tellers.  In this  sense,  companies that  independently deploy these
machines “have the ATM as a main line of business but for banks, in particular, the ATM is a
channel that is complementary to other services and often leverages purely as on a cost-substitution
basis” (ATMIA 2014:8). Over 2.75 million automatic tellers are currently estimated to be installed
103 http://www.valuepartners.com/downloads/PDF_Comunicati/2014.02-ATMIA-and-Value-Partners-ATM-
Benchmarking-and-Industry-report-report.pdf (last accessed 17/06/2016)
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world wide, and ATMIA's study shows a 17% percent increase of this figure within the next three
years. Wikipedia's ATM entry also tells us that four regions (US, Canada, Europe, and Japan) have
the highest number of automated teller machines per million people, while ATMIA's study estimates
the total amount of cash dispensed in 2013 by all these automated tellers at approximately $10.47
trillion (US Dollars). The Asia and Pacific regions concentrate the largest total of automated tellers
installed (1.2 million units) and are the fastest growing markets (12%), along with the Middle-East
& Africa (12%) since 2006. While indicating a grow of 6% over the same period, Europe ranks
second in the global amount of available machines (0.6 million units). The North American region
follows with  0.45  million  automatic  teller  machines,  but  showing a  marginal  increase  of  units
shipped (3%) since 2006. Central & South America's market has grown 4% in the past eight years,
totalling  roughly  more  than  0.3  million  of  available  units.  In  short,  these  figures  of  ATMIA's
research posit the ongoing strategic importance of the automated teller machine to distribute cash,
notwithstanding the rapid emergence of electronic payment systems, as well as the modest uprising
of crypto-currencies. 
Coining  the  networked  automated  teller  machine  also  created  a  business  niche  for
developing  infrastructures  for  moving  data.  Interbank  networks  are  a  mingled  landscape  of
companies  and  standards,  so  that  entangling  automated  tellers  entails  authorizing  financial
transactions  over  protocol  shaped  channels  –  such  as  the  ISO  8583  standard  for  exchanging
messages during financial transactions – owned by interbank networks such as  NYCE,  PULSE,
PLUS,  Cirrus,  AFFN,  Interac,  Interswitch,  STAR,  LINK, MegaLink and BancNet  (Wikipedia's
ATM  entry).104 Most  of  the  movement  of  data  through such  networks  of  automated  tellers  is
channelled  by  telephone  lines,  and  often  via  ADSL and  dial-up  modems,  though  high  traffic
machines preferably use private or leased lines. Fees for transactions are the order of the day in
many cash points. During 2013 the global amount of transactions of interbank networks peaked just
104 Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automated_teller_machine  (last accessed 26/06/2016)
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below 70 billion connections (ATMIA 2014). So I may grasp, as I touch this hole in the wall, the
UK interbank network called LINK, an entanglement of nearly 2,5 billion cash withdrawals and 1.3
billion of other transactions made in 2015, and with an estimated circulation of £127,8 billion.105
From LINK's website we also learn that all automated tellers in the UK (approximately 70,600 in
2015) exchange transactions through this interbank network, and 75% of these machines are “free
to use”.106
Neoliberal optics 
All of these stories and figures help to disclose what we buy into when we withdraw cash
from automated tellers.  With Mark Hayward and his examination of ATMs,  teleprompters,  and
photobooths (2013), I could suggest that these devices point to a short history of neoliberal optics, a
term  Hayward  proposes  to  name  “the  uses  of  light  that  contribute  to  forms  of  sociality  and
subjectivity  that  constitute  neoliberal  culture”  (2013:194).  Hayward  explains  that  a  neoliberal
culture  tends  to  shape  or  articulate  (the  elements  of)  the  self  and  the  body  of  the  user  via
technological  means,  and  to  optically  produce  “the  appropriation  of  forms  of  direct,  personal
address in order to maintain and exploit affective engagement on the part of individual towards
institutions” (Hayward 203:194). 
Hayward's neoliberal optics help me to stress how cash points may be agential apparatuses
that  enforce  regimes  of  individuation  (2013:195),  configuring  places  with  machinic  optics  and
arrangements  through  which  people  are  called  to  inhabit  life-styles  textured  by  the  modes  of
existence  of  neoliberalism.  To  examine  what  exactly  is  neoliberal  about  the  automated  teller,
105 http://www.link.co.uk/about-link/statistics/   (last accessed 17/06/2016)
106 Automatic teller machines of this interbank network are mostly hosted by the Bank of Ireland (2,872), Cardtronics
(16,069), Barclays (4,146), DC Payments (6,168), Halifax (1,935), HSBC (2,363), Lloyds Bank (2,822), NatWest
(3,747),  NoteMachine  (8,704),  PayPoint  (4,224),  the  Royal  Bank of  Scotland  (4,172),  Santander  (2,327),  and
YourCash (3,637). 
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Hayward  notes  that  Simjian's  automatic  teller  machine,  in  contrast  to  the  photobooth  and  the
teleprompter  –  which  materialize  a  sense  of  optics  inherited  from  the  studies  of  light  in  the
nineteenth  century,  as  described by Jonathan Crary107 –  created  instead  a  banking practice  that
fragmented and distributed the individual. Automated tellers would no longer insist on embedding
vision to stabilize the human body. Unlike photobooths and teleprompters, which immobilize and
capture subjects facing a camera, automated tellers work by grasping a few fragments of the user
(e.g. a plastic card, a PIN number, a biometric pattern) to identify and so screen her as a bank
customer. In this way bank customers get cash away from the counter, a translation afforded by the
machinic  infrastructures  built  since  the  1970s  for  automated  tellers.  Nevertheless,  this
reconfiguration of customers beyond the bank counter entails, according to Hayward, extending an
affective  power  onto  the  user's  body  (Hayward  2013:198).  Like  the  photobooth  and  the
teleprompter,  this  power  persuades  people  to  disclose  their  identities  daily  as  individual  bank
customers.  This  effects  a  regime of  individuation,  through which  a  neoliberal  economy108 may
become a part of mundane life, through an apparatus like the automated teller. 
In  this  sense,  what  happens  with  automated  tellers  is  indeed  very  different  than  what
happens  with  self  checkouts,  insofar  as  in  their  use  of  the  latter  people  can  avoid  disclosing
themselves as identifiable sources of further profit. Of course at the supermarket there are many
other ways of making shoppers more profitable; for example, goods may be displayed around the
aisles of the shopping floor in ways that encourage customers to collect them. But, at the cash point,
power works with a more personal touch. Users are persuaded to collect cash only in exchange for
their personal data. In this way, it becomes tricky for me as a user to move sideways from the
calculations or algorithms of automated tellers, as they generate logs and individual profiles that
107 The study of optics in the nineteenth century, according to Crary, was far more interested in “the makeup of the
human  subject,  rather  than  [in]  the  mechanics  of  light  and  optical  transmission”  (1992:70  cited  in  Hayward
2013:196).
108 What is a “neoliberal economy”? This can be contested on both scholarly and practical grounds, but what I am
referring to here is  how automated tellers  that  lure people to disclose themselves as profitable individuals  are
authorized by a set of economical, political, and legal practices.
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inform retail and financial markets how to profit from me further. Against this I read the automated
teller with a different Inka figure, the pukara, the topos of the Inka fortress. As the pukara enfolds a
place  where  daily  encounters  are  partly  aligned  by  walls,  they  are  helpful  to  sketch  how the
automated teller persuades people to face a line in the centre: an alignment in which users interact,
through the interface, with a machinic power that configures them as individuals beyond the bank,
and with an embodied power that addresses them individually.109
Let's consider how the powers of affective engagement may be deployed in relation to users
of automated tellers. Hayward follows Mark Hansen to assert that a body does not vanish when
connected  to  a  stream of  information.  When the  visual  becomes  digitalized,  bodies  remain  an
affective,  fleshy  experience  of  space.  In  other  words,  Hansen's  digital  bodies  are  haptic  –  “a
modality  of  spacing  that  has  been  wholly  detached  from  vision,  that  has  become  affective”
(2004:230  cited  in  Hayward  2013:201).  Hayward  coins  the  phrase  “neoliberal  optics”  for  this
affective engagement110 with the optical features of machines, insofar they afford spaces for regimes
of  exploitation  and expropriation  under  neoliberalism.  Neoliberal  optics  outlines  enactments  of
graphical  interfaces  that  lure  users  to  become  well  known  customers,  and  thus  profitable
individuals. Asking for trust in the exchange of cash and distrusting those who are undisclosed, or
109 In  this  sense,  because  of  the  similarities  between the  neoliberal  affective  powers  of  the  teleprompter  and  the
automated teller, Hayward asserts that Simjian's contribution: “must  be  interpreted  as  more  than  simply  a
contribution to the technological infrastructure of television, but a material shift in those techniques which structure
norms about how to present oneself while on screen as natural and comfortable before a physically absent audience.
There  are  a  variety  of  venues  in  which  the  modes  of  address  made  possible  by  the  teleprompter  have  been
operationalised  including,  as  will  be  discussed  below,  the  ATM.  Common across  all  these  areas  […]  is  the
relationship that the modes of address have to engagement, trust as well as more ephemeral forms of affective
connection connoted by the ideas of the 'personal touch'. In this way, the contribution that the teleprompter made to
the production of televisual intimacy starting in the 1950s must be situated as enabling support for the increasingly
important role that affects plays, whether as part of a process for identity formation or as productive labour itself,
within the reconfiguration of the division between personal and public life and the distinction between cognitive
and physical  activity that  defines  the regime of  exploitation and expropriation under neoliberalism” (Hayward
2013:198). 
110 For quite different reasons, a sense of affective engagement with automated tellers is also invoked by ATMIA's
study, where we are invited to imagine these machines as touch-points between the customer and the banks – which
is the kind of concern addressed by neoliberal optics. “The ATM industry’s offering has evolved significantly since
its inception in the early 1960s, becoming a key enabler of branch innovation, and now evolving in parallel to
internet banking and newly developing mobile banking channel, developing its role from a pure teller substitution /
cash dispensing service to being one of, if not in many cases, the most important touch-point between a financial
services organisation and its retail and SME customers” (2014:9).
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identified  as  an  other  than  the  bank  customer,  automated  tellers  enfold  people  into  particular
banking practices. Such folds entail meeting, at the cash point, a line in the centre – a line that
becomes  a  fold  through  an  encounter  with  an  apparatus,  a  mundane  fold  that  concerned  the
observers of early automated tellers, such as the Bankograph and the Bankomat, because it envelops
how these self service machines affect people's lives. If these holes in the walls are folds in this
sense, Hayward's affective engagements can be considered as encounters with the automated teller's
line in the centre, a becoming with, in the prosaic poiesis or enfolding of everyday life. 
Filling up topologies
Scholars  of  everyday  life,  in  their  different  ways,  have  undertaken  studies  that  see  the
prosaic encounters of people and things as never trivial, but always critical for the constitution and
maintenance of mundane capacities for action.111 I want to write with a topological imagination to
suggest and inhabit a sense of the everyday which is not defined through engagements with an
external, natural or social world produced in advance as life's container. Instead, I follow practical
meetings112 that draw attention to the material-semiotic actors that Haraway encourages, and a sense
of daily life that is a multipartner dance or an encounter in which identities that emerge within “a
relational  web opening to  non-Euclidean pasts,  presents,  and futures” (2008:32).113 I  attune my
111 For  instance,  Mikhail  Bakthin  writes  against  the  opinion  that  meaning  of  the  mundane  must  be  produced
exclusively from “such external value-spheres as philosophy, religion or politics” (Gardiner 2000:50). By drawing
from a disparate collection of phenomenological and process thinkers – such as Husserl, Bergson, and Merleau-
Ponty  –  Bakthin  aptly  conveys  how being  always  entails  to  grasp,  prior  to  rationalization,  an  experience  of
everyday events: “Being-as-Event must be therefore lived through, and not passively comprehended from apart”
(Gardiner  2000:50).  Rooting being as event, people's  actions stem from mundane life,  so Bakthin situates  the
everyday in the rhythms and textures of prosaic lived experience.
112 For Lefebvre, “praxis [even within a dialectical framework] is not restricted to the utilitarian transformation of
external nature through repetitive, instrumental action. It also involves love, sensuality, the body – a plethora of
creative, emotive and imaginative practices Lefebvre calls poiesis” (Gardiner 2000:80).
113 See chapter  2.  Haraway situates  her  sense  of  material-semiotic  actors,  particularly  those  she  calls  companion
species (2008),  relentlessly across any essentialist boundary of the natural and the social,  emerging through a
“becoming with” in open ended and constitutive relationships. “The shape and temporality of life on earth are more
like a liquid–crystal consortium folding on itself again and again than a well-branched tree. Ordinary identities
emerge and are rightly cherished, but they remain always a relational web opening to non-Euclidean pasts, presents,
and futures. The ordinary is a multipartner mud dance issuing from and in entangled species. It is turtles all the way
down; the partners do not preexist their constitutive intra-action at every folded layer of space and time. These are
the contagions and infections that wound the primary narcissism of those who still dream of human exceptionalism.
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fingeryeyes with a material-semiotic sense of reading actors topologically, to unpack the spatialities
of automated tellers, and to suggest a way of moving sideways. 
Tracing  the  influence  of  topological  thinking  in  social  and  cultural  theory,  Celia  Lury,
Luciana  Parisi  and Tiziana  Terranova argue  that  “culture  itself”  is  now increasingly  becoming
topological (2012). They explain how the study of this cultural shift – coined as a “turn to the
surface” – was initially developed by Sigfried Kracauer, who paid attention to how people and
things  can  have  an  elected  affinity  with  a  surface,  such as  the  alignment  of  furniture  in  hotel
lobbies,  the  coordination  of  bodies  in  dance  groups,  or  the  ordering  of  words  and  images  in
newspapers.  Kracauer  noted  with  these  examples  that  cultural  forms  may  be  introduced  in  a
situation  by  way  of  a  ratio,  so  that  what  may  be  performed  becomes  a  'demonstration  of
mathematics'  and  who  performs  must  be  understood  rationally.  The  reason  at  work  in  these
mundane  configurations  is  then  one  of  a  specific  mathematical  logic,  an  Euclidean  geometry
grasped by people  to  create  a  mass  ornament  on  the  surface  (Lury  et  al.  2012:4).  But  a  new
mathematical  logic  would  be  articulating  what  is  now  proposed  as  a  cultural  shift:  “a  new
rationality  is  emerging:  the  moving ratio  of  a  topological  culture”  (2012:4).  This  reshaping  of
culture  would  take  place  as  the  surfacing  of  social  order  becomes  'unfixed'  from  Euclidean
geometry. In turn, a more dynamic ordering of spatio-temporal continuity emerges with various
topological  forms  of  economic,  political  and  cultural  life.  This  order  grows  from practices  of
sorting,  numbering,  labelling  comparing,  listing,  and  calculating,  all  introducing  a  sense  of
constantly  changing  deformation  that  becomes  culturally  established  as  constant,  normal,  and
immanent  –  rather  than  as  occasional,  extraordinary  and  endogenously  produced  (Lury  et  al.
2012:4). 
These  are  also  the  cobblings  together  that  give  meaning  to  the  “becoming  with”  of  companion species  in
naturecultures” (Haraway 2008:32).
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Insofar  as  the  effect  of  these  ordering  practices  is  to  bring  “new  continuities  into  a
discontinuous  world  by  establishing  equivalences  or  similitudes,  and  to  make  and  mark
discontinuities  through repeated contrasts  [so that]  the topological cultural  forms (or constantly
changing deformation) of lists, models, networks, clouds, fractals, and flows proliferate” (Lury et
al. 2012:4), it seems useful to detail what Lury et. al mean by discontinuity, as something to be
grasped by reading spatial patterns with topological figures such as networks, fractals, etc. Thus
when Lury et  al.  talk about a production of (new) continuities  into a  discontinuous world,  my
reading is that they are conceptually aiming at a cultural shift with topology to say that places may
remain  connected  by  stretching  continuities  such  as  paths,  hyperlinks,  etc.  But  also,  more
importantly,  they  are  suggesting  that  space  may  be  produced  in  non-Euclidean  terms  through
ordering  practices,  and  this  would  increasingly  matter  for  the  prosaic  poiesis  of  the  social.114
Perhaps this  can be exemplified with the stretching115 of sociotechnical  networks  during the so
called great acceleration period116 expanded during the twentieth century “with similar if not even
more extreme consequences” (May & Thrift 2001:9); notwithstanding the asymmetric distribution
of “new technologies of transport and communication, speed and light, of new systems of social
regulation and time-discipline, and of new ideas as to the basic qualities of time and space” (May &
Thrift 2001:18). 
114 “The becoming topological of culture does not simply correspond to how culture imagines topology: instead, our
proposal is that topology is now emergent in the practices of ordering, modelling, networking and mapping that co-
constitute culture, technology and science. In short, a distributed, dynamic configuration of practices is organizing
the forms of social life in ways that supplement and extend those of Euclidean geometry” (Lury et al. 2012:5). 
115 'Stretching' a continuity is also suggestive of the consecutive 'compression' of space and time (Harvey 1989). Still,
“in terms of space, it not simply that a sense of geographical distance has been radically compressed, but that more
familiar understandings of location and position might have to be abandoned altogether (Shields 1992)” (May &
Thrift 2001:9). 
116 “Certainly, when considering the period from the middle of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of the First World
War it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there occurred a radical if not revolutionary change in the nature and
experience of both space and time through those years. So too, for both living through them and those subsequently
mapping these changes, the overwhelming impression seems to have been one of radical compression of spatial and
temporal  horizons  –  a  notion  captured  in  contemporary  accounts  of  a  'great  acceleration'  or  the  progressive
'annihilation of space by time' (Marx 1987). Indeed, as the century progressed evidence as to this 'great acceleration'
was  everywhere  apparent,  discussed  most  frequently  both  at  the  time  and  since  in  relation  to  a  series  of
developments in transport and communication technologies out of which it is in turn usually understood as having
arisen” (May & Thrift 2001:7).  
172
Lury  et  al.  orient  their  discussion  of  spatio-temporal  transformations  of  contemporary
culture  by  working  with  an  insightful  conception  of  dis/continuities  borrowed  from  topology,
situating  their  reading  of  culture  through  the  characterization  of  the  influences  of  topological
thinking styles  in  social  and cultural  theory  (2012:7-13).  Showing how topological  approaches
travel  between different  knowledges,  Lury  et  al.  then  draw from the  attention  to  hair-splitting
practices of mediation in the the work of Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, as well as from the
cultural changes of windows, mirrors, and screens117 tackled by Lev Manovich, Anne Friedberg,
Beatrice  Colomina,  Gilles  Deleuze,  and  Mary-Ann  Doane,  to  propose  how  surfaces  act118 in
topological culture.119
Nigel  Thrift  and  colleagues  have  published  collections  that  point  to  the  influences  of
topological  thinking  in  Geography  (Crang  & Thrift  2000;  May  & Thrift  2001).  Among  other
examples  of  the  contribution  of  topology to  different  styles  of  thought,  Scott  Lash (2012:216)
formulated  a  proposition  that  resonates  with  Lury  et  al.’s  sense  of  a  becoming  topological  of
culture, asserting that “topology is integral to a shift in socio-cultural theory from a linguistic to a
mathematical paradigm.”120 Taking the imaginary as central to consider this shift, both Lash and
Lury  et  al.  connect  their  topological  conceptions  of  contemporary  culture  to  a  sense  of  self-
production,  either  as a  self-organizing socio-technical  imaginary121 (Lash 2012:277) or  as auto-
117 In  particular,  from  the  movement  of  the  television  and  the  computer  screen  “out  of  the  box  and  into  the
environment,” as studied by Katherine Hayles (Gane et al. 2007:349 cited in Lury et al. 2012:11).
118 “[…] the  operations  of  invariance  in  topological  geometry  –  ordering  and  continuity  –  are,  by  contrast  with
Euclidean  Geometry,  more  general.  Crucially,  they  mean  that  invariance  and  intrinsic  change  (understood  as
deformation) are not incompatible; rather they are rigorously inter-related. Put another way, topology is the setting
up of spaces of different kinds of order and continuity in such a way as to enable deformation or change, what
Massumi (2002) calls the continuity of transformation. Alternatively, we can describe a topological surface as 'a
relational field of emergence' (Parisi 2012, Manning 2009)” (Lury et al. 2012:8). 
119 The emergence of topological  culture would not be confined to communication media.  Lury et  al.  draw from
political concepts,  such as Etienne Balibar's  sense of border or Penny Harvey's description of large-scale road
construction in Peru, to grasp more broadly how “a topological ratio can be seen to be emerging in processes of
mediation” (Lury et al. 2012:13). 
120 “This has enabled in Badiou and Žižek a critique of the symbolic register, understood in terms of pure conceptual
abstraction. Drawing on topology [I understand their critique] instead in terms of the  figure. The break with the
symbolic and language necessitates a break with form, but topologically still preserves a logic of the figure. This
becomes a process of figuration, indeed a process of 'deformation'” (Lash 2012:261). 
121 “As a process of largely self-determining figurations, the social imaginary is also temporal […] In the 21 st century,
this social imaginary takes the form of a system. There was always technology. But there is a tipping point at which
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spatialization (Lury et al. 2012:13). But this alleged autopoiesis begs the question, at least in the
case of self service practices, of which selves are reproduced under the hood, so to speak, of the
figure of an observer in those imagined spaces. For me, the trouble stems from the “view that
topological culture is a form of practical abstraction” (Toscano 2008, cited in Lury et al. 2012:12),
without making clear how topology allows practices of abstraction  into specific locations rather
than abstraction  from cultural situations.122 Moreover, at stake is the definition of what counts as
topology123 and  so  how culture  may  be  read  topologically.  If  topology  is  taken  as  a  set-point
abstraction  from space,  my concern echoes Henri Poincaré's complaint that “set theory was the
disease  of  the  19th century”124 (cited  Lury  et  al.  2012:22).  In  any  case,  taking  topology  as  an
abstraction  from culture125 runs  the  conceptual  risk  of  imagining  “a  Platonic  universe  of  ideal
abstract  multiplicities  without  histories  or  any  relation  to  bodies”  (Rotman  2012:250).  Thus  I
suggest  below how a generative  use  of  figures  in  surface  topologies  allows us  to  imagine  the
spatialities  of  locations,  like  the  cash  point,  by  abstracting  low  dimensional  manifolds  into
situations without disjoining spaces and selves, but rather cutting them agentially through a course
of action. Inspired by the etymology of the word algebra,126 I am not concerned with the so-called
human subjects become integrally ensconced in human-technical systems – with the predominance of ubiquitous
media, a range of technologies, the image-society, brands and consumer capitalism. Social systems, once rightly
described as structural-functional  by Parsons,  become increasingly communications systems, Luhmann's (1995)
semantic systems” (Lash 2012:277). But it seems for me difficult to reconcile this sense of self-figuration when
borrowing from Niklas Luhmann's theory of autopoietic social systems. Lash seems to forget the large debt of
Luhmann to George Spencer-Brown's “Laws of Form” (1972) – a seminal foundation of mathematics – which
eclipses the alleged centrality of the imaginary without the real.  For a great  example of how the real  and the
imaginary  may be fused  to  articulate  mathematics,  with figures  enacted  as  forms,  see George  Bernett-Stuart's
markable marks: http://www.markability.net/site_map.htm (last accessed 15/06/2016)
122 Insofar the 'becoming topological' of culture says nothing about nature, then 'abstraction from' a situation seems to
me a form of purification (Latour 1993). 
123 “One of the most basic problems in topology is to determine when two topological spaces are the same, that is,
when they can be identified with one another in a continuous way. This has been called the 'Poincaré Conjecture',
marking the beginning of algebraic topology (Eynde 1999:82-87; Rotman 2012)” (Lury et al. 2012:29). 
124 For a more contemporary conception of  sets in social  practice,  see Adrian MacKenzie's  (2012) reading of the
proliferation of sets and forms of set-making.
125 A style well exemplified by Alan Badiou.
126 Poincaré  is  closely  related  to  the  development  of  algebraic  topology  through  his  concepts  of  homotopy  and
homology – both referring to invariants under constant  change or deformation. The word algebra refers to the
Arabic  al-jabr:  ‘the reunion of broken parts’, ‘bone-setting’, from  jabara:  ‘reunite, restore’. All these meanings
point to ‘the surgical treatment of fractures’. The mathematical sense of the word comes from the title of the book
‘ilm  al-jabr  wa'l-muqābala  ‘the  science  of  restoring  what  is  missing  and  equating  like  with  like’,  by  the
mathematician al- wārizmīḴ . 
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becoming  topological  of  culture,127 but  rather  with  matters  of  reading  specific  locations  with
topology  to  make  space  for  moving  sideways  and  opening  up,  in  this  case,  the  protection  of
currencies within a regime that lures people to disclose themselves as profitable individuals. For
me, if the spatialities of the self services afforded by automated tellers are topological, the question
is  how  to  use  figures  to  reimagine  their  locations  as  places  to  secure  particular  optics  and
economies, through actions like computing and screening a circulation of currencies.
Note  how  with  the  supermarket  self  checkouts  examined  in  the  previous  chapter,  we
unpacked  how the  self  service  purchase  (the  troubles  of  collecting  items)  was  aligned  by  the
machine's  bounding  of  the  shopping  floor.  However,  in  the  case  of  the  automated  teller  two
considerable differences in the way that their screens align a course of action become apparent.
Cash points do not fully envelop the space where a course of action takes place. In contrast to
purchase points,  queues around automated tellers can be particularly aligned “in the wild”,  not
supported with props to shape them. Likewise, bank employees rarely sort out the troubles when
things get messy or out of order. Also things in the supermarket may appear articulated to profit
from shoppers, but people do not have to disclose themselves as profitable individuals through the
purchase. Shoppers can pay with cash to avoid using a debit, credit, or loyalty card. The opposite
happens at the self service cash point as automated tellers persuade people to identify themselves as
bank clients. They are profiled as distinct users with a gender, age, address, account number, etc.,
aggregated in data sets of well known customers, addressed as a population, and touched affectively
by banks that wager on their calculations of credit risk.
These  differences  have  important  consequences  for  the  potential  openings  of  moving
sideways.  Below  I  detail  how  stopping  by  the  cash  point  entails,  more  evidently  than  when
127 Alternatively, one may propose that culture has always been topological, so that Lury et al. may be grasping a
sociotechnical reconfiguration where non Euclidean manifolds are increasingly as relevant as Euclidean surfaces
for everyday life.
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purchasing at the supermarket, stretching a course of action by “filling up” or restoring what is
missing  when  breakdowns  take  place.  I  will  outline  automated  tellers  with  figures  of  low
dimensional manifolds, to sketch how sustaining a course of action is a mundane practice of filling
up topologies, through movements in which breakdowns are agential and generative cuts. In this
sense, the material duration or performative resistance of making a withdrawal of cash through the
interfaces of automated tellers may also be practised as a resistance to the line in the centre. This is
done not as confrontation or destruction but as a prosaic move sideways, from the powers that affect
users when banks seek to profit from them. Such resistance aims to open up passages for all kinds
of “cracks and fissures [that] appear in the smooth wall of controlled consumption and the visage of
ubiquitous  panoptic  power  […]  So  Lefebvre  suggests  that  late  modernity  is  marked  by  the
appearance of an 'elaborated  body' that resists the homogenizing abstractions of bureaucratic neo-
capitalism” (Gardiner 2000:96). To elaborate this body is an assembling and devising task that may
become an alternative to confronting or destroying the making of profitable individuals at the cash
point. But how may bodies resist Hayward's affective engagement towards the bank? How may
people  stretch  the  making  of  knots  for  living  “spaces  of  freedom and  jouissance?”  (Lefebvre
1988:82 cited in Gardiner 2000:96). 
Torus space
I have delineated how the automated teller's line in the centre enfolds a banking practice
with a regime of individuation. And with pukaras, I signalled how facing a line in the centre means
encountering (through the interface) an embodied and a machinic power. Resonating now with the
figures of time outlined in the last chapter, I will sketch with closed two-dimensional manifolds (i.e.
the torus, the sphere, the Klein bottle, and the projective plane) how people may embody spatial
patterns to pass through an automated teller by filling up topologies around, through, and away
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from a cash point. 
Let's go back then to the automated teller I approached by drawing an L shaped figure in
order to queue between a wall and the market in Penny Street. This is an example of a specific
moment of embodiment of a spatial  pattern enacted in order to withdraw cash. In the previous
chapter I read such particular moments of queuing as a temporal pattern around supermarket self
checkouts, a moment of plotting the queue on the shopping floor with other shoppers' bodies, a
movement that now I read on Penny street as a spatial patterning of bank customers, a specific L
shaped alignment of people moving around the automated teller, a movement towards a point of
service. 
For  Harold  Garfinkel  and  Eric  Livingstone,  people  in  queues  are  “incessantly  busied
positioning  themselves  so  as  to  exhibit  the  real  existence  of  an  order  of  service”  (2003:21).
Audiovisual details appear as fundamental for this mundane task of producing and locating the
setting's: 
phenomenal  field  of  designed  enterprises:  oriented  objects,  directional,  orientational,
positional,  place,  placement,  distanced,  facings,  rotational,  and normal  passing  looks  of
things, perspectival, aspects, approaches, inner, outer, and temporal horizontal properties, in
and as of embodied visual details of witnessable things. These are produced in accountable
coherent  technical  particulars  of  the  setting's  immortality,  and  in  just  that  immortality's
witnessable details, its witnessable generality (Garfinkel & Livingstone 2003:21).
In  this  suggestive  articulation  of  queues,  Garfinkel  and  Livingstone  focus  on  grasping
queues  ethnographically  through  their  specific  features,  which  people  exhibit  by  ordering  the
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alignment  in practices of spatialization: bodies  orienting,  facing,  entering,  approaching,  rotating
exiting, etc., the queue by moving around, through, and away from the particular details of this
collective  setting.  Queues  are  then  embodied  spatial  patterns,  an  endogenously  produced
organization  (Garfinkel and Livingstone 2003:21) of bodies attentive to the details of places in
which they shape the space in between each other. Note how such an endogenous ordering device
assembles  the  queue  with  a  line,  a  material-semiotic  actor  made  of  people  and  things
heterogeneously  realizing  Garfinkel  and  Livingstone’s  order  of  service.  In  this  sense,  I  am
interested in considering queues as embodied spacing: a bodily placement  of space,  a place of
bodies and for bodies to collectively wait for, and move in an orderly way towards, a machinic point
of service, an endogenously produced organization that is prevalent, ordinarily local and locally
produced  and  recognized,  lexically  and  gesturally  produced  in-line  through  talking  bodies,
empirically  detailed  through  the  witnessable  features  of  this  'phenomenal  field',  through  the
properties  of  this  local  population  cohort  of  people,  keeping themselves  busy  with  the  prosaic
enterprise  of  designing a  service  line  of  parties  making “the  line  that  appears”  (Garfinkel  and
Livingstone  2003:21-25),  a  line  that  signals  the  embodiment  of  a  mutably  mobile  pattern  of
becoming.128 
Queues  are  alignments  that  follow a sense of  distance  in  between the  bodies  that  wait,
particularly  shaped  through  remaining  in  touchless  touch  with  the  queue.  Queues  entail  an
estimation  of  distances,  a  calculative  sense  I  qualified  with  Cochoy's  notion  of  calqulation
(2008:30),  a  talk  of  bodies  tracing  the  spatialities  of  an  “immortal  queue,  a  queue  that  could
continue  indefinitely”  (Garfinkel  &  Livingstone  2003:26),  a  queue  that  is  constitutive  of  the
subjects  becoming  this  alignment  of  people,  all  intra-acting  with  what  helps  them to  sort  out
(assemble)  a  line  in  a  particular  location  (Fraser  2006:199).  There  is  a  spatial  patterning,  a
distinctive  kind  of  space  for  this  creative  plot  time of  queues,  indicative  of  the  relational  and
128 See Law and Singleton (2005).
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generative  gesture  of  remaining  in  touchless  touch.  I  think  queues  resonate  with  a  trace-like
figuration  of  bodies,  above  all  with  a  sense  of  worldly  wide  webs  of  mutably  mobile  actor-
networks.
This  spatial  patterning  has  been  widely  conceptualized  in  studies  of  technoscience,129
nevertheless, it  strikes  me  how  often  the  very  figure  of  the  network  as  an  allegory  remains
unproblematic.  Granted  that  queues  are  fleshy rather  than  abstract  sets  of  nodes  and relations
represented with maps and plotted on flat surfaces, how do we propose a topology that may be an
alternative  to  this  Euclidean geometry  of  networks? As discussed  in  the  previous  sections,  the
spaces  of  queuing  bodies,  read  with  close  two-dimensional  manifolds,  may  offer  a  mundane
detailing of how lines, bodies,  and spaces intra-act in the patterning of places to queue around
things.
Becoming  a  subject  of  a  queue  is  a  mundane  achievement  exhibited  by  rotating,
fragmenting,  or  dissolving  a  line  that  enfolds  people  into  a  particular,  embodied  pattern  of
movement. For instance, L shaped alignments of the queue are afforded by people bending the
pattern  to  run  parallel  to  something that  leaves  little  space  to  queue,  as  mentioned above and
pictured by my biomechanical  eye in  Manchester,  UK (figure 55).  Note how the queue moves
sideways  from a  circle  of  nearby bodies,  and  also  parallel  to  the  public  street,  an  articulation
attained  by  the  queuing  people,  folding  those  lines  outside.  In  this  sense,  the  queue  is  a
concealment,  a  prosaic  pleat  that  can  be  read  with  pukaras  as  holding  still  the  open  ended
distinction  between  the  insides  and  outsides  of  the  alignment.  In  practice,  queues  are  fragile,
slippery, “the properties of a queue's apparent coherence in its details is elusive” (Garfinkel and
Livingstone  2003:25).  Queues  can  be  dismembered,  disbanded,  disintegrated,  partially  or  fully
dissolved.  So  by  stretching  and  cutting  positions  for  bodies  in  the  queue,  people  can  extend
129 See Law and Hassard (1999), Law and Mol (2001, 2002), Law and Singleton (2005), and Law and Moser (2006).
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whatever  may  circulate  through  and  break  down  the  alignment.  Stands  and  stripes  can  then
materialize a sense of resistance for people to screen the queue, a resistance enveloped into the
queue as a detail of the alignment, a fold to manage the task of attending to the place in which
people shape the space in between each other,  the space from where a line grows, moves and
mutates, the space where people become a queue. Note as well how the alignment is broken by
bodies moving across the space left in between queuing people (figure 56), a space arranged by
people  filling  up that  place  on the  sidewalk  with  a  line,  a  place  in  which  they  can  remain  in
touchless touch, resist losing grasp of each other's bodies, restore what is missing in between the
gaps.
       Figure 55. L queue line            Figure 56. Restoring the queue
 (photograph by author)                 (photograph by author)
Reading  the  connections  of  the  space  left  by  the  bodies  in  these  queues  topologically
underlines  how people  agentially  cut  (i.e.  performatively  locate)  their  positioning or  alignment
through  a  course  of  action.  This  grasping  of  the  queue  entails  detailing  how  the  line,  the
“witnessable  apparent  coherence  of  the  order  of  service”  (Garfinkel  and  Livingstone  2003:25)
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grows with the witnessable apparent non coherence130 of  the phenomenal field.  In other words,
people always grapple more or less with the mess of the places co-produced with a queue line,
bodies  in-line  inter-intra  act  with  what  travels  through  the  queue,  and  with  people  and  things
moving around and away from the line. So multiple lines (figure 57) may grow from the queue,
requiring people to stay in touch with the queue's shape by figuring its connections (topology)
rather than its characteristics (geometry) – by attending to its links rather than its features. This line
that  could continue indefinitely actually  does  not,  by bounding particular  subjects,  the queuing
people,  into a  pattern,  a kind of  connectivity,  a topology,  rather  than a  geometry of  individual
positions  locatable  on  the  street.  It  is  a  positioning,  a  patterning,  a  connectivity  that  can  be
suggested as fleshed by the bodies queuing on that particular place, stretching a kind of spatiality.
This making of space or spacing could continue indefinitely, but actually does not, as it enfolds and
cuts people, together and apart, in a queue, in a shaping of a figure. 
            Figure 57. Multiple lines               Figure 58. Sum of tori
 (photograph by author)          
130 Following Law (2004), non coherence is not incoherence or nonsense but orderings that are not congruent with
each other. In the case of queues, multiple orders may traverse the space between the bodies from which 'the line
that appears' grows. 
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Insofar  as  this  figure  may  be  stretched  by  focusing  on the  connections  rather  than  the
characteristics of a queue, it can be imagined topologically as a torus: as space lived by filling a
place up with a  fold embodied around the gaps between queuing people,  a  place to  remain in
touchless  touch,  to  grasp  each  other's  patterning,  and  to  restore  the  figure  when  the  links  are
punctured.  A torus  is  the  space  of  a  two-dimensional  manifold,  a  finite  surface  of  a  three-
dimensional  figure.  Tori  are  any  thing  shaped  like  doughnuts  by  revolving  a  circle  around  a
coplanar  axis;  tropes  to  sketch  daily  life  since  “the  surface  of  any solid  object  [or  subject]  in
everyday  life  is  a  bounded  [or  a  finite]  set  in  three-dimensional  space”  (Firby  and  Gardiner
1991:20). 
To  read  queues  with  tori,  first  note  how  the  surface  of  anyone  can  be  reimagined
topologically  as  deformable,  like  a  rubber  sheet.  Some daily  things  (e.g.  coffee  cups,  pierced
bodies)  may be then  stretched,  deformed,  and so become a torus,  while  the  rest  (i.e.  anything
without  a  hole)  can  be  distorted  into  a  sphere,  without  tearing  them  apart.  Surfaces  are
homeomorphic131 for  topologists  insofar  “one  of  the  space  models  [or  the  figures]  can  be
continuously distorted to look like the other” (Firby and Gardiner 1991:20). In this sense, a torus
cannot  become a sphere  in  topology because  the  gap of  a  torus  cannot  be 'glued',  one cannot
transform one  into  the  other.  In  other  words,  one  can  differentiate  them.  On  the  other  hand,
manifolds,  like  the  torus  or  the  sphere,  may be added to  each other.  With  these  insights,  let's
consider  that  people  in  queues  may  stretch  themselves  as  a  sum of  tori  (figure  58):  a  figure
connecting the gaps that suggests a way to read and reimagine queues,  as the linking of space
around  the  breakdowns  of  the  line,  positionings  around  the  gaps  of  a  sum of  aligned  bodies,
stretching  and  cutting  themselves  through  each  queuing  position,  so  leaving  space  between
themselves to sketch a coherent line, and to allocate the non coherence of assembling a place to
queue.  In  this  placement  of  queues,  in  this  way  of  reading  spatially  the  gaps  of  a  line  :  the
131 A relation of similarity rather than of sameness.
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breakdowns of an alignment : the holes of a queue : are generative agential cuts as who passes
through this space may break down and thus subvert  the line as a daily queuing device :  as a
creature  of  the  queue.  This  means  for  anybody to  remain  aligned  by filling  up  constantly  the
topology of the queue (what  remains  under constant  change),  or alternatively by sketching the
queue differently,  by  following  the  multiple  conduits  underlined  by people  and  things  moving
across  the  alignment,  the  various  lines  this  queue  could  alternatively  follow,  the  passages  to
abandon the queue while still  waiting in line.  Those who stay in the queue may leave it,  after
waiting in the first  position,  by taking the queue's  exit  passage,  which leads  in this  case to an
automated teller.
For me, a torus helps to refigure nodes and relations by eschewing the Euclidean or flat
model  of  space in which they can be traced as links  connecting nodes on a plane,  a  mode of
mapping to navigate across places by looking down at them, by gazing from above. Let's then
imagine this  refiguration as a transformation of a plane into a torus. Fold a plane along a link
connecting two nodes on it:  the fold transforms the plane into a cylinder.  Then fold again this
cylinder into a torus: the fold connects both open ends. In this way, any mapped point or node
linked  with  a  relation  on  a  plane  can  be  refigured  by  folding  along  the  connections.  If  this
transformation is applied to all the nodes and relations on a map, then it becomes a sum of tori.
Evidently this  map loses all  its  geometrical  capacity to  signal size or location.  Nevertheless,  it
acquires  figures  that  are  attuned not  only  to  coherent  alignments,  as  detailed  with the  case of
queues, but also to the non coherence resulting from other configurations intersecting with those
alignments.  This  is  precisely  the  kind  of  textures  that  appear  manifestly  absent  from  maps,
representing places  without taking into account  how they are always co-produced,  in particular




A plane can be refigured into a sphere as well. Fold into a single point the perimeter, or
boundary line,  of the plane.  Spheres are  topologically  equivalent  to  any figure without  a  hole.
Spheres  can  be  deformed  into  any  three-dimensional  shape  that  resembles  an  enclosure  or  a
container:  the  surface  of  a  concealed  space.  Thus  spheres  can  resonate  well  with  a  specific
modelling  of  place.  In  particular  when  a  sphere  is  stretched  into  a  cube,  it  overlaps  with  an
Euclidean  imaginary,  a  framework  that  informs  much  of  Western  epistemology,  a  model  that
pictures space as a container132 of processes without history,  a “neutral  backdrop against which
events  unfold”  (Barad  2007:224).  This  model  of  people  without  bodies-in-the-making,  things
without  contingent  temporalities  (Barad  2007:223-224)  seems  appealing  for  the  prediction  of
events:  for  killing  time in  advance.  It  seems as  if  people  and things,  when  enfolded into  this
container  model  of  space,  become  attached  to  the  flow  of  a  clock,  to  a  specific  rhythm  or
conversion of time's duration (Canales 2015),  or a movement implicated in perceptions of time
(Galison 2003). 
Note  how during  the  opening  and  closing  hours  of  a  place,  like  a  supermarket,  when
imagined  as  contained  in space,  the  flow  of  (more  or  less)  synchronized  clocks  relentlessly
convenes time, once and for all. Instead of using the sphere to picture this model of an immutable
geometry of space,133 I want to propose with spheres, as topological figures, that the concealment of
space is a mundane achievement. It is a performance of people and bodies, enfolding a place into a
container, a booth or a building,  a prosaic pleat that can be read with pukaras as fixing the open
132 “Spatialization as a never-ending, power-laced process engaged by a motley array of beings can be fetishized as a
series of maps whose grids nontropically locate naturally bounded bodies (land, people, resources – and genes)
inside 'absolute' dimensions such as space and time. The maps are fetishes in so far as they enable a specific kind of
mistake that turns process into nontropic, real, literal things inside containers” (Haraway 1997:136 cited in Barad
2007:224).
133 “The classical object that we encounter – as most forcefully and powerfully delineated by Kant – is a form in
something like a 'container space'. As such it is 'topographical'. Topology will take us beyond this classical object
and  form.  Yet  it  will  remain geometrical  and  spatial  and  as  such  does  not  take  us  beyond the  figure”  (Lash
2012:261-262, italics in original). 
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ended distinction between the insides and outsides of a fortification. With spheres, I make space for
a figure to read places when modelled as non punctured containers of the movement of people and
things patterned by clocks. I detailed previously this moment of movement as a temporal pattern
around the timing of opening and closing hours of the supermarket, shaping the movements of the
insides and outsides of the shopping floor, ticking the moments in which customers and employees
come to move around, through, and away from the checkout points, and then leave. I think there is
for these clocks, plotting time in advance, a distinctive spatial patterning. This pattern echoes the
relational and generative gesture of remaining in touch, and concealing through contact: spheres are
helpful figures to sketch this double effect. In this sense, resonating with the walls of pukaras as
well, spheres are suggestive of the double task of displaying and concealing money with automated
tellers.  With  spheres,  and with  spheres  within  spheres,  I  sketch  the  light  and shadows  of  this
apparatus. 
                     Figure 59. Vaults                               Figure 60. Sphere 
     (photograph by author)134                  
134 Taken in Alexandra Square, Lancaster University, UK.
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Automated  tellers  are  indeed  curious  mixes  between  bank  counters  and  financial
strongrooms. Such strongly fortified and CCTV-monitored locations often situate  the machine's
interface  outside  the  financial  office  of  a  bank  (figure  59).  Still,  automated  teller  machines
sometimes have a  place inside a  banking building (figure 61) or can be located inside booths,
offering a self banking service on or off a bank's premises (figure 63). Given this, note how bank
customers  encounter  a  kind  of  container.  Suspicious  people  may  temporarily  enlarge  these
enclosures  by  enfolding  their  own  bodies  and  things  around  the  automated  teller's  graphical
interface (figure 66). 
These  machines  are  often  equipped  with  security  technologies  to  prevent  attacks,  from
vandalism  to  robbery,  while  guards  may  watch  over  their  maintenance  and  everyday  use.
Automated  tellers  are  left  the  rest  of  their  time  to  their  own  defence  devices.  They  become
assembled with bollards to deter ram-raids:  crushing a large vehicle into them to open up their
topos;  gas  suppression  systems  to  avoid  plofkraak:  exploding  the  automated  teller  with  a
combustible  gas,  or  some  other  explosive  technique;  notes  neutralisation  systems  to  mark  the
money  in  case  the  enclosure  breaks  down;  audiovisual  systems  to  register  deviant  activities:
tampering  the  machines  to  record  PIN  numbers  and  cards'  information;  biometric  systems  to
identify  users  through  body  recognition  technologies;  and  encryption  systems  to  scramble
transactions over  exposable data  networks,  as  well  as to  offer  data  protection against  hacks  or
viruses. 
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                        Figure 61. Safe                                 Figure 62. Sphere on premise
                 (photograph by author)135                                 
Let's  take  closer  a  look  at  these  folds  to  suggest  with  their  spatial  configurations  a
specification  of  the  machine's  fortifications,  by  distinguishing  between  bank  safes  and  vaults.
Figure 59 displays an enclosure shaped as a vault,  a machine attached to the architecture of a
building.  In contrast,  figure 61 pictures a fortification designed as a safe in a security booth: a
machine placed inside a building. While figure 59 shows how automated tellers may appear in
public places for private use, figure 61 conveys how they can be found also in private places for
public  use,  including  stations,  pharmacies,  universities,  etc.  In  this  sense  note  then  how  the
distinction  (between  safes  and  vaults)  can  be  contrasted.  Figure  63  shows an  automated  teller
located  outside  a  bank.  At  first  glance  it  looks  shaped  like  a  vault,  but  the  machine  is  not  a
constitutive part of the architecture of the building. It may be also looked at as safe that is not
located  on  the  premises  of  the  bank.  While  the  walls  appear  to  envelop  this  automated  teller
135 Taken in Argentina Avenue, Viña del Mar, Chile
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machine, they do not quite enfold or protect it completely. Let's call the configuration an unsafe
safe.
Unlike in situations such as the assembly of queue lines where people enfold places by
aligning the gaps,  here people approach strongholds.  They touch around their  various surfaces,
aligning themselves with the passages of access,  the gaps cut into these prosaic enclosures. To
remain in touch by patting, poking, or nudging around people and things then seems useful for
sketching the curves of an apparatus, in order to outline the co-production of action, place, and
apparatus.  Touching  around  is  a  generative  gesture  I  draw  with  spheres  to  trace  the  practical
accomplishment  of  people  locating  holes,  or  access  passages  cut  into  the  folds  of  fortress-like
configurations.  Then  attuned  to  a  container  model  of  space,  useful  for  reading  the  practical
achievement  of  enclosures,  with  spheres  I  sketch  pleats  that  stabilize  the  slippery  and  fragile
distinction  of  being  inside  or  outside  concealed  places  (e.g.  supermarkets,  cash  points)  when
enfolded  by  walls.  Tori  and  spheres  are  orientable manifolds,  surfaces  on  which  a  clockwise
rotation  may  be  determined  with  no  topological  twists,  like  Möbius  strips,  undermining  a
specification  of  the  sides  of  the  surfaces.  These  two-dimensional  manifolds  outline  a  spatial
patterning that delimits  the insides  and outsides of a topos.  In contrast  to  this  reference “if  by
following some closed loop on a surface, we can change clockwise rotation into anti-clockwise
rotation [if  a traveller faces the other way around after a loop],  we say that the surface is  non
orientable” (Firby and Gardiner 1991:28). In the next section, I detail twisted loops at the cash
point.
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          Figure 63. Unsafe safe                  Figure 64. Sphere off premise
         (photograph by author)136                  
Figure 60 signals with a sphere the lines of a movement, a mode of making and finding
passages  by contact,  by touching around the  spatiality  of  concealed  places,  in  the  way people
navigate  locations  of  whatever  scale  with  their  fingeryeyes,  either  by  creating  or  eventually
bumping  into  the  cuts  of  the  curves  of  a  place,  by  touching  around  the  passages  for  steady
movement  of  people  and  things,  the  pathways  of  access  stabilizing  the  flows  of  daily  traffic:
translation  without  mutation.  In  this  way,  people  may  touch  around  the  curves  of  a  city,  for
example,  stretching  themselves  along  an  urban  landscape,  looking  out  with  their  fiddling
fingeryeyes.  In  this  sense,  particular  locations  may  be  remembered  in  the  flesh,  people  may
navigate  places  with less trouble to orient  themselves around the walls  that  enfold houses  and
buildings.
136 Taken in Argentina Avenue, Viña del Mar, Chile
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Fortifications, like automated tellers shaped as vaults, with spheres may be complemented
by drawing a sphere within that sphere, adding a pleat to read automated tellers inside booths or
buildings.  Then a sphere on premise (figure  62)  indicates  the  fortification  of  automated  tellers
shaped as safes, to delineate how people access them by touching around consecutive folds, making
iterative distinctions of the insides and outsides of a pleat, aligning the movement around the pleats
towards the cash point, stretching a passage of access. In contrast, a sphere off premise (figure 64)
underlines the fortifications of automated tellers when shaped with vulnerable folds, to trace how
people may bump into unsafe enclosures, appearing to offer less resistance to accessing them by
touching around. 
Michel  Foucault  initially  distilled  from the  apparatus  curves  of  visibility  and  utterance
(Deleuze  2007:343).  At  the  cash  point,  to  touch  around  means  to  become  with  the  curves  of
visibility  and  utterance  of  automated  tellers,  appearing  ready  all  the  time,  open  for  business,
working  around  the  clock,  or  without  closing  hours,  by  delegating  to  a  self  service  machine
particular  banking practices.  Grasping the  folds  of  places  like  cash  points  by  touching around
eventually  requires  people  to  stretch  themselves  through  the  passages  of  access  cut  into  a
fortification,  to  align  themselves  with  a  display  and a  concealment  of  money,  with  a  machine
meshing a bank counter and a strongroom. Here the machine begins to exercise powers with a
personal  touch.  People  are  persuaded to  collect  cash  only by typing in  their  personal  data,  an
enticement  configuring  the  visualization  of  automated  tellers,  a  silent  utterance  of  light  and
shadows.137 I outlined and stressed such contrast throughout this section's figures. In particular, I
pictured various fortress-like configurations to sketch some bright and darks spots of automated
tellers. 
137 In figure 63 note my shadow on the door.
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             Figure 65. Light                         Figure 66. Shadows        
   (photograph by author)138                        (image taken from reddit.com)
People  touching  around,  extending  themselves,  following  the  curves  of  the  lines  of
movement towards  a  cash point,  grasp meandering  lines  that  make visible  the  variable  figures
inseparable  from an  apparatus,  the  alignment  of  light  and  shadows  falling  over  an  apparatus,
orienting people towards a cash point,  pointing their  ways into the display and concealment of
money.  Figure  65  pictures  how visualization,  the  casting  of  light  and shadows,  means  making
something visible:
Visibility  does not refer to a general light that would illuminate preexisting objects; it  is
made up of lines of light that form variable figures inseparable from an apparatus. Each
apparatus has its regime of light, the way it falls, softens and spreads, distributing the visible
and the invisible, generating or eliminating an object, which cannot exist without it (Deleuze
2007:343). 
138 Taken in Barcelona, Spain.
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Then  with  fingeryeyes,  people  stretch  a  movement  around  the  resistances  enfolding
enclosures,  making  and  finding  ways  into  the  pleats,  a  movement  signalled  by  the  light  and
shadows  falling  over  this  apparatus.  In  daily  life  people  grasp  the  bright  and  dark  curves  of
automated  tellers,  of  self  banking  services  working  around  the  clock,  except  when  their
fortifications  become  inaccessible,  as  they  may  be  broken  or  reused  (to  sleep  overnight),139
scheduling  a  closing  hour,  a  time  out  of  service.  In  this  sense,  the  curves  of  visibility  of  the
automated  teller  machine  shed  light  upon  the  multiple  practices  afforded  everyday  by  these
protections.  Likewise,  shadows  can  be  extended  over  the  machines  to  obscure  the  various
consequences of these self  banking services,  that people touch and so inhabit at the cash point
everyday.
In other words, to cast light and shadows means to fill up places in collaborative ways.
Figure  66  shows  one  person  stretching  a  jacket  over  the  fortification  of  an  automated  teller,
enfolding  or  hiding  the  user,  casting  darkness  over  her  actions,  enlarging  the  shadows of  this
apparatus.  In  less  exaggerated  ways,  people  may fill  up  cash  points  by stretching their  bodies
around  the  machines,  concealing  the  screens  with  their  shoulders,  the  keyboards  with  their
fingeryeyes.
 
139 Taken in 2012, figure 63 captures the aftershock of the economic recession that began in 2007 as a consequence of




The  curves  of  visibility  and  utterance  which  entangle  the  light  and  shadows  of  these
machines stretch beyond what  is  out  here:  what  is  made visible  and said around a cash point.
Intimate  alignments  entwine  what  is  made  present  outside  the  automated  teller  with  what  is
manifestly  absent,  or  made  present  in  there,  inside  the  machine.  Hence  what  is  displayed  is
connected  to  what  is  concealed  by  the  machine,  and  to  what  is  assembled  beyond  this  place.
Furthermore,  this  alignment  of  an  encounter  with  automated  tellers  is  rectified  by  a  tangent,
connecting  cash  points  with  customers'  databases,  linking  them  together  as  networks  of  the
computers  of  banks.  This  tangent  is  a  line  of  force,  a  line  that  centralizes  around  banks  the
production  of  individual  subjects  with  particular  profiles,  a  register  of  exchanges  between  the
insides  and outsides  of people and machines,  during a  moment of touching through automated
tellers, and a movement of cash articulated by a line in the centre that touches back and affects
people.
So,  touching  through  and  being  touched  by  automated  tellers  designates  an  inside  and
outside  exchange  at  the  cash  point.  Previously,  I  sketched  this  moment  of  movement  as  an
algorithmic  dance  of  the  user  and  the  machine  through  the  allegories  of  an  interaction,  an
allegorithmic  time  at  the  point  of  purchase  of  supermarkets,  a  daily  passage  in  which  people
traverse  the  distinction  between  the  spaces  to  collect  items,  and  to  move  away  from  the
supermarket.  This  sense  of  time  entails  plotting  bodily  figures  with  the  clocks  of  machines,
speeding  calculative  processes;  a  time  to  compose  computations,  to  articulate  metaphors  into
hardware  (Haraway  1998:231-243);  a  moment  to  live  with  algorithms,  to  flesh  them  out;  a
movement  of  machine  time  as  a  “mosaic  of  relations  and  ordering  of  actions  brought  into
proximity”  (MacKenzie  2007:89).  For  this  affinity  of  allegorithmic  time  there  is,  I  think,  a
distinctive  spatial  patterning  of  insides  and  outside  reversals,  that  denote  in  the  case  of  self
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checkouts  and  automated  tellers  an  exchange  of  what  may  be  inside  or  outside  people  and
machines, delineated by a loop-and-twist-like tracing of the course of action. This is a moment of
reciprocal  touch  in  which  users  may  twist  themselves  out,  or  may  be  detached  from,  looping
through a  machinic  process  such as  a  purchase  or  a  withdrawal,  aligned  in  a  cash  point  or  a
purchase point.  Reversals can be refigured by folding a plane into a cylinder,  then twisting the
surface,  like  a  Möbius strip  (figure  67),  to  connect  both  ends.  The  result:  a  Klein  Bottle,  a
topological  figure  difficult  to  imagine,  impossible  to  shape  without  intersecting  it  in  three-
dimensional  space,  a  closed  two-dimensional  manifold  created  by  mathematician  Felix  Klein.
Representations  on  paper  of  this  twisted  figure  can  allow  the  surface  to  intersect  with  itself,
resembling a bottle whose “neck” has been curved, turned up-side down, and connected to the
bottom (figure 68).140 
             Figure 67. Möbius strip Figure 68.  Klein Bottle
140 “Since we are doing this in 3-dimensional space, it is necessary to cut the paper to allow part of a non-orientable
surface to pass trough another part of the surface. In the final model, we pretend such cuts are not there. In fact we
have to imagine that the paper model is in four or higher dimensions, where the space model that it represents
actually exists. The paper model is a realization of the projection of the space model into three dimensions” (Firby
and Gardiner 1991:38).
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To  touch  through  automated  tellers  and  to  be  touched  by  them  is  a  mundane,  fragile
achievement,  prone  to  breakdowns,  interferences  or  cuts  of  the  process  of  exchange  of  things
between  the  insides  and  outsides  of  people  and  machines.  In  practice,  this  reversal  of  being
cashless, this reciprocal touch, often happens without the help of employees. Unlike self checkouts
at the supermarket, here they rarely lurk around in case something breaks down or someone gets
lost while looping with an automated teller through a cash withdrawal. The exchanging of things by
touching through and being touched enacts or gestures towards an adjustment that couples people's
bodies, and enfolds practices that matter for making lives accountable.  Being in touch with the
accounts of particular lives means, in the case of the automated teller, being touched by money
through machines touching accounts beyond the cash point. 
In  this  sense,  touching  through  and  being  touched  is  a  practical  endeavour,  a  reversal
accomplished  by  fingeryeyes,  a  mutual  enfolding  and  twisting  of  people  and  things  through
practices  articulated  by  centring  the  prosaic  alignments  of  bodies,  machines,  wallets,  cards,
currencies,  etc.  Such  junctures  affect  people,  as  they  become  attached  to  a  line  in  the  centre
touching  them  back,  a  tangent  entangled  to  the  visibility  and  utterance  of  automated  tellers,
persuading  people  to  approach  the  machinic  cash  point,  and  making  impossible  for  them  to
withdraw  money  without  disclosing  themselves  as  individual  subjects,  unless  people  touch
differently  or  destroy  such  mutual  alignments,  embodied  as  an  everyday  self  service  banking
practice:
An apparatus contains lines of force. One might say that they move from one single point to
another on the previous lines. In a way, they 'rectify' the previous curves [of visibility and
utterance], draw tangents, surround the paths from one line to another, operate to-and-fro
from seeing to speaking and vice versa, acting like arrows that constantly mix words and
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things,  without  ceasing  to  carry  out  their  battles.  A line  of  force  is  produced  in  every
relationship between one point and another and moves through every place in an apparatus.
[…] It is the dimension of power (Deleuze 2007:344). 
The  dimension  of  power  of  the  line  in  the  centre  of  automated  tellers  becomes  subtly
embodied  and enlivened  through the  brief  gestures  of  people.  Resonating  once  again  with  the
fortification  of  pukaras,  people  passing  through  automated  tellers  are  screened  by  making  a
generative,  relational,  agential  cut  between  what  is  made  visible  and  said,  and  what  is  made
invisible  and  left  unsaid.  This  rectification  connects  in  strategic  ways  what  is  made  present,
manifestly  absent,  and Othered.  Under  the  foldings  of  the  automated  teller's  line  in  the  centre
reversals  may  happen,  people  indeed  get  cash  from  the  machine,  what  was  once  inside  the
automated  teller  may be made present  outside.  This  is  done strictly  under  secured  procedures,
configuring  how  and  for  whom  particular  economies  may  flourish,  through  computing  and
screening  moments  of  movement,  in  places  designed  to  prolong  the  circulation  of  specific
currencies. Then grasping the line in the centre becomes everyday business, by facing automated
tellers. 
Immutably  waiting  in  place,  people  attracted  daily  into  these  envelopments  become
immobilized  for  a  moment  in  front  of  the  machine,  where  the  menu  patterns  displayed  by  a
computer  screen  take  hold  of  them.  Since  interactions  with  automated  tellers  begin  with
fingeryeyes,  things  stored  inside  containers  (such  as  wallets,  purses,  backpacks,  handbags,
notecases, etc.) may be unfolded to look for debit and credit  cards. Then sliding these banking
devices through the access-slots of automated tellers (figure 69), people present themselves to the
machines as individual subjects by entering a PIN number (figure 70). Interestingly, this does not
matter yet. If you type any four digit number at a cash point the automated teller will display the
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self service menu patterns for you. In other words, exchanges concern so far what is made present
out here (at the cash point) and what is made manifestly absent in there (inside the machine), as no
exit passage has been made for things to travel beyond this place. In practice, it is only after the
fulfilment of a self banking service procedure, when a user has already faced the machine, pressed
the buttons,  and located on the  display  (figure 71)  the  steps  to  handle  the withdrawal  of  cash
without interruptions, that exit passages for the money, the data, and the user are created that allow
them to move away from the automated teller (figures 72-73). It is here and in this way that a line in
the centre powerfully designates what counts as desirable banking and for whom; as well as who is
authorized to (re)configure lawfully the exchanges of currencies for information, when people and
machines meet.  
              Figure 69. Inserting a card                                  Figure 70. Entering a PIN number
    (photograph by author)                (photograph by author)
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     Figure 71. Facing the ATM141               Figure 72. Getting cash     Figure 73. Moving away  
(photograph by author)    (photograph by author)      (photograph by author)
     
In  short,  a  line  of  force  enfolds  the  cash point,  opening up exit  passages  for  a  line  of
subjectification:  for  the  disclosure,  profiling,  aggregation,  and  centralization  of  well  known,
profitable  customers  around  banks.  Still,  the  production  of  particular  individuals  crosses  over,
escapes,  breaks  away from the circumscription of  the line of force of  an apparatus.  Not  every
apparatus has it.  For Deleuze this  line has surplus value (2007:345) or a dimension of the self
through  which  people  become  authorized  to  process  particular  selves,  by  passing  through  an
apparatus:
This going beyond the line of force is what happens when it bends back, starts meandering,
goes underground, or rather when force, instead of entering into a linear relationship with
another  force,  turns  back  on itself,  acts  on  itself  or  affects  itself.  […]  The  Self  is  not
knowledge or power. It is a process of individuation that effects groups or people and eludes
141 I thank my friend Jess Phoenix for enacting a self banking service at the cash point. 
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established lines of force and constituted knowledge (Deleuze 2007:345).
The line of subjectification of the automated teller may be confused with the (ab)use of
forces  and  knowledges  as  resources  of  power.  When  these  machines  are  assaulted,  when  the
automated  teller's  line  in  the  centre  gets  confronted  or  destroyed by those  refusing  to  identify
themselves  as  distinct  individuals;  when  people  add  pleats  to  hack  the  process  and  collect
information  to  commit  card  fraud;  when  they  attack  and  explode  the  fortifications  of  these
machines;  when  they  break  down  these  folds  and  flee  with  the  money;  then  people  are  not
attempting to escape the powers of this place.  Rather,  they are tied up and defined by them as
unlawful  subjects  wishing to  get  money  in  undesirable  ways.  They  are  pursued  and  if  caught
violently  touched  back.  To  make  a  careful  move  sideways  here  what  is  needed  is  a  better
understanding of the sociotechnical ways in which the line of subjectification of the automated
teller may be performed by way of creation of alternatives, to responsibly devise actions to touch
one another differently.
Projective space
Living  with  currencies,  making  a  payment,  trading  off  money  for  goods  and  services,
exchanging  information  for  cash,  following  Karen  Barad,  are  all  intra-actions;  not  pre-given
possessables  but  perfomative processes,  not  interactions  timed in  advance  but  matters  of  intra-
action.142 These  matters  put  money in circulation,  subjected to  accountable iterations  which,  of
course,  may  be  decided  upon  by  talking  about  the  powers  of  the  economies  articulated  with
monetary  currencies,  and  the  assemblages  of  political,  economical,  and  legal  institutions  that
support  them.  In  short,  economies  and  currencies  are  always  co-produced  by  specific  agential
apparatuses:
142 See chapter 5.
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Agency  is  doing/being  in  its  intra-activity.  It  is  the  enactment  of  iterative  changes  to
particular practices – iterative reconfigurings of topological manifolds of spacetimematter
relations – through the dynamics of intra-activity. Agency is about changing possibilities of
change  entailed  in  reconfiguring  material-discursive  apparatuses  of  bodily  production,
including the boundary articulations and exclusions that are marked by those practices in the
enactments of a causal structure (Barad 2007:235). 
With  closed  two-dimensional  manifolds,  with  tori,  spheres,  and  Klein  bottles,  it  is  this
understanding of agency and change, as a topological reconfiguration of relations that matter in
space  and  time,  that  I  think  can  be  sketched  around,  through,  and  away  from  an  apparatus.
Computer  screens  enveloped  in  self  service  machines  are  for  me  important  examples  of  this
assembling and devising task.  But the question remains: how to move sideways into spaces  of
freedom and  jouissance? How to design allegorithmic intra-actions  for  becoming response-able
when  people  and  machines  touch  one  another?  How  might  their  animations  and  automations
(Stacey and Suchman 2012) retell  stories,  reshape figures,  and rebuild  passages  for  circulating
currencies?  Exploring  the  proposition  of  sketching  with  surface  topology,  projective  planes143
appear at last immanently appealing for staying with the trouble of living with money while moving
parallel to banks. 
The name of this manifold comes from stretching parallel lines that meet at one point at
most.  Imagine  a  plane  refigured  as  a  sphere  whose  whole  surface  self-intersects,  continuously
looping inside out. Thus like the Klein bottle the projective plane is a non-orientable manifold,
143 “The development of painters of the system of focused perspective led to the growth of a new form of geometry,
called projective geometry. […] In Euclidean plane geometry, parallel lines never meet, while in the new projective
geometry, in accordance with what we see, every pair of lines meet. If we stand between railway lines, we see that
they meet at a point on the horizon, so we include this point in our new plane geometry. By doing this for parallel
lines in all directions, the whole of the horizon is included in our new geometry” (Firby and Gardiner 1991:41-42,
italics in original).
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which features in  the Klein Manifesto of 1872, the Erlangen program, that  sorted the growing
invention  of  non-Euclidean  geometries  as  particular  cases  of  the  projective  plane.144 With  this
manifold  allowing  for  parallel  lines  to  meet  with  each  other,  I  sketch  how parallel  lives  may
interfere  with  one  another  on  a  horizon  articulated  by  machines  passing  currencies  that  work
without  banks.  And these wicked species,145 circulating around and away from the institutional
frameworks  that  affect  people  daily,  open  up  passages  for  the  transaction  of  new  kinds  of
currencies. With the projective plane, I move sideways into the modest rise and falls of crypto-
currencies.
Along with a second report  commissioned once again to Value Partners  consultants,  the
industry  association  of  automated  tellers  (ATMIA) released  a  position  paper146 during  2014 on
Bitcoin,  one  of  the  most  prominent  crypto-currencies  circulating  without  the  governance  and
securitization of entities like the International Monetary Found, the World Bank, or any central
government  or  bank  traditionally  in  charge  of  steering,  policing,  and backing  up the  financial
planification  of  currencies  such  as  Pounds,  Euros,  Dollars,  Yens,  Pesos  or  any  other  people's
currencies.  ATMIA's  publication  highlights  that  Bitcoin  would  not  be  “a  threat  to  cash  or  to
established  electronic payment  methods  but  [ATMIA]  recommends  increased  support  and
supervision  of  BitCoin  ATMs  to  ensure they  abide  by  security  best  practices  &  maintain  the
industry’s  current   levels  of consumer trust”  (2014:1).  The paper  values  Bitcoin as a  “creative
destruction  […]  A disruptive  new innovation  in  the  sense  that  it  creates  a  different  model  of
144 Euclid defined his flat geometry by resorting to five axioms including the parallel postulate: parallel lines never
meet. “In the first half of the nineteenth century there had been several developments complicating the picture.
Mathematical applications required geometry of four or more dimensions; the close scrutiny of the foundations of
the traditional Euclidean geometry had revealed the independence of the parallel postulate from the others, and non-
Euclidean geometry  had been born” (Wikipedia's Erlangen Program entry retrieved from  http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Erlangen_program last accessed 26/06/2016).
145 The etymology of the word species refracts into multiple directions (see chapter 4). Species can be a type or kind of
thing;  a  mental  impression,  an  idea;  a group  of  plants  or  animals  having  similar  appearance;  a  rank  in  the
classification of organisms; the image of something cast on a surface, or reflected from a surface, or refracted
through a lens or telescope; a visible or perceptible presentation; an appearance; something perceived; a  coin, or
coined silver, gold, or other metal, used as a circulating medium. Here I use it to designate a coin.
146 http://goo.gl/b3s71o  (last accessed 19/02/215)
201
payment  and  a  new  global,  decentralized  digital  currency,  challenging  some  fundamental
assumptions  of  established  payment  methods  and  governance  of  currency”  (2014:1-2).  Bitcoin
notably  thrives  on  networks  of  computing  devices  to  mint  (create),  afford,  and  regulate  a
generalized  medium of monetary exchanges based on the allegorithmic configuration of a currency
with  a  public  ledger.  Bitcoin's  method  to  account  for  financial  exchanges  is  referred  to  as  a
Blockchain technology.147
Bitcoin's  payment  system was  created  by  Satoshi  Nakamoto  in  2008,148 allegedly  as  a
response  to  the  political  and economical  bailout  of  international  banks,  in  the  context  of  their
irresponsible behaviour related to credit  markets for financing the housing sector in the United
States  and  elsewhere.  The  crypto-currency,  like  others  that  copied  or  modified  its  innovative
schemes,  translates  the  role  of  banks  by  designing  software  to  produce  a  currency  under  a
determined  provision  of  coins,  a  programmed  growth  of  the  currency,  to  strategically  tackle
inflation as well  as peer to peer payments.149 In this  way online payments become irreversible:
people need to “trust computers alone with their money”. One asks a bank to reverse a payment
online if  a good bought  from a vendor through Amazon,  for example,  turns out to  be a scam.
Bitcoin does not allow that because the chain of events, the Blockchain, once actualized, cannot
147 “Until now [most] monetary systems have been built on centralized ledger-keeping […] The problem has always
been that this model confers too much power and excessive profit on those central record-keepers […] Bitcoin's
blockchain ledger is a long chain of blocks, or groupings, of transactions occurring around the same time. The chain
will continue to grow indefinitely [like queues] so long as the system keeps operating. This chronological structure
is crucial because it confers legitimacy [trust] in the oldest transactions, the idea being that later-dated attempts by a
user  to  re-spend  the  same  bitcoin  balance  is  treated  as  illegitimate.  By creating  a  time-stamped  sequence  of
expenditures  and  receipts  among  every  participant  in  the  bitcoin  economy,  the  system keeps  track  of  where
everybody's balances are at any given moment, as well as identifying information attached to every bitcoin – and
fraction of bitcoin – ever created, spent, or received” (Vigna & Casey 2015:120-123). 
148 A mysterious character believed to be a pseudonym for a person or a group. After publishing the description of
Bitcoin's  transactions,  timestamp  servers,  proof-of-work,  networks,  incentives,  verifications,  privacy,  etc.,
Nakamoto made a few more appearances online and then vanished. Different identities have been suggested, all
unconfirmed.
149 “Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as trusted third
parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for most transactions, it still suffers
from the  inherent  weaknesses  of  the  trust  based  model.  Completely  non-reversible  transactions  are  not  really
possible, since financial institutions cannot avoid mediating disputes […] These costs and payment uncertainties
can  be  avoided  in  person  by  using  physical  currency,  but  no  mechanism  exists  to  make  payments  over  a
communications channel without a trusted party” (Nakamoto 2008:1).
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change  in  order  to  avoid  the  problem of  double  spending  electronic  money,  as  coins  may  be
duplicated when configured digitally,  just  like copying a  folder.  “We propose a  solution to  the
double-spending  problem  using  a  peer-to-peer  distributed  timestamp  server  to  generate
computational proof of the chronological order of transactions. The system is secure as long as
honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes”
(Nakamoto  2008:1).  From  here  on  the  technicalities  of  Bitcoin  multiply.  Let  me  provide  a
description  of  a  transaction150 and  discuss  the  promises  and  troubles  of  crypto-currencies  like
Bitcoin.
A digital wallet to store, send and receive bitcoins is the equivalent of a bank account.151
Wallets  come  in  flavours:  software  and  web  based.  In  the  latter  people  trust  their  electronic
payments to a third party.  To acquire bitcoins it  is possible to simply run Bitcoin software and
provide computing power to collaborate in the system of transactions.  People can help minting
coins  by  solving  Bitcoin's  algorithmic  puzzles,  a  practice  allegorically  named  mining,  thus
resonating  with  extracting  metals  as  resources  to  make  coins.152 These  computing  puzzles,  on
average,  are  solved  every  ten  minutes.  The  difficulty  increases  as  more  people  and  machines
collaborate,  which keeps  Bitcoin growing steadily.153 The ceiling is  fixed:  21 million coins  are
expected to  be minted by 2140. Computers  are  paid in bitcoins when they solve puzzles,  thus
150 “We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally
signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the end of the
coin […] To accomplish this without a trusted party,  transactions must be publicly announced, and we need a
system for participants to agree on a single history of the order in which they were received. The payee needs proof
that at the time of each transaction, the majority of nodes agreed it was the first received” (Nakamoto 2008:2). In
short, Bitcoin's economy builds ad hoc politics.
151 “Sending bitcoins is as easy as copying and pasting someone else’s address, choosing an amount, and clicking send.
[…] Essentially, sending a bitcoin is a lot like sending an email. You put in someone else’s address and there’s no
going back after you hit send” (Bitcoinsimplified Website retrieved from  http://bitcoinsimplified.org/get-started/
how  - to-  use-bitcoins/).
152 “Miners keep the block chain consistent, complete, and unalterable by repeatedly verifying and collecting newly
broadcast  transactions into a  new group of transactions called a  block.  A new block contains information that
'chains' it to the previous block […] A new block must also contain a so-called proof-of-work [evidence of solved
puzzles]” (Wikipedia's Bitcoin entry retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin).
153 http://blockchain.info/charts graphs the Bitcoin economy: number coins and transactions, market capitalizations,
etc.
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around this  practice miners organize themselves in computer “pools” or “farms” to collaborate.
Another way to get bitcoins is  by running and helping the system to check attempts at  double
spendings and other  attacks.  A third way is  to exchange other  (crypto)  currencies  for bitcoins.
People can,  of course,  offer  goods and services,  including their  labour  power,  in  exchange for
bitcoins. 
               Figure 74. Lamassu ATM            Figure 75. Robocoin ATM
           (image taken from lamassu.is)   (image taken from coinatmradar.com)
“The key innovation of [these] digital currencies is the 'distributed ledger' which allows a
payment system to operate in an entirely decentralised way” (Ali  2014:1).  But decentralising a
currency  is  not  without  problems  in  practice.  In  contrast  to  the  ethnographic  difficulties  of
approaching  automated  tellers  in  locations  with  high  surveillance,  where  taking  a  photo  or
approaching a person at  the cash point already looks like a robbery,  to study crypto-currencies
means to  be subjected to  a  modified regime of individuation.  What  public  ledgers such as the
Blockchain  register  are  IP addresses  or  locations  of  computers,  but  to  establish  a  connection
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between distinct people and specific IPs is a layer that monetary systems based on crypto-currencies
do not  comply with.  While  providing a  degree of anonymity,  this  feature allows economies  to
function in bewildering ways, prone to controversies. Then experts on crypto-currencies point out
their  troubles:  deflationary  spirals  due  to  hoarding,  forking  of  the  public  ledgers,  delayed
transactions, digital attacks to wallets and exchange services, lack of legal or financial support from
central  banks  and  governments,  affordance  of  money  laundering,  black  markets,  selfish  or
speculative use, etc.154 And perhaps the cruellest attack on Bitcoin is not to consider it as a currency
at all; at best as an economic asset, when compared to a bona fide currency.155 
On  the  other  hand,  experts  in,  and  users  of,  crypto-currencies  count  their  sometimes
unexpected benefits: a public account for economic exchanges, a predictable supply of money, a
new way of  building  trust,  a  method to send cash  around the  world  at  low cost,  a  “'practical
materialism”, a cause of reduction of violence in drug markets, etc.156 In any case, services thriving
on crypto-currencies abound, either because they are taken as a profitable business, or as ways of
combining fun and software  as they may “bind the psychic energy of programmers into certain
forms of  movement,  feelings  of  potency and somewhat  aggressive and eroticized attachments”
(MacKenzie  2014:129).  Among  the  growing  list  of  services  for  these  curious  new currencies,
automated tellers machines to buy cash (withdraw) in exchange for currencies (without disclosure
of personal data) multiply: Robocoin, Bitaccess, Bitcoin ATM, Lamassu, etc.157
154 Ali 2014; Barber et al. 2012; Ben-Sasson et al. 2014; Biryukov & Pustogarov 2014; Elwell et al. 2015; European
Central Bank 2015; FBI 2012; Koss & Koss 2012; Maurer et al. 2013; Nakamoto 2008.
155 “A bona fide currency functions as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account, but bitcoin
largely fails to satisfy these criteria. Bitcoin has achieved only scant consumer transaction volume, with an average
well below one daily transaction for the few merchants who accept it […] Bitcoin's daily exchange rates exhibit
virtually zero correlation with widely used currencies and with gold, making bitcoin useless for risk management
and exceedingly difficult for its owners to hedge. Bitcoin prices of consumer goods require many decimal places
with leading zeros, which is disconcerting to retail market participants” (Yermack 2014:1).
156 Aldridge & Décary-Hétu 2014; Ali 2014; Barber et al. 2012; Ben-Sasson et al. 2014; Elwell et al. 2015; Koss &
Koss 2012; Maurer et al. 2013; Nakamoto 2008.
157 http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-atm-map/ lists and maps these automated tellers available in different locations.
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Coda
In these discussions, cutting money to knot economies in a new cryptographic way appears
to produce bewildering effects. In my view, it seems that the consequences of crypto-currencies like
Bitcoin create everyday places of resistance to the persuasions of the line in the centre.  Places of
resistance are co-produced through the timings and spacings of bodies and apparatuses; they entail a
kind of positioning, a move sideways. People in places of resistance pursue lines of subjectification,
as “the extreme edge of an apparatus [insofar] they trace the passage from one apparatus to another:
in this sense, they would prepare for lines of fracture” (Deleuze 2007:348).  
ATMs passing crypto currencies do not prepare for lines of fracture by default.  Lines of
fracture are made in specific histories and practices and by changing dynamics of change through
iterative reconfigurations.  Such dynamics  might be grasped as a  projective horizon, a topology
where parallel lives meet and become accountable for their constitutional exclusions. It is a matter
of shifting the possibilities of in/determination of causal structures in a particular situation with
specific  costs.  This may facilitate  an escape to  break away from the rectifying capacity  of  the
automated  teller's  line  in  the  centre.  Interestingly,  this  seems an  effect  of  meshing people  and
crypto-currencies  with  digital  wallets.  For  instance  if  wallets  are  assaulted or  accidentally  lost,
people  witness  the  destructive  creation  of  zombie  coins:  a  bitcoin  that  indeed  appears  in  the
Blockchain but may not be passed around. It is effectively excluded from circulation. This odd
situation is similar to finding a coin that is stuck in the pavement, one may grasp it but not pick it
up. This is what I find very interesting about automated tellers passing around Bitcoin or other
equivalent  crypto-currencies.  In  particular,  what  I  think  is  fascinating  is  the  possibility  of  non
coherent  economies. Because  automated  tellers  passing  crypto-currencies  are  designed to  leave
indeterminate  (i.e.  trouble)  the  disclosure  of  people  (their  ages,  genders,  etc.)  in  economic
exchanges,  the  bewildering  situations  and  controversial  effects  of  these  apparatuses  may  be
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understood  as  opening  up  non coherent  economies  assembled  through  the  circulation  of  these
tokens.  This  possibility  implies  that  Bitcoin  economies,  like  any other,  do  not  produce  totally
coherent  accounts  –  or  rather  the  actors  participating  in  their  assemblages  ontologically  shift
around,  sometimes  acting  coherently,  sometimes  not.  In  my  view,  this  is  why  critics  of  these
economies  have  trouble  in  valuing  their  effects  seriously.  Bitcoin  does  not  fit  their  theoretical
assumptions of what a currency is, as many of them seem to have forgotten that  oikonomias are
mundane. 
In  other  words,  the  Bitcoin  economy seems to  resist  being  concealed  conceptually  and
practically  in  known,  traditional  ways.  It  mutates,  so  to  speak,  between  mobile  and immobile
positions.  Bitcoin  discloses  the  multiplicity  of  currencies  (tokens)  as  mutable  immobiles  and
mutable mobiles.  To say it  with surface topology:  to  open up passages through the cracks and
fissures  that  crypto-currencies  help  to  delineate,  people  can  learn  to  move  sideways  into  the
temporal and spatial patternings that I figured here as tori, spheres, Klein bottles, and projective
plane.  In  this  sense,  the  creation  of  spaces  of  freedom  and  jouissance is  not  unlimited  but
conditioned to the shifting gears of apparatuses, to their agential cuts, exclusions and potentials,
opening up new ways of affecting one another  through touch,  and of aligning our  selves with
devices.  
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Chapter 8. Exit Passage
In this study of screens and screening devices, we began by moving sideways from seeing
screens as displays. In chapter 1 I observed that screens, on the one hand, bring something into
view. I called the “display” that which screens make visible. The display of a screen, on the other
hand, always leaves something else out of sight.  This sense of screen includes then,  but is  not
limited to, the notion of display. What a screen brings into view and what is left out of sight can be
considered as an effect of an alignment of people and things with a display, which at once reveals
and conceals in a specific situation. Frames in this conceptualisation are the material enclosures of
the display. A frame attracts the attention of the viewers of a display, and bounds or limits what the
screen's display makes visible. So I distinguish between screens and displays, and include the latter
in the former: displays are parts of screens that cut off particular views and viewers. This distinction
of  screen  and display  makes  a  place  for  divisions  and concealments,  which are also a  part  of
screens. 
Studying alignments of people and things with displays guided my analysis of what screens
conceal. By enacting alignments, I approached screens and noted how people and things become
located  in  relation  to  displays  and their  concealments.  Aligning  screens  takes  place  in  prosaic
situations. In chapter 2, with Ingold (2007), I explored lines as figures, in order to approach screens
as alignments of everyday matters. I did an exploration of lines on the road, on a pedestrian and
bicycle pathway to Lancaster University. Following Haraway (1991), lines are  material-semiotic
actors; with them I unpacked the markings on the road's surfaces. Lines are excellent figures with
which to grasp how surfaces are threaded, and how screens are made out of surfaces and/or gaps.
Taking as an example the line in the centre of the pathway, I considered how it aligns people and
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things. It sorts them out along the road in order to arrange their pathways across the land. The line
in the centre became a figure to indicate how sorting out or screening people and things can be tied
to centres of calculation (Latour 1987) and coordination (Suchman 2011). 
In  chapter  3,  I  asked what  happens when people cannot  turn away from the display of
screens.  An  occulo-centric  embodiment  frames  screens  as  (digital)  surface  and  so  reduces  the
alignment of screens to their displays; this has consequences, particularly for screens that try to
leave  nothing out  of  sight,  to  reach and “augment”  everything.  We imagined  the  viewers  that
emerge  in  such cases  with  Google  Glass  and its  promotional  video  “One  Day”.  The  fictional
observer of these “smartglasses” featured in the ad enacted for us how the device would smoothly
configure the world for a “user” who never needs to take his glasses off. Following someone we
never got to see, we circulated effortlessly around a city “augmented” by Glass. Nothing appeared
to escape our capacity to visualize “useful information,” to resolve or avoid problems in advance.
Then we discussed how this story hides what the screen of Google Glass leaves out of sight. We
contrasted “One Day” with a YouTube parody that mocks the alleged benefits of Glass. In this
version, wearing the glasses at all times made visible the contingent outcomes of matching locations
with  layers  of  data.  Exaggerating  how  actual  situations  may  interrupt  expectations,  Glass's
transparency was called into question, and shattered by the breakdown of actions. 
These breakdowns disclosed blind spots that allowed us to see how Glass configures people
as users. Moving sideways from see-through digital surfaces like the display of Glass is hard; one
has to let go for a moment of what the display makes visible. But putting Glass away seemed not
enough to respond to Google's business – based as it is on extracting user data for a profit (Fuchs
2012). One can stay in touch with Glass when the display is off and thus remain attached to centres
of calculation and coordination that exploit the unpaid work of people who provide their data. That
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is  a  tricky line in  the centre.  Perhaps moving sideways from Google database services  entails,
instead,  shaking off  the  figuration  of  users  as  humans  “augmenting”  reality.  In  this  sense,  we
speculated with Emma how to step out from the human-machine configuration (Suchman 2007) of
screens. I began to see through as well as to look around and away from the screen's display. This is
what I call juggling with screens: letting go of what they show to momentarily grasp what they hide,
by paying attention  to  what  is  around,  through,  and away from their  displays.  Grappling  with
screens in this way helps to avoid reducing them to displays or surfaces.
Emma's curiosity suggested that we might learn from dogs how to move sideways from
figuring  screens  as  displays  made only for  humans.  In  chapter  4  we did  this  by training  with
Medical  Detection Dogs (MDD). Training is  a  canonical activity of Haraway's  “contact zones”
(2008:205), where species “become with” one another. Threaded together in partnerships, in multi-
layered  practices  or  gestures,  species  texture  the  web of  relations  that  brings  them into  being.
Human trainers in contact zones with dogs learn to recognize the cues of authority of their canine
companions.  That  is  the  case  in  agility,  biodetection,  and  care  practices.  Learning  in  this  way
allowed us  to  understand in  the contact  zone  how screens  and screening practices  make sense
with/for  dogs.  We  focused  on  the  courses  of  action  crafted  by  training  in  collaboration  with
biodetection  dogs  (Lucy and Daisy).  In  these  circuits  or  passages,  aligned  by the  practices  of
detecting  cancer  samples  and  sending  alarm  messages,  what  counted  as  screen  and  screening
practice  (what  Lucy,  Daisy,  Rob,  and Lydia  made visible  and  hid  from each other,  what  they
displayed and concealed) took place around, through, and away from the sample and the alarm
system. 
We saw that  this  process  does  not  revolve around one partner.  It  is  not  centred on the
humans,  the dogs,  or the samples.  Instead,  the screening of cancer  required the distribution of
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samples in a carousel or a line of stands. And by teaching a biodetection dog like Daisy to go
around, through, and away from such devices, the dog, the human, and the sample became all
caught  up in  the  web of  relations  that  brought  the  presence/absence  of  cancer  into  view.  This
entangled  way of  working and playing at  MDD allowed  dogs  to  become screens  for  humans.
Enjoying  this  non-invasive  way  of  detecting  the  disease,  Daisy  screened  the  samples  with/out
cancer.  But  dogs cannot  say with human words  how they do it,  they remain silent  about  their
doggish ways.  That  opened up the question  of  the place of  the  nonhuman animal  in  scientific
laboratories. 
For  this  debate I  blended ethnography with animal  studies  and geographies  (Wolch and
Emel 1995, Philo and Wilbert  2000),  to argue that  dogs may be good lab assistants.  They can
collaborate  by  bonding  with  humans  and  thus  performing  jobs  as  partners  rather  than  as  test
subjects. In this sense I moved sideways with the task of dogs at MDD and unravelled the moments
of movement around, through, and away from the carousel and the stands. This put together the
affects  and  creativities  of  the  partners,  and  textured  the  relations  through  which  they  became
significant for one another. I detailed such textures with Law and Lien's notion of architextures
(2013), and talked about another case of conjoined practice with dogs at MDD: a design of Animal-
Computer  Interaction  which  I  borrowed  from Charlotte's  canine  alarm system.  This  prototype
illustrated with Lucy how the choreography, or the patchwork of moments of movement through
which Lucy expressed her care for Lydia, meandered around, through, and away from the tuggy-toy.
And again we read that path as made in a web of relations without a centre. 
The lines, surfaces, and textures from chapters 2, 3, and 4 helped me to study screens as
alignments of gaps and/or surfaces, that arrange or architexture encounters of people and things
with the display of screens. In chapter 5 with Vig and Ben I folded such textures in order to outline
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the limits of what they can display and conceal. I traced how grasping what Vig and Ben made
visible entails touching and being touched by their displays. In this sense I outlined two modes of
touching. On the one hand, I described how writing with Vig helped me to unfold my workplace, as
a passage assembled around and through its display. I drew the limits of my workplace with Vig in
my shared office. On the other hand, I observed how unravelling my workplace with Ben required
enfolding  its  display  within  wider  arrangements.  I  tracked  with  Ben  the  ways  in  which  my
workplace touched me back. Both complementary ways of touching articulated how Vig, Ben, and I
took a place in and out of my workplace, seen as a practical enactment rather than as a fixed space. 
With Vig,  I  articulated the idea of folds as the unravelling of a web of relations,  or an
unfolding of my workplace. With Ben I considered how this web of relations is enveloped in wider
arrangements, or enfolded in a hinterland. By un/en/folding, I grappled with what displays bring
into view/leave out of sight. Pleating displays and their concealments, Vig and Ben allowed me to
un/en/fold an account of my embodiment of these screens and of the materiality of their screenness.
As argued initially with Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger (2000, 2002) grasping the way in which actions
like trading and writing take place through the display discloses how people and things on screen
come into being. Spaces “in between” screens are embodied; and what appears on screen gains,
through  observation  and  manipulation  of  the  display,  material  and  tangible  features  (Myers
2008:178). I expanded this insight with Vig in order to think through how my embodiment and the
materiality of this screen are aligned, by articulating a relational web that partly includes what goes
on around the display. Extending this point, I suggested with Ben that what is excluded from this
approach may be concealed from view and can appear away from the display, while remaining
necessary for the screen. 
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Moving sideways is an approach to grasping screens that starts around rather than in front of
them. This simple consideration is key to understanding how screens take a place in everyday life.
Screens are always somewhere. I have condensed the contributions of this approach to screens in
the set of figures introduced in these chapters. Lines helped us first to differentiate between screens
and displays. With lines I considered how screens overflow the frames of their displays, insofar as
screens not only bring something into view but also leave other things out of sight. I used the term
‘alignment’ in order to stress how to engage with screens is to become aligned with displays that
partially blind the observer/user. Alignment designates frames as a limit of the display; that is, a
material enclosure of what screens make visible. Frames matter for screens when one acts through
the display; around and away from displays, the boundaries of screens are outlined by what they
leave out of sight in a specific location. In this way I tried to resist concentrating our attention on
displays while looking at screens. 
Surfaces further  allowed me to think about screens  as displays with blind spots.  Seeing
screens only as displays configures them as surfaces that,  taken to the extreme case of Google
Glass, leave no gaps and spaces in which to look away from the display and to juggle with or
realign the screen. Missing what screens leave out of sight interferes with people's experience of
what goes on through their displays. Taking blind spots into account helps to approach screens
sideways, in order to resist the extraction of values (specially valuable data) as an intrinsic element
of the encounter. 
The figure of textures underlined the gaps and/or surfaces of screens in the alignment of
people and things. Textures are the qualities of a relation. By examining textures with Medical
Detection  Dogs  we learned to  relate  to  people  and  things  as  companions  or  partners  made in
practice.  Textures choreographed in alignments foreground the situatedness of becoming with a
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screen. On the one hand, the lessons of screening with dogs helped me to appreciate the gaps and/or
surfaces of screens in the array of cancer samples and the design of Charlotte's canine alarm system.
On the other, what counted as a screen, for whom screens were made, and what was screened out,
became a matter of moving around, through, and away from the samples and the alarm system.
With textures I tried to grasp screens without centring my attention on a single surface. Screens in
practice  can  be  shape-shifters,  “not  particularly  stable  because  different  practices  do  them  in
different ways” (Law and Lien 2013:5).158 They change according to the variable geometry that
enfolds the places in which people and things unfold their relations with screens.  
I  used the figure of the fold as a trope to approach how screens take place in concrete
locations.  According  to  Bowker  (2010),  folds  are  about  staying  in  touch  with  the  insides  and
outsides, or the boundaries, of people and things. Thinking about folds suggests methods to grapple
with the twofold act of screens, or the un/en/folding of the screenness of screens, what they display
and conceal, what they make present, manifestly absent, and Other. I developed this idea with the
notions of method assemblage (Law 2004) and apparatus of bodily production (Haraway 1991,
Barad 2007), considered through Myer's body-work (2008) and Hayward's fingeryeyes (2010), as
two ways of touching, of becoming in touch with what screens bring into view and leave out of
sight. 
Knots  and cuts  are  figures  that  helped  me  to  study specific  locations  in  which  screens
un/en/fold alignments  of people and things with displays.  Self  checkouts  and automated tellers
served  as  examples  of  locations  (the  supermarket  and  the  cash  point)  in  which  screens  align
shopping  and  banking  activities  that  go  around,  through,  and  away  from the  display  of  these
machines. I used the expression moment of movement to draw attention to the duration in time, or
158 Law and Lien looked at human-salmon relations to make this argument. I have tried to apply the point to screens in 
human-dog relations.    
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timing, and the extension in space, or spacing, of their approaches to screens. Knots helped us to
detail how the duration of the purchase rests upon the moments of calculation that move people and
things in a supermarket. Cuts helped us to detail how the extension of the withdrawal of money
from the ATM rests upon the flows of money going through people and things, in and out of banks.
In this sense knotting and cutting screens emphasized what they cut off from view, in a specific
location (Winthereik, Lutz, Suchman & Verran 2011:1). 
Stretching or  reaching into  folds  defines  the  duration  and extension  of  the  moments  of
movement around, through, and away from the display of screens. In this way I approached in
chapters  6  and 7  the  screens  of  self  checkouts  and  automated  tellers.  In  chapter  6  I  read  the
unfoldings of screens during supermarket purchases, and stressed with knots how understanding the
calculation of self service practices requires grasping their inclusion of people and things acting
around and through the display of self checkout machines. Focusing on the alignments unfolded by
the screens of self checkouts in supermarkets, I accompanied my friends Marina and Liviu who
enacted a purchase for me, a passage that zigzagged around the aisles, through a self checkout
machine, and away from the shopping floor.  I followed their commitment to the purchase in the
making  of  knots  or  attachments  to  the  supermarket,  by  doing  face-to-basket  and  face-to-shelf
alignments. And I highlighted such knotting with the khipu, as a figure that brings the supermarket
into view. Khipus (a mnemonic Inka device) are a reminder of how telling shopping stories with
knots creates an account of purchases as calculative practices. Callon and Muniesa (2005) provided
insights  with  which  to  think  about  market  calculations,  and  their  relation  to  supermarket  self
checkouts,  as  algorithmic  configurations  of  collective  devices,  a  pragmatic  approach to  market
agencies.  Since  actors  and  trade  in  supermarkets  are  path-dependent  features,  or  outcomes  of
making  activities  economic,  I  explored  how  self  checkouts  help  to  display  configurations  of
supermarkets  and  shoppers.  For  this  task,  I  unpacked  the  purchase  of  Marina  and  Liviu  and
composed  an  open-ended  list  of  moments  of  movement  around,  through,  and  away  from  the
215
purchase point. From Bakthin (1981) I borrowed his sense of chronotope to examine the stretchings
or durations of such moments. By proposing a conjunction of space and time, the chronotope is a
trope that knots in practice the duration of a moment, with the extension of a movement.
Equipped  with  these  insights,  I  considered  how the  time  to  pay  is  delayed  during  the
purchase in a supermarket. I traced this configuration of supermarkets through the history of self
service practices, making sense of the self checkout as a money machine knotted into this history,
which  became  situated  at  the  purchase  point  as  a  boundary  of  the  shopping  floor.  Such  a
configuration arranges the shopping floor  around predefined opening and closing times,  and so
invites people to become shoppers who qualculate (Cochoy 2008) or evaluate and choose items
without immediately paying for them. Qualculation is the calculative practice of the supermarket
made visible on the shopping floor. The practice is tied to the self checkout by the shopping basket
(which offer less qualculative space than the shopping cart, but is permitted in the self checkout
zone). I registered a second calculative practice, a mutual adjustment or calqulation (Cochoy 2008)
of movements arranged by people and things, in order to reciprocally adjust their positions while
queuing. By making calqulations, people in queues are screened from those people shopping or
doing qualculations on the shopping floor. The queues may be seen as a different chronotope than
the shopping floor; queues signal the duration of a waiting time that supermarkets can anticipate
and structure, but people may also align themselves into queues with unpredictable shapes. 
Queues stretching towards self checkout machines are entangled in the chronotope of the
purchase point, where the calculation of items takes place as an “express” self service practice. We
observed, however, how employees assist the purchase when shoppers have trouble dancing with
the machines, and noted how often employees put the machines out of service in order to extract
their  cash.  Supermarkets  profit  from people  using  self  checkouts  by recording their  purchases,
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profiling their preferences, and translating shoppers into well know customers. I followed Marina
and Liviu out of the supermarket, tracking the chronotopes that they unfolded around, through, and
away from the purchase point, a passage enfolded in the collective device called supermarket. This
path, tying shopping floors, queues, purchase points, and exit passages (four moments of movement
of supermarkets, knotted or configured to calculate profit margins and coordinate purchases), may
be further reconfigured on screen, by aligning shopping floors as websites, queues as deliveries, and
purchases as online payments, making it easier still to register people as customers. 
In chapter 7 I examined the enfoldings of screens during cash withdrawals, and emphasized
with  cuts  how  grasping  the  fortification  of  banking  services  with  automated  tellers  requires
recognising their exclusion of those acting away from the display, but who remain necessary in
order  for  bank  clients  to  get  their  cash  from  the  machine.  Pinpointing  the  enfoldings  of  the
alignments unfolded by the screens of automated tellers, I followed my friend Jess who made a cash
withdrawal  in  a  square,  along a  passage  enfolded by a  queue,  beside  a  building  nearby to  an
automated teller, and through the bank of the machine. I grasped the automated teller machine as a
mixture  of  a  counter  and a  strongroom that  supplies  and protects  cash.  The machine's  display
screens cash, it affords the withdrawal of funds from a client's account, and aligns the protection of
money secured by the bank. I traced these couplings of clients, machines, and money in the making
of cuts, or entanglements (Barad 2007), to the bank, tracking how people and cash are brought
together apart at the cash point. I described the cutting effects of the automated teller machine with
the figure of the pukara, as an arrangement that leaves the profits of banks out of sight. A topos of
the Inka fortress, pukaras signalled how concealing banking activities, with the walls and the booths
of ATMs, co-produces actions, apparatuses, and places (of resistance). I unpacked Luther Simjian's
Bankograph  from the  history  of  the  automated  teller,  to  illustrate  the  way  in  which  the  ATM
industry  introduced  this  cash  point  machine,  as  an  alternative  to  counters  staffed  with  human
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employees.
People  and money entangled  in  the  cash point  are  subject  to  movements  that  articulate
banking  services.  In  this  sense  I  tracked  how automated  tellers  screen  the  accounts  of  clients
persuaded by banks to identify themselves, through their affective engagements with the machine's
neoliberal optics (Hayward 2013). Examining the extension of this course of action, I attuned my
fingeryeyes to the spacing of automated tellers – the making of the space in which they take a place
in everyday life – and sketched with topological figures the enfolding of clients, machines, and
money while moving sideways. With Garfinkel and Livingstone (2003), we read the ATM queue as
an endogenously generated organization of an embodied spatial pattern. Recalling Cochoy's (2008)
concept of actions traced in relation to adjacent bodies (or calqulation), queues demonstrate a trace-
like pattern of filling up the queue by constantly making a line, cut by the gaps in between waiting
bodies.  With tori,  I  took note of queues  as enfoldings of bodies cut  together apart,  in order  to
account for how non-queuing people go through the queue's gaps, which are constitutive of the
enfolding. After queueing I reached into the fortification of automated tellers, the walls and  booths
that protect the cash point, including security props such as CCTV. These I noted by thinking with
spheres  how  concealing  automated  tellers  becomes  a  prosaic  activity,  that  also  articulates  the
trouble of passing by the cash point without being the client of a bank. Spheres helped me to stress
how passages to access cash points cut gaps in the protection of automated tellers.
The chiaroscuro of the automated teller, the ways in which these machines are made visible
that  also obscure,lures  people to  identify  themselves  as  bank clients.  Automated  tellers  display
accounts connected to databases of banks, and conceal what counts as fair banking – and for whom.
In this sense I noted how Jess enfolded the space to withdraw cash, a space that sometimes people
delimit by covering it with their own shoulders. Within this space another kind of cut took place: a
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mutual exchange of cash for personal information. This exchange was partly hidden by the display
of the automated teller – leaving out of sight how banks profit from people. I attended to this trade-
off as an algorithmic dance of the client and the machine, performed by looping, twisting, and so
withdrawing cash through a step-by-step procedure.  This loop-and-twist-like pattern at  the cash
point may be compared to Klein bottles, which I used to grasp how the automated teller touches
people daily. This moment of movement leaves no space to move sideways from the withdrawal.
We are caught in between lines of force, in a web of relations of an apparatus threaded with a line in
the centre, that links banks and automated tellers. 
I  considered  how detaching people  and cash  from automated  tellers  doesn't  necessarily
entail tampering with or destroying the cash point. It means rather to relocate it in conversations
about, and experiments in, making alternative currencies economic. In this sense I refigured Klein
bottles  as  encounters  of  clients,  machines,  and  money.  I  draw  them  in  a  projective  plane  or
speculative  horizon.  Automated  tellers  for  Bitcoin  served  as  an  example  of  this  conjectural
reconfiguration.  What  happens  when  what  is  concealed  becomes  visible,  when  trade  is  made
accountable in Blockchains, displaying a full payment pattern between peers, while leaving people's
identity hidden. I suggested that this opens circuits for cutting money differently; circuits that can
be fostered by moving sideways with automated tellers in order to approach cash points as a place
of resistance to the banking system.  
 The exit  passage is  the provisional  end of  this  study of  screens.  Exit  passages  are  the
moments of movement that bring temporary closure to the relational webs of screens, disconnecting
people and things from displays, moving them from one place to another.  They are the spatio-
temporal pathways through which people and things move away from screens. In this exit passage, I
reviewed  how  reconfiguring  practices,  agencies,  and  affects  with  screens  helps  to  resist  the
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extraction  of  values,  the  concentration  of  attention,  and  the  exploitation  of  people  and  things
touched  by  displays.  By  moving  sideways  I  juggled  with  the  moments  of  movement  around,
through, and away from the display of screens. This method is useful to study the embodiment of
screens and the materiality of screenness:  how screens display and conceal,  making people and
things  present,  manifestly  absent,  and  Other.  Moving  sideways  makes  accounts  of  screens  by
following how people and things approach them, but without simply giving an overview of the
action, or centring the attention on a single actor. Instead, moving sideways suggests that we study
screens laterally.  In this sense moving sideways implies engaging with the places of screens in
everyday life, in order to cultivate a kind of Bergsonian intuition or sympathy for things, that also
overlaps  with  the  radical  empiricism of  William James  (MacKenzie  2010:208).  Inquiring  into
screens in this way fosters an open-ended, contingent, and situated method to study their empirical
and material-semiotic relations. This engagement with screens can be taken further into encounters
within various other sociotechnical alignments, that I might also approach by moving sideways.
Bridges, tunnels, pipes, parks, stadiums, dams, highways, rails – what they align and how to learn to
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